Nine
Questions Exhibited, by the Deputies of the Synod, to Their Lordships the
Curators of the University of Leiden, for the Purpose of Obtaining an Answer to
each of them from the Professors of Divinity; and the Replies which James
Arminius Gave to them, in November, 1605. With Other Nine Opposite Questions.
QUESTION
#1 – ELECTION AND FAITH
Question #1 put
to Arminius
Which
is first, Election, or Faith Truly Foreseen, so that God elected his people
according to faith foreseen?
Arminius’ Reverse
Question in Response to Question #1
Is
the decree “for bestowing Faith on any one,” previous to that by which is
appointed “the Necessity of Faith to salvation?”
Arminius’
Answer to Question #1
The
equivocation in the word “Election,”
makes it impossible to answer this question in any other manner, than by
distinction. If therefore “Election” denotes “the decree which is according to
election concerning the justification and salvation of believers.” I say
Election is prior to Faith, as being that by which Faith is appointed as the
means of obtaining salvation. But if it signifies “the decree by which God
determines to bestow salvation on some one,” then Faith foreseen is prior to
Election. For as believers alone are saved, so only believers are predestinated
to salvation. But the Scriptures know no Election, by which God precisely and
absolutely has determined to save anyone without having first considered him as
a believer. For such an Election would be at variance with the decree by which
he hath determined to save none but believers.
QUESTION
#2 – THE AUTHOR OF SIN AND GOD’S ETERNAL DECREE
Question #2 Put
to Arminius
If
it be said, “that God, by his eternal decree, has determined and governs all things
and everything, even the depraved wills of men, to appointed good ends,” does
it follow from this, that God is the author of sin?
Arminius’ Reverse
Question in Response to Question #2
Is
“to determine or direct all things and everything, even the depraved wills of
men, to appointed good ends,” the same thing as “to determine that man be made
corrupt, by which a way may be opened for executing God’s absolute decree
concerning damning some men through wrath, and saving others through mercy?”
Arminius’
Answer to Question #2
Sin
is the transgression of the law; therefore, God will be the author of sin, if
He cause any man to transgress the law. This
is done by denying or taking away what is necessary for fulfilling the law, or
by impelling men to sin. But if this “determination” be that of a will which is
already depraved, since it does not signify the denying or the removing of
grace nor a corrupt impelling to sin, it follows, that the consequence of this
cannot be that God is the author of sin. But if this “determination” denote the
decree of God by which He resolved that the will should become depraved, and
that man should commit sin, then it follows from this that God is
the
author of sin.
QUESTION #3 – ORIGINAL SIN AND ETERNAL
DEATH
Question #3 Put
to Arminius
Does
original sin, of itself, render man obnoxious to eternal death, even without
the addition of any actual sin? Or is
the guilt of original sin taken away from all and every one by the benefits of
Christ the Mediator?
Arminius’ Reverse
Question in Response to Question #3
If
some men are condemned solely on account of the sin committed by Adam, and
others on account of their rejection of the Gospel, are there not two
peremptory decrees concerning the damnation of men, and two judgments, one
Legal, the other Evangelical?
Arminius’
Answer to Question #3
Those
things which in this question are placed in opposition to each other, easily
agree together. For original sin can render man obnoxious to eternal death, and
its guilt can be taken away from all men by Christ. Indeed, in order that guilt
may be removed, it is necessary that men be previously rendered guilty. But to
reply to each part separately: It is perversely said, that “original sin
renders a man obnoxious to death,” since that sin is the punishment of Adam’s
actual sin, which punishment is preceded by guilt, that is, an obligation to
the punishment denounced by the law. With regard to the second member of the
question, it is very easily answered by the distinction of the soliciting,
obtaining, and the application of the benefits of Christ. For as a
participation of Christ’s benefits consists in faith alone, it follows that, if
among these benefits “deliverance from this guilt” be one, believers only are
delivered from it, since they are those upon whom the wrath of God does not
abide.
QUESTION
#4 – SAVING GRACE AND THE WORKS OF THE REGENERATE
Question #4 Put
to Arminius
Are
the works of the unregenerate, which proceed from the powers of nature, so
pleasing to God, as to induce Him on account of them to confer supernatural and
saving grace on those who perform them?
Arminius’ Reverse
Question in Response to Question #4
Are
a serious consciousness of sin, and an initial fear so pleasing to God, that by
them He is induced to forgive sins, and to create a filial fear?
Arminius’
Answer to Question #4
Christ
says, “To him that hath shall be given, and from him that hath not shall be
taken away even that which he hath.” Not, indeed, because such is the
worthiness and the excellence of the use of any blessing conferred by God,
either according to nature or to grace, that God should be moved by its merits
to confer greater benefits; but, because such are the benignity and liberality
of God, that, though these works are unworthy, yet He rewards them with a
larger blessing. Therefore, as the word “pleasing” admits of two meanings, we
can reply to the question proposed in two ways -- either affirmatively, if that
word be viewed as signifying “to please,” “to find favour in his eyes,” and “to
obtain complacency for itself;” or negatively if “placeo” be received for that which it also signifies, “to please by
its own excellence.” Yet it might be said, that good works are rewarded, in a
moral view, not so much through the powers of nature, as by some operation in
them of the Holy Spirit.
QUESTION
#5 – SUFFICIENT GRACE AND THE REQUIREMENT OF FAITH IN FALLEN MAN
Question #5 Put
to Arminius
Can
God now, in his own right, require faith from fallen man in Christ, which he
cannot have of himself? But does God bestow on all and every one, to whom the
Gospel is preached, sufficient grace by which they may believe, if they
will?
Arminius’ Reverse
Question in Response to Question #5
Can
God require that man to believe in Jesus Christ, for whom He has determined by
an absolute decree that Christ should not die, and to whom by the same decree
He has determined to refuse the grace necessary for believing?
Arminius’
Answer to Question #5
The
parts of this question are not opposed to each other; on the contrary, they are
at the most perfect agreement. So that the latter clause may be considered the
rendering of a reason, why God may require from fallen man faith in Christ,
which he cannot have of himself. For God may require this, since he has determined
to bestow on man sufficient grace by which he may believe. Perhaps, therefore,
the question may be thus corrected: “Can God, now, in his own right, demand
from fallen man faith in Christ, which he cannot have of himself, though God
neither bestows on him, nor is ready to bestow, sufficient grace by which he
may believe?” This question will be answered by a direct negative. God cannot
by any right demand from fallen man faith in Christ, which he cannot have of
himself, except God has either bestowed, or is ready to bestow, sufficient
grace by which he may believe if he will. Nor do I perceive what is false in
that reply, or to what heresy it has affinity. It has no alliance with the
Pelagian heresy: for Pelagius maintained, that with the exception of the
preaching of the Gospel, no internal grace is required to produce faith in the
minds of men. But what is of more consequence, this reply is not opposed to St.
Augustine’s doctrine of Predestination; “yet this doctrine of his, we do not
account it necessary to establish,” as Innocent, the Roman Pontiff, has
observed.
QUESTION
#6 – JUSTIFYING FAITH
Question #6 Put
to Arminius
Is
justifying faith the effect and the mere gift of God alone, who calls,
illuminates, and reforms the will? and is it peculiar to the elect alone from
all eternity?
Arminius’ Reverse
Question in Response to Question #6
Can
that be called a mere gift which, though offered by the pure liberality of Him
who makes the offer, is still capable of being rejected by him to whom it is
offered? But does a voluntary acceptance render it unworthy of the name of a
gift? It may likewise be asked, “Is faith bestowed on these who are to be
saved? Or is salvation bestowed on those who have faith?” Or can both these
questions be answered affirmatively in a different respect? If they can, how is
it then that there is not in those decrees a circle, in which nothing is first
and nothing last?
Arminius’
Answer to Question #6
A
double question requires a double answer. (1.) To the first I reply, Faith is
the effect of God illuminating the mind and sealing the heart, and it is his
mere gift. (2.) To the second I answer, by making a distinction in the word Election. If it be understood as
signifying Election to salvation;
since this, according to the scriptures, is the election of believers, it
cannot be said, “Faith is bestowed on the elect, or on those who are to be
saved,” but that “believers are elected and saved.” But if it be received for the decree by which God determines variously
to administer the means necessary to salvation; in this sense I say that
Faith is the gift of God, which is conferred on those only whom He hath chosen
to this, that they may hear the word of God, and be made partakers of the Holy
Spirit.
QUESTION
#7 – ASSURANCE OF SALVATION
Question #7 Put
to Arminius
May
everyone who is a true believer be assured in this life of his individual
salvation; and is it his duty to have this assurance?
Arminius’ Reverse
Question in Response to Question #7
Does
justifying faith precede, in the order of nature, remission of sins, or does it
not? And can any man be bound to any other faith than that which
justifies?
Arminius’
Answer to Question #7
Since
God promises eternal life to all who believe in Christ, it is impossible for
him who believes, and who knows that he believes, to doubt of his own
salvation, unless he doubts of this willingness of God [to perform his
promise.] But God does not require him to be better assured of his individual
salvation as a duty which must be performed to himself or to Christ; but it is
a consequence of that promise, by which God engages to bestow eternal life on
him who believes.
QUESTION
8 – THE POSSIBLITY OF THE LOSS OF FAITH
Question #8 Put
to Arminius
May
true believers and elect persons entirely lose faith for a season?
Arminius’ Reverse
Question in Response to Question #8
May
any man who has faith and retains it, arrive at such a moment, as, if he were
then to die, he would be damned?
Arminius’
Answer to Question #8
Since
Election to salvation comprehends within its limits not only Faith, but
likewise perseverance in Faith; and since St. Augustine says, “God has chosen
to salvation those who he sees will afterwards believe by the aid of his
preventing or preceding grace, and who will persevere by the aid of his
subsequent or following grace;” believers
and the elect are not correctly taken
for the same persons. Omitting, therefore, all notice of the word “Election,” I
reply, believers are sometimes so circumstanced, as not to produce, for a
season, any effect of true faith, not even the actual apprehension of grace and
the promises of God, nor confidence or trust in God and Christ; yet this is the
very thing which is necessary to obtain salvation. But the apostle says,
concerning faith, in reference to its being a quality and a capability of
believing, “some, having cast away a good conscience concerning faith, have
made shipwreck.”
QUESTION
#9 – THE PERFECTION OF BELIEVERS
Question #9 Put
to Arminius
Can
believers under the grace of the New Covenant, perfectly observe the law of God
in this life?
Arminius’ Reverse
Question in Response to Question #9
May
God, or may He not, require of those who are partakers of the New Covenant,
that the flesh do not lust against the Spirit, as a duty corresponding with the
grace of that covenant?
Arminius’
Answer to Question #9
The
performance of the law is to be estimated according to the mind of Him who
requires it to be observed. The answer will be two-fold, since He either wills
it to be rigidly observed in the highest degree of perfection, or only
according to epieikeian clemency;
that is, if he require this according to clemency, and if the strength or
powers which he confers be proportionate to the demand. (1.) Man cannot
perfectly perform such a law of God, if it be considered as to be performed
according to rigor. (2.) But if he require it according to clemency, and if the
powers conferred be proportionate, (which must be acknowledged, since He
requires it according to the evangelical covenant,) the answer is, it can be
perfectly observed. But the question about capability is not of such great
importance, “provided a man confesses that it is possible to be done by the
grace of Christ,” as St. Augustine justly observes.
Arminius’
Remarks on the Preceding Questions and on those Opposed to them
In
reply to some queries which [John] Uitenbogaert had addressed to Arminius,
concerning these nine questions and their opposites, the latter gave his friend
the following explanation, in a letter dated the 31st of January, 1606,
“In
answer to the First Question, this
is the order of the decrees.
(1.)
It is my will to save believers.
(2.)
On this man I will bestow faith and preserve him in it.
(3.)
I will save this man.
For
thus does the first of these decrees prescribe, which must necessarily be
placed foremost; because, without this, faith is not necessary to salvation,
and therefore no necessity exists to administer the means for faith. But to
this is directly opposed the opinion which asserts, that faith is bestowed on
him on whom God had previously willed to bestow salvation. For, in this case,
it would be his will to save one who did not believe. All that has been said
about the difference of the decree and its execution, is futile; as if, in fact,
God willed salvation to any one prior to faith, and yet not to bestow salvation
on any others than believers. For, beside the consistent agreement of these,
[the decree and its execution,] it is certain that God cannot will to bestow
that which, on account of his previous decree, He cannot bestow. As therefore
faith is, in a general manner, placed before salvation by the first decree; so
it must, specially and particularly, be placed before the salvation of this and
that man, even in the special decree which has the subsequent execution.
“To
the Third Question I shall in
preference oppose the following: Has God determined peremptorily to act with
some men according to the strict rigor of the law, as He did with the fallen
angels, and to act with others according to the grace of the Gospel? If they
deny this, I have what I wish. But if they affirm it, such a sentiment must be
overwhelmed with absurdities; because in such a case God would have acted
towards many men with greater severity, than towards the fallen angels, who, as
being creatures purely spiritual, each sinned of himself, through his own
wickedness without persuasion from any one.
“They
will not be able to deny my Fourth
opposite Question. For remission is promised to those who confess their sins;
and the fear is called initial in reference to the filial fear which follows.
If they acknowledge it, but say, ‘Yet God is not induced by them;’ I will then
command them to erase the same word out of their interrogatory, and in a better
form to enunciate their own opinion.
“They
will not consider it their duty entirely to deny my Fifth opposing Question. If they affirm it, they will declare a
falsehood, and will incur the ill opinion of all prudent persons, even of those
who are weak. Let them therefore search out what they may place as an
intermediate postulate between theirs and mine, and I will then show that it
coincides either with their postulate or with mine.
“I
have placed two questions in opposition to the Sixth, because their question is also a double one. On the First of
them you require no observation. About the Second I have said, for the sake of
explanation, ‘that it is a circle, in which nothing is first and nothing last,’
but in every part of it a beginning and an end are found -- which cannot,
without absurdity, have place in the decrees of God. I ask, has God determined
to bestow salvation on those who believe, or to bestow faith on those who are
to be saved? If both of these be asserted, I ask, which of them is the first,
and which the last? They will reply, neither; and it is then a circle. If they
affirm the latter, that God has determined to bestow faith on those who are to
be saved; I will prove, that He has determined to bestow salvation on those who
believe, and shall then have formed a circle, notwithstanding their
unwillingness. If they adduce the different respect, I will endeavour to
confute it; which cannot be a work of much difficulty in so very plain a
matter.
“In
the Seventh opposite Question, I had
regard to the expression, is it his duty? for about its possibility there is no
contention. But justifying faith is not that by which I believe that my sins
are remitted; for thus the same thing will be the object and the effect of
justifying faith. By this [justifying faith] I obtain remission of sins,
therefore it precedes the other object; [the remission of sins;] and no one can
believe that his sins are remitted, unless he knows that he believes by a
justifying faith. For this reason, also, no one can believe that his future
sins will likewise be remitted, unless he knows that he will believe to the
end. For sins are forgiven to him who believes, and only after they have been
committed; wherefore the promise of forgiveness, which is that of the New
Testament, must be considered as depending on a condition stipulated by God,
that is FAITH, without which there is no covenant.
“With
respect to the Eighth Question, let
a distinction be made between Faith as it is a quality or habit, and between
the same as it is an art. Actual believing justifies, or the act of believing
is imputed for righteousness. Because God requires actual faith; for our
capability to perform which, He infuses that which is habitual. Therefore, as
actual faith does not consist with moral sin, he who falls into mortal sin may
be damned. But it is possible for a believer to fall into mortal sin, of which
David is seen as an instance Therefore, he may fall at such a moment as, if he
were then to die, he would be damned. ‘If our heart condemn us not, then have
we confidence toward God.’ Therefore, if it does condemn us, we have no
confidence, we cannot have any; because ‘God is greater than our heart, and
knows all things.’ What is said about the impossibility of this event, because,
God has determined not to take such persons out of the world at that moment,
conduces nothing in favour of their hypothesis. For this is opposed to final
destruction, not to temporary, and to their total destruction for a season,
which is the subject of their Eighth Question.
“If
it be replied to my Ninth opposing Question, that, in the covenant of
grace, God requires a duty which is impossible to man; they will be forced to
confess, that, in addition to this covenant, another is necessary, according to
which God pardons a duty not performed according to that covenant of grace; as
it was necessary that there should be another covenant, by which God might
pardon a duty not performed according to the legal covenant. And thus shall we
proceed on ad infinitum. At length we
must arrive at the point from which we can say, God save sinners, of his
infinite mercy, which is limited by no conditions prescribed by his equity.
This seems to be an expression which will be entirely conformable to the whole
doctrine of those who urge absolute predestination, For, since wrath and mercy
are opposed to each other, as wrath is infinite, may not mercy too, be
infinite? According to their doctrine, whatever they oppose to the contrary,
wrath makes men sinners, that it may have those whom it can punish. But they
expressly say, mercy makes men believers by an omnipotent force, and preserves
them from the possibility of falling, that it may have those whom it can save.
But, as Nicasius Van der Schuer says, if God could make a sinner, that He might
have one whom He could punish; He could also punish without sin; therefore He
could likewise mercifully save without faith. And as Wrath willed to have a
just title for damnation, through the intervention of sin, so it became Mercy
to save, without the intervention of any duty, that it might be manifest that
the whole is of mercy without the semblance of justice. I say, without the
semblance of justice; because it begets faith by an irresistible force, and by
an irresistible force it causes man to continue in faith to the end, and thus
necessarily to be saved, according to the decree, he that believes and
perseveres, shall be saved This being laid down, all equity is excluded, as
well from the decree of predestination to salvation, as from that of
predestination to death. These objections, I am conscientiously of opinion,
may, without calumny, be made to their sentiments; and I am prepared to
maintain this very thing against any patron whatsoever of those sentiments. For
they do not extricate themselves when they say, that man spontaneously sins,
and believes by a spontaneous motion. For that which is spontaneous, and that
which is natural, are not in opposition. And that which is spontaneous
coincides with that which is absolutely necessary; as, a stone is moved downwards;
a beast eats, and propagates its species; man loves that which is good for
himself. But all excuses terminate in this spontaneous matter.”
