ARTICLE
XXI (I.)
It
is a new, heretical and Sabellian mode of speaking, nay, it is blasphemous, to
say “that the Son of God is autoqeon
(very God,)” for the Father alone is very God, but not the Son of the Holy
Spirit.
ANSWER
Most
of those persons who are acquainted with me at all, know with what deep fear,
and with what conscientious solicitude, I treat that sublime doctrine of a
Trinity of Persons. The whole manner of my teaching demonstrates, that when I
am explaining this article I take no delight either in inventing new phrases, that
are unknown to Scripture and to orthodox antiquity, or in employing such as
have been fabricated by others. All my auditors too will testify, how willingly
I bear with those who adopt a different mode of speaking from my own, provided
they intend to convey a sound meaning. These things I premise, lest anyone
should suppose, that I had sought to stir up a controversy about this word,
with other persons who had employed it.
But
when, in the course of a particular disputation, a certain young man with much
pertinacity and assurance defended not only the word itself, but likewise that
meaning which I believe and know to be contrary to all antiquity, as well as to
the truth of the Scriptures, and was not backward in expressing his serious
disapproval of the more orthodox opinions; I was compelled to explain what were
my sentiments about the word and its meaning.
I
said that the word is not contained in the Scriptures; yet, because it had been
used by the orthodox, both by Epiphanius, (Heres. 69,) and by some divines in
our days, I do not reject it, provided it be correctly received.
But
it may be received in a twofold signification, according to the etymon of the
word; and may mean, either one who is truly and in himself God, or one who is
God from himself. In the former signification, I said, the word might be
tolerated; but in the latter, it was in opposition to the Scriptures and to
orthodox antiquity.
When
the opponent still urged, that he received the word in this last sense, and
that Christ was indeed autoqeon that
is,. God from himself, who has in reality an essence in common with the Father,
but not communicated by the Father; and when he asserted this with the greater
boldness, because he knew that in this opinion he had Trelactrius of pious memory
agreeing with him, from whose instructions he appeared to have derived his
ideas on the subject; I said that this opinion was a novel one, which was never
heard of by the ancients, and unknown both to the Greek and Latin Fathers; and
that, when rigidly examined, it would be found to be heretical, and nearly
allied to the opinion of Sabellius, which was, that the Father and the Son are
not distinct persons, but one person called by different names. I added, that,
from this opinion, the entirely opposite heresy might likewise be deduced,
which is, that the, Son and the Father are two different persons, and two
collateral gods; this is blasphemous. I proved my remarks by the following
brief arguments: FIRST. It is the property of the person of the Father, to have
his being from himself, or, which is a better phrase, to have his being from no
one. But the Son is now said to have his being from himself, or rather, from no
one: therefore, the Son is the Father; which is Sabellianism. SECONDLY. If the
Son have an essence in common with the Father, but not communicated by the
Father, he is collateral with the Father, and, therefore, they are two gods.
Whereas, all antiquity defended the unity, the Divine essence in three distinct
persons, and placed a salvo on it by this single explanation, “that the Son has
the same essence directly, which is communicated to him by the Father; but that
the Holy Spirit has the very same essence from the Father and the Son.”
This
is the explanation which I adduced at that time, and in the maintenance of
which I still persist: and I affirm, that in this opinion I have the Scriptures
agreeing with me, as well as the whole of antiquity, both of the Greek and the
Latin churches. It is therefore most wonderful, that our brethren have dared to
charge this upon me as an erroneous sentiment. Yet, in doing this, they do not
act with sincerity, since they do not explain the word autoqeon by removing its ambiguity; which they undoubtedly ought to
have done, lest any person should suppose that I denied the Son to be in every
sense, and therefore that he is not very and true God. This they ought the more
particularly to have done, because they know that I have always made a
distinction between these significations, and have admitted one of them, but
rejected the other.
Since
the matter really stands thus, I might simply accuse this article of making a
false charge; because in a certain sense I confess the son to be autoqeon also the Holy Spirit, and not
the Father alone. But, for the sake of justifying this phrase and opinion, the
framers of it declare, “When it is said, the Son is God from himself, then the
phrase must be received in this sense, the essence which the Son has, is from
himself, that is, from no one. For the Son is to be considered as he is God,
and as he is the Son. As God, he has his being from himself. As the Son, he has
it from the Father. Or two things are to be subjects of consideration in the
Son, his essence and his relation. According to his essence, the Son is from no
one or from himself. According to his relation, he is from the Father.”
But
I answer, FIRST. This mode of explanation cannot, except by an impropriety of
speech, excuse him who says, “the Son has indeed an essence in common with the
Father, but not communicated.”
SECONDLY.
“The essence, which the Son has, is from no one,” is not tantamount to the
phrase, “the Son, who has an essence, is from no one.” For, “Son” is the name
of a person that has relation to a Father, and therefore without that relation
it cannot become a subject either of definition or of consideration. But “Essence”
is something absolute: and these two are so circumstanced between themselves,
that “essence” does not enter into the definition of “Son,” except indirectly,
thus, “he is the Son, who has the Divine essence communicated to him by the
Father;” which amounts to this, “he is the Son, who is begotten of the Father.”
For, to beget, is to communicate his essence.
THIRDLY.
These two respects in which He is God and in which He is the Son, have not the
same affection or relation between each other, as these two have, “to exist
from himself or from no one,” and “to exist from the Father,” or “to have his
essence from himself,” or “from no one,” and “to have it from the Father:”
which I demonstrate thus by two most evident arguments. (1.) “God” and “the Son”
are consentaneous and subordinate: for the Son is God. But “to derive his being
from no one” and “to derive it from another,” “to have his essence from no one,”
and “to have it from another,” are opposites, and cannot be spoken about the
same person. In the comparison which they institute, those things which ought
to be collated together are not properly compared, nor are they opposed to each
of their parallels and classes or affinities. For a double ternary must here
come under consideration, which is this:
HE
IS GOD: -- HE IS THE FATHER: -- HE IS THE SON:
He
has the Divine essence,: He has it from no one,: He has it from the
Father:
These
are affinities and parallels. (1.) “He is God,” and “has the Divine essence.”
(2.) “He is the Father,” and, “has the Divine essence from no one.” (3.) “He is
the Son,” and, “has the Divine essence from the Father.”
But,
by the comparison which our objectors institute in their explanation, these
things will be laid down as parallels. “He is God,” and “has his essence from
no one.” If this comparison be correctly formed, then either the Father alone
is God, or there are three collateral Gods. But far be it from me to charge
with such a sentiment as this those who say, “the Son is autoqeon that is, God from himself.” For I know that they
occasionally explain themselves in a modified manner. But their explanation
does not agree with the phraseology which they employ. For this reason Beza
excuses Calvin, and openly confesses “that he had not with sufficient
strictness observed the difference between these particles a se and per se.”
I
have stated only what follow as consequences from these phrases, and from the
opinion which agrees with them; and I have therefore said, that people must
refrain from the use of such phraseology. I abstain from proofs, multitudes of
which I could bring from the Scriptures and the Fathers; and if necessity
require, I will immediately produce them: for I have had them many years in
readiness.
GOD
is from eternity, having the Divine Essence.
THE
FATHER is from no one, having the Divine Essence from no one, which others say
is “from himself.”
THE
SON is from the Father, having the Divine Essence from the Father.
This
is a true parallelism, and one which, if in any manner it be inverted or
transposed, will be converted into a heresy. So that I wonder much, how our
brethren could consider it proper to make any mention of this matter; from
which they would with far more correctness and prudence have abstained, if,
while meditating upon it, they had weighed it in equal balances.
ARTICLE
XXII (II.)
It
is the summit of blasphemy to say, that God is freely good.
ANSWER
In
this article likewise, our brethren disclose their own disgraceful proceedings,
which I would gladly allow to remain buried in oblivion. But, because they
recall this affair to my recollection, I will now relate how it occurred.
In
a disputation, it was asked, “can necessity and liberty be so far reconciled to
each other, that a person may be said necessarily or freely to produce one and
the same effect?” These words being used properly according to their respective
strict definitions, which are here subjoined. “An agent acts necessarily, who,
when all the requisites for action are laid down, cannot do otherwise than act,
or cannot suspend his acting. An agent acts freely, who, when all the
requisites for action are laid down, can refrain from beginning to act, or can
suspend his acting,” I declared, “that the two terms could not meet in one
subject.” Other persons said, “that they could,” evidently for the purpose of
confirming the dogma which asserts, “Adam sinned freely indeed, and yet
necessarily. FREELY, with respect to himself and according to his nature:
NECESSARILY, with respect to the decree of God.”
Of
this their explanation I did not admit, but said necessarily and freely differ
not in respects, but in their entire essences, as do necessity and contingency,
or what is necessary and what is contingent, which, because they divide the
whole amplitude of being, cannot possibly coincide together, more than can
finite and infinite. But Liberty appertains to Contingency.
To
disprove this my opinion, they brought forward an instance, or example, in
which Necessity and Liberty met together; and that was God, who is both
necessarily and freely good. This assertion of theirs displeased me so
exceedingly, as to cause me to say, that it was not far removed from blasphemy.
At this time, I entertain a similar opinion about it; and in a few words I thus
prove its falsity, absurdity, and the blasphemy [contained] in the falsity.
(1.)
Its falsity. He who
by natural necessity, and according to his very essence and the whole of his
nature, is good, nay, who is Goodness itself, the Supreme Good, the First Good
from whom all good proceeds, through whom every good comes, in whom every good
exists, and by a participation of whom what things soever have any portion of
good in them are good, and more or less good as they are nearer or more remote
from it. He is not FREELY good. For it is a contradiction in an adjunct, or an
opposition in an apposition. But God is good by natural necessity, according to
his entire nature and essence, and is Goodness itself, the supreme and primary
Good, from whom, through whom: and in whom is all good, &c. Therefore, God
is not freely good.
(2.)
Its absurdity.
Liberty is an affection of the Divine Will; not of the Divine Essence,
Understanding, or Power; and therefore it is not an affection of the Divine
Nature, considered in its totality. It is indeed an effect of the will,
according to which it is borne towards an object that is neither primary nor
adequate, and that is different from God himself; and this effect of the will,
therefore, is posterior in order to that affection of the will according to
which God is borne towards a proper, primary and adequate object, which is
himself. But Goodness is an affection of the whole of the Divine Nature,
Essence, Life, Understanding, Will, Power, &c. Therefore, God is not freely
good; that is, he is not good by the mode of liberty, but by that of natural
necessity. I add, that it cannot be affirmed of anything in the nature of
things, that it is freely, or that it is this or that freely, not even then
when man was made what he is, by actions proceeding from free will: as no man
is said to be “freely learned,” although he has obtained erudition for himself
by study which proceeded from free will.
(3.)
I prove that
blasphemy is contained in this assertion: because, if God be freely good, (that
is, not by nature and natural necessity,) he can be or can be made not good. As
whatever anyone wills freely, he has it in his power not to will; and whatever anyone
does freely, he can refrain from doing. Consider the dispute between the
ancient Fathers and Eunomius and his followers, who endeavoured to prove that
the Son was not eternally begotten of the Father, because the Father had
neither willingly nor unwillingly begotten the Son. But the answer given to
them by Cyril, Basil, and others, was this: “The Father was neither willing nor
unwilling; that is, He begat the Son not by will, but by nature. The act of
generation is not from the Divine Will, but from the Divine nature.” If they
say, “God may also be said to be freely good, because He is not good by
co-action or force:” I reply, not only is co-action repugnant to liberty, but
nature is likewise; and each of them, nature and co-action, constitutes an
entire, total and sufficient cause for the exclusion of liberty. Nor does it
follow, “co-action does not exclude liberty from this thing; therefore, it is
freely that which it actually is. A stone does not fall downwards by co-action;
it, therefore, falls by liberty. Man wills not his own salvation by force,
therefore, he wills it freely.” Such objections as these are unworthy to be
produced by MEN; and in the refutation of them shall I expend my time and
leisure, Thus, therefore, the Christian Fathers justly attached blasphemy to
those who said, “the Father begat the Son willingly, or by his own will;”
because from this it would follow, that the Son had an origin similar to that
of the creatures. But with how much greater equity does blasphemy fasten itself
upon those who declare, “that God is freely good? For if he be freely good, he
likewise freely knows and loves himself, and besides does all things freely,
even when He begets the Son and breathes forth the Holy Spirit.
ARTICLE
XXIII (III.)
It
frequently happens that a creature who is not entirely hardened in evil, is
unwilling to perform an action because it is joined with sin; unless when
certain arguments and occasions are presented to him, which act as incitements
to its commission. The management of this presentation, also, is in the hand of
the providence of God, who presents these incitements, that he may accomplish
his own work by the act of the creature.
ANSWER
Unless
certain persons were under the excitement of a licentious appetite for carping
at those things which proceed from me, they would undoubtedly never have
persuaded themselves to create any trouble about this matter. Yet, I would
pardon them this act of officiousness, as the rigid and severe examiners of
truth, provided they would sincerely and without calumny relate those things
which I have actually spoken or written; that is, that they would not corrupt
or falsify my sayings, either by adding to or diminishing from them, by
changing them or giving them a perverted interpretation. But some men seem to
have been so long accustomed to slander, that, even when they can be openly
convicted of it, still they are not afraid of hurling it against an innocent
person. Of this fact, they afford a luminous example in the present article.
For those things which I advanced in the Theses, On the Efficacy and
Righteousness of the Providence of God concerning evil, and which were disputed
in the month of May, 1605, are here quoted, but in a mutilated manner, and with
the omission of those things which are capable of powerfully vindicating the whole
from the attacks of slander. The following are the words which I employed in
the fifteenth thesis of that disputation.
“But
since an act, though it be permitted to the ability and the will of the
creature, may yet be taken away from his actual power or legislation; and
since, therefore, it will very frequently happen, that a creature, who is not
entirely hardened in evil, is unwilling to perform an act because it is
connected with sin, unless when some arguments and occasions are presented to
him, which resemble incitements to its commission. The management of this
presenting (of arguments and occasions) is also in the hand of the Providence
of God, who presents these incitements, both that He may fully try whether the
creature be willing to refrain from sinning, even when urged on, or provoked,
by incitements; because the praise of abstaining from sin is very slight, in
the absence of such provocatives; and that, if the creature wills to yield to
these incitements, God may effect his own work by the act of the creature.”
These
are my words from which the brethren have extracted what seemed suitable for
establishing the slander, but have omitted and quite taken away those things
which, in the most manifest manner, betray and confute the calumny. For I laid
down two ends of that administration by which God manages the arguments,
occasions, incitements, and irritatives to commit that act which is joined with
sin. And these two ends were neither collateral, that is, not equally intended;
nor were they connected together by a close conjunction. The FIRST of them,
which is the exploration or trial of his creature, God primarily, properly, and
of himself intends. But the LATTER, which is, that God may effect his own work
by the act of the creature, is not intended by God, except after he has
foreseen that his Creature will not resist these incitements, but will yield to
them, and that of his own free will, in opposition to the command of God, which
it was his duty and within his power to follow, after having rejected and
refused those allurements and incitements of arguments and occasions. But this
article of theirs propounds my words in such a way, as if I had made God to
intend this last end only and of itself, omitting entirely the first; and thus
omitting the previous condition under which God intends this second end through
the act of his creature, that is, when it is the will of the creature to yield
to these incitements.
This
calumny, therefore, is two-fold, and evidently invented for the purpose of drawing
a conclusion from these, my words -- that I have in them represented God as the
author of sin. A certain person, having lately quoted my expressions in a
public discourse, was not afraid of drawing from them this conclusion. But this
was purely through calumny, as I will now prove with the utmost brevity.
The
reason by which it can be concluded, from the words that have been quoted in
this article from my Thesis, “that God is the author of the sin which is
committed by the creature,” when God incites him by arguments and occasions, is
universally, three-fold:
The
FIRST is, that God absolutely intends to effect his own work by the act of the
creature, which act cannot be performed by the creature without sin. This is
resolvable into two absolute intentions of God, of which the first is that by
which he absolutely intends to effect this, his work; and the second, that by
which he absolutely intends to effect this work in no other way, than by such
an act of a creature as cannot be done by that creature without sin.
The
SECOND REASON IS, that the creature being invited by the presenting of these
allurements and provocatives to commit that act, cannot do otherwise than
commit it; that is, such an excitation being laid down, the creature cannot
suspend that act by which God intends to erect his work, otherwise God might be
frustrated of his intention: Hence arises
The
THIRD REASON which has its origin in these two -- that God intends by these
incentives to move the creature to perform an act which is joined to sin, that
is, to move him to the commission of sin.
All
these things seem, with some semblance of probability, to be drawn as
conclusions from the words thus placed, as they are quoted in this their
article, because it is represented as the sole and absolute end of this
administration and presenting-that God effects his work by the act of the
creature. But those words which I have inserted, and which they have omitted,
meet these three reasons, and in the most solid manner, confute the whole objection
which rests upon them.
- My own words meet the FIRST
of these reasons thus: For they deny that God absolutely intends to effect
his own work by the act of the creature; because they say that God did not
intend to employ the act of the creature to complete his work, before he
foresaw that the creature would yield to those incitements, that is, would
not resist them.
- They meet the SECOND by
denying that, after assigning this presentation of incitements, the
creature is unable to suspend his act; since they say, likewise, that, if
it be the will of the creature to yield to these incitements, then God
effects his own work by the act of the creature. What does this mean if it
be his will to yield? Is not the freedom of the will openly denoted, by
which, when this presenting of arguments and occasions is laid down, the
will can yet refuse to yield,
- They also meet the THIRD:
For they deny that God intends by those incitements to move the creature
to the commission of an act which is joined to sin, that is, to commit
sin, because they say, that God intends the trial of his creature, whether
he will obey God even after having been irritated by these incitements.
And when God saw that the creature preferred to yield to these
incitements, rather than to obey him, then he intended, not the act of the
creature, for that is unnecessary; because, his intention being now to
try, he obtains the issue of the act performed by the will of the
creature. But God intended to effect his own work by an act founded on the
will and the culpability of the creature.
It
is apparent, therefore, that these words which my brethren have omitted, most
manifestly refute the calumny, and in the strongest manner solve the objection.
This I will likewise point out in another method, that the whole iniquity of
this objection may be rendered quite obvious.
That
man who says, “God tries his creature by arguments and occasions of sinning,
whether he will obey him even after he has been stirred up by incitements,”
openly declares that it is in the power of the creature to resist these
incitements, and not to sin: otherwise, this [act of God] would be, not a trial
of obedience, but a casting down, and an impelling to necessary disobedience.
Then, the man who says -- “God, by these provocatives and incitements, tries
the obedience of his creature,” intimates by these expressions, that those
occasions and arguments which are presented by God when he intends to try, are
not incitements and irritations to sin, through the end and aim of God. But
they are incitements, first, by capability according to the inclination of the
creature who can be incited by them to commit an act connected with sin. They
are also incitements, secondly, in their issue, because the creature has been
induced by them to sin, but by his own fault; for it was his duty, and in his
power, to resist this inclination, and to neglect and despise these
incitements.
It
is wonderful, therefore, and most wonderful indeed, that any man, at all expert
in theological matters, should have ventured to fabricate from my words this
calumny against me. Against me, I say, who dare not accede to some of the
sentiments and dogmas of my brethren, as they well know, for this sole reason
-- because I consider it flows from them that God is the author of sin. And I
cannot accede to them on this account -- because I think my brethren teach
those things from which I can conclude by good and certain consequence, that
God absolutely intends the sin of his creature, and thence, that he so
administers all things, as, when this administration is laid down, man
necessarily sins, and cannot, in the act itself, and in reality, omit the act
of sin. If they show that the things which I say, do not follow from their
sentiments, on this account at least, I shall not suffer myself to be moved by
their consent in them. Let the entire theses be read, and it will be evident
how solicitously I have guarded against saying anything, from which by the most
distant probability, this blasphemy might be deduced; and yet, at the same
time, I have been careful to subtract from the providence of God nothing,
which, according to the Scriptures, ought to be ascribed to it. But I scarcely
think it necessary, for me now to prove at great length, that the fact of God’s
providential efficacy respecting evil is exactly as I have taught in those
words; especially after I have premised this explanation. I will, however, do
this in a very brief manner.
Eve
was not only “a creature not entirely hardened in evil,” but she was not at all
evil; and she willed to abstain from eating the forbidden fruit because “it was
connected with sin,” as is apparent from the answer which she gave to the
serpent: “God has, said, You shall not eat of it.” Her compliance with this
command was easy, in the midst of such an abundance of fruit; and the trial of
her obedience would have been very small, if she had been solicited with no
other argument by the tempter. It happened, therefore, that, in addition to
this, the serpent presented to Eve an argument of persuasion, by which he might
stimulate her to eat, saying, “Ye shall not surely die, but ye shall be as
gods.” This argument, according to the intention of the serpent, was an
incitement to commit sin: Without it, the serpent perceived, she would not be moved
to eat, because he had heard her expressing her will to abstain from the act
because it was “connected with sin.”
I
ask now, Is the whole management of this temptation to be ascribed to God, or
not? If they say, “It must not be attributed to him,” they offend against
Providence, the Scriptures, and the opinion of all our divines. If they confess
that it should be ascribed to him, they grant what I have said. But what was
the end of this management? An experiment, or trial, whether Eve, when solicited
by arguments, and stimulated by Satan, would resolve to refrain from an act,
that she might obtain from her Lord and Creator, the praise of obedience. The
instance of Joseph’s brethren, which is quoted in the fifteenth thesis of my
ninth public disputation, proves this in the plainest manner, as I have shown
in that thesis.
Let
the case of Absalom be inspected, who committed incest with his father’s
concubines. Was not this the occasion of perpetrating that act -- God gave his
father’s concubines into his hands, that is, he permitted them to his power.
Was not the argument inducing him to commit that act, from which nature is
abhorrent, furnished by the advice of Ahithophel, whose counsels were
considered as oracles? (2 Sam. 16:20-23.) Without doubt, these are the real
facts of the case. But that God himself managed the whole of this affair,
appears from the Scripture, which says that God did it. (2 Sam. 12:11-12.)
Examine
what God says in Deut. 13:1-3, “You shall not obey the words of that prophet, who
persuades you to worship other gods, although he may have given you a sign or a
wonder which may have actually come to pass? Is not the diction of “the sign,”
[by this false prophet,] when confirmed by the event itself, an argument which
may gain credit for him? And is not the credit, thus obtained, an incitement,
or an argument to effect a full persuasion of that which this prophet
persuaded? And what necessity is there for arguments, incitements and
incentives, if a rational creature has such a propensity to the act, which
cannot be committed without sin, that he wills to commit it without any
argument whatsoever, Under such circumstances, the grand tempter will cease
from his useless labour. But because the tempter knows, that the creature is
unwilling to commit this act, unless he be incited by arguments, and
opportunities be offered, he brings forward all that he can of incentives to
allure the creature to sin. God, however, presides over all these things, and
by his Providence administers the whole of them, but to an end far different
from that to which the tempter directs them. For God manages them, in the first
place, for the trial of his creatures, and, afterwards, (if it be the will of
the creature to yield,) for Himself to effect something by that act.
If
any think, that there is something reprehensible in this view, let them so
circumscribe the right and the capability of God, as to suppose Him unable to
try the obedience of his creature by any other method, than by creating that in
which sin can be committed, and from which He commanded him by a law to
abstain. But if He can try the obedience of his creature by some other method
than this, let these persons show us what that method is beside the presenting
of arguments and occasions, and why God uses the former method more than the
preceding one which I have mentioned. Is it not because he perceives, that the
creature will not, by the former, be equally strongly solicited to evil, and
that therefore it is a trivial matter to abstain from sin, to the commission of
which he is not instigated by any other incentives?
Let
the history of Job be well considered, whose patience God tried in such a
variety of ways, and to whom were presented so many incitements to sin against
God by impatience; and the whole of this matter will very evidently appear. God
said to Satan; “Have you considered my servant Job, a perfect and an upright
man, one that fears God and departs from evil,.” Satan answered the Lord and said: “What wonder
is there in this, since you have so abundantly blessed him. But try him now by
afflictions.” And the Lord said unto Satan: “Behold, all that he has is in your
power. Only upon himself do not put forth your hand.” What other meaning have
these words than, “Behold, incite him to curse me! I grant you permission,
since you think small praise is due to that man who abounds with blessings, and
yet fears me. Satan did what he was permitted, and produced none of the
effects; [which he had prognosticated]; so that God said, “Job still holds fast
his integrity, although you moved me against him.” (2:3.) This trial being
finished, when Satan asked permission to employ against him greater incentives
to sin, he obtained his request; and, after all, effected nothing. Therefore
God was glorified in the patience of Job, to the confusion of Satan.
I
suppose these remarks will be sufficient to free the words of my Theses from
all calumny and from sinister and unjust interpretations. When I have
ascertained the arguments which our brethren employ to convict these words of
error, I will endeavour to confute them; or if I cannot do this, I will field
to what may then be deemed the truth.
ARTICLE
XXIV (IV.)
The
Righteousness of Christ is not imputed to us for Righteousness; but to believe
[or the act of believing] justifies us.
ANSWER
I
do not know what I can most admire in this article -- the unskillfulness, the
malice, or the supine negligence of those who have been its fabricators! (1.)
Their NEGLIGENCE is apparent in this, that they do not care how and in what
words they enunciate the sentiments which they attribute to me; neither do they
give themselves any trouble to know what my sentiments are, which yet they are
desirous to reprehend. (2.) Their UNSKILLFULNESS. Because they do not distinguish
the things which ought to be distinguished, and they oppose those things which
ought not to be opposed. (3.) The MALICE is evident, because they attribute to
me those things which I have neither thought nor spoken; or because they
involve matters in such a way as to give that which was correctly spoken the
appearance of having been uttered in perverseness, that they may discover some
grounds for calumny. But, to come to the affair itself.
Though
in this article there seem to be only two distinct enunciations, yet in potency
they are three, which must also be separated from each other to render the
matter intelligible. The FIRST is, “the righteousness of Christ is imputed to
us.” SECOND, “the righteousness of Christ is imputed for righteousness.” THIRD,
“the act of believing is imputed for righteousness.” For thus ought they to
have spoken, if their purpose was correctly to retain my words; because the
expression, “justifies us,” is of wider acceptation than, “is imputed for
righteousness.” For God justifies, and it is not imputed for righteousness.
Christ, “the righteous servant of God, justifies many by his knowledge.” But
that by which He thus does this, is not “imputed for righteousness.”
- With regard to the FIRST. I
never said, “the righteousness of Christ is not imputed to us.” Nay, I
asserted the contrary in my Nineteenth Public Disputation on
Justification, Thesis 10. “The righteousness by which we are justified
before God may in an accommodated sense be called imputative, as being
righteousness either in the gracious estimation of God, since it does not
according to the rigor of right or of law merit that appellation, or as
being the righteousness of another, that is, of Christ, it is made ours by
the gracious imputation of God.” I have, it is true, placed these two in
alternation. By this very thing I declare, that I do not disapprove of
that phrase. “The righteousness of Christ is imputed to us, because it is
made ours by the gracious estimation of God,” is tantamount to, “it is
imputed to us;” for “imputation” is “a gracious estimation.” But lest
anyone should seize on these expressions as an occasion for calumny, I
say, that I acknowledge, “the righteousness of Christ is imputed to us”
because I think the same thing is contained in the following words of the
Apostle, “God hath made Christ to be sin for us, that we might be made the
righteousness of God in Him.” (2 Cor. 5:21.)
- I have said, that I
disapprove of the SECOND enunciation, “the righteousness of Christ is
imputed to us for righteousness.” And why may not I reject a phrase which
does not occur in the Scriptures, provided I do not deny any true
signification which can be proved from the Scriptures? But this is the
reason of my rejection of that phrase. “Whatever is imputed for righteousness,
or to righteousness, or instead of righteousness, it is not righteousness
itself strictly and rigidly taken. But the righteousness of Christ, which
He has performed in obeying the Father, is righteousness itself strictly
and rigidly taken. THEREFORE, it is not imputed for righteousness.” For
that is the signification of the word “to impute,” as Piscator against
Bellarmine, when treating on justification, (from Romans 4:4,) has well
observed and satisfactorily proved.
The matter may be rendered clearer by
an example. If a man who owes another a hundred florins, pays this his creditor
the hundred which he owes, the creditor will not speak with correctness if he
says, “I impute this to you for payment.” For the debtor will instantly reply, “I
do not care anything about your imputation;” because he has truly paid the
hundred florins, whether the creditor thus esteems it or not. But if the man
owe a hundred florins and pay only ten, then the creditor, forgiving him the
remainder, may justly say, “I impute this to you for full payment; I will
require nothing more from you.” This is the gracious reckoning of the creditor,
which the debtor ought also to acknowledge with a grateful mind. It is such an
estimation as I understand as often as I speak about the imputation of the
righteousness which is revealed in the Gospel, whether the obedience of Christ
be said to be imputed to us, and to be our righteousness before God, or whether
faith be said to be imputed for righteousness. There is, therefore, a crafty design
latent in this confusion. For if I deny this, their enunciation, they will say
I deny that the righteousness of Christ is imputed to us. If I assent to it, I
fall into the absurdity of thinking that the righteousness of Christ is not
righteousness itself. If they say, that the word “impute” is received in a
different acceptation, let them prove their assertion by an example; and when
they have given proof of this, (which will be a work of great difficulty to
them,) they will have effected nothing. For “the righteousness of Christ is
imputed to us by the gracious estimation of God.” It is imputed, therefore,
either by the gracious estimation of God for righteousness; or it is imputed by
his non-gracious estimation. If it be imputed by His gracious estimation for
righteousness, (which must be asserted,) and if it be imputed by His
nongracious estimation; then it is apparent, in this confusion of these two
axioms, that the word “impute” must be understood ambiguously, and that it has
two meanings.
- The THIRD is thus
enunciated: “Faith, or the act of believing, is imputed for righteousness”
which are my own words. But omitting my expressions, they have substituted
for them the phrase, “The act of believing justifies us.” I should say, “They
have done this in their simplicity,” if I thought they had not read the
fourth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, in which this phrase is used
eleven times, “Faith, or the act of believing, is imputed for
righteousness.” Thus it is said in the third verse, “Abraham believed God,
and it was imputed unto him for righteousness; that is, his believing was
thus imputed. Our brethren, therefore, do not reprehend ME, but the
APOSTLE, who has employed this phrase so many times in one chapter, and
who does not refrain from the use of the other phrase, “to be justified by
faith, and through faith,” in the third and fifth chapters of the same
epistle. They ought, therefore, to have reprehended, not the phrase
itself, but the signification which I attach to it, if I explain it in a perverted
manner. Thus incorrectly should I seem to have explained the Apostle’s
phrase if I had said, “the righteousness of Christ is not imputed to us or
does not justify us, but faith, or the act of believing, does.” But I have
already replied, that this assertion concerning me is untrue, and I have
declared that I believe both these expressions to be true, “the
righteousness of Christ is imputed to us,” and “faith is imputed for
righteousness.” When they place these phrases in opposition to each other,
they do this, not from the meaning which I affix to them, but from their
own; and, therefore, according to the signification which they give to
them severally, they fabricate this calumny, which is an act of iniquity.
But they will say, that I understand this phrase, “Faith is imputed for
righteousness,” in its proper acceptation, when it must be figuratively
understood. This they ought, therefore, to have said, because this alone
is what they were able to say with truth. Such in fact are my real
sentiments on this subject; and the words make for the proper acceptation
of the phrase. If a figure lies concealed under it, this ought to be
proved by those who make the assertion.
ARTICLE
XXV (V.)
The
whole of that in which we appear before God, justifies us. But we appear before
God, not only by Faith, but also by Works. Therefore, we are justified before
God, not only by Faith, but likewise by Works.
ANSWER
A
man who is ignorant of those things which are here the order of the day, and
who reads this article, will undoubtedly think, that, in the point of
justification, I favour the party of the Papists, and am their professed
defender. Nay, he will suppose, that I have proceeded to such a pitch of
impudence, as to have the audacity to maintain a conclusion directly contrary
to the words of the Apostle, who says, “We conclude, therefore, that a man is
justified by faith, without the works of the law.” But when he shall understand
the origin of this article, and why it is charged on me, then it will be evident
to him that it arises from calumny and from a corruption of my words. I deny,
therefore, that I made that syllogism, or ever intended to draw that
conclusion, or to propound those things from which such a conclusion might be
deduced.
This
brief defense would suffice for all upright minds, to give a favourable
interpretation, if perchance anything had been spoken which could give occasion
to unjust suspicion. But it will be labour well bestowed, for me to transcribe
my own words from a certain disputation on JUSTIFICATION, from which this
article has been taken; that it may appear with what kind of fidelity they have
made their extract. The Ninth Thesis in it is thus expressed:
“From
these things, thus laid down according to the Scriptures, we conclude, that
JUSTIFICATION, when used for the act of a judge, is either purely the
imputation of righteousness, bestowed, through mercy from the throne of grace
in Christ the Propitiation, on a sinner, but on one who believes; or that man
is justified before God, of debt, according to the rigor of justice, without
any forgiveness. Because the Papists deny the latter, they ought to concede the
former. And this is so far true, that, how highly soever anyone of the saints
may be endowed with faith, hope, and charity, and how numerous soever and
excellent may be the works of faith, hope, and charity, which he has performed,
yet he will not obtain from God, the judge, a sentence of justification, unless
He quit the tribunal of His severe justice, and place Himself in the throne of
Grace, and out of it pronounce a sentence of absolution in his favour, and
unless the Lord of his mercy and pity, graciously account for righteousness the
whole of that good with which the saint appears before Him. For woe to a life
of the greatest innocence, if it be judged without mercy! This truth even the
Papists seem to acknowledge, who assert, that the works of the saints cannot
stand before the judgment of God, unless they be sprinkled with the blood of
Christ.”‘ (Public Disput. XIX.)
Thus
far my Thesis. Could any person imagine that the major in this article can,
according to my sentiments and design, be deduced from it, “The whole of that
in which we appear before God, justifies us;” how can this be deduced, when I
say, “that not even this good, which the Papists are able or know how to
attribute to the most holy men, can obtain from God a sentence of
justification, unless He, through mercy from the throne of grace, reckon this
graciously for righteousness.” Who does not perceive, that I grant this through
sufferance and concession?” “God considers and esteems for righteousness all
this good in which, the Papists say, the saints appear before God.” I yield
this, that I may the more firmly confute them; and I thus obtain, “that not
even that total can be accounted for righteousness, except graciously and
through mercy.” This conduct is real malignity, and a violent distortion of my
words; on account of which I have indeed no small occasion given to me of
complaining before God of this injury. But I contain myself, lest my complaint
to God should be detrimental to their souls; I would rather beseech God to be
pleased to grant them a better mind.
The
matter, with regard to me, stands thus; as if anyone should say to a Monk or a
Pharisee, who was boasting of his virtues and works of his faith, hope, love,
obedience, voluntary chastity and similar excellences: “O man! unless God were
to omit the severity of his justice, and unless from the throne of Grace, He
were to pronounce a sentence of absolution concerning you, unless He were
graciously to reckon all that good of yours, however great it may be, and thus
to account it for righteousness, you would not be able to stand before Him, or
to be justified.” I declare, and before Christ I make the declaration, that
this was my meaning. And every man is the best interpreter of his own
expressions. But let it be allowed, that I have said these things from my own
sentiments; was this proposition [of their fabrication] to be deduced from my
words? If it was, they ought to have proceeded thus according to scientific
method. They ought to have briefly laid down the enunciation which I employed,
and which might be in this form: “Unless God graciously account for
righteousness the whole of this good in which a saint appears before Him, that
saint cannot be justified before God.” From which will be deduced this
affirmative proposition, “If God graciously accounts for righteousness this
good in which a holy man appears, then this holy man can be justified before
God,” or “he will then be justified before God” The word “the whole,” has a
place in the negative proposition; because it conduces to the exaggeration. But
it ought not to have a place in that which is affirmative. Let this question,
however, have a place here: Why have my brethren omitted these words? “The Lord
graciously of his mercy, from the throne of his Grace, having omitted the
severity of judgment, accounts that good for righteousness.” And why have they
proposed only these? “The whole of that in which we appear before God,
justifies us.” This is, indeed, not to deny the fact; but a pretext is thus
sought for calumny, under the equivocation of the word “justifies,” as
justification may be either of grace, or of debt or severe judgment. But I have
excluded that which is of debt or severe judgment from my expressions, and have
included only the justification which is of grace. Let these remarks suffice
for the major proposition.
I
now proceed to the assumption that they have subjoined to this proposition,
which is theirs and not mine. It reads thus: “But we appear before God, not
only by Faith, but also by Works” Then is it your pleasure, my brethren, to
appear thus before God? David was not of this opinion, when he said: “Enter not
into judgment with thy servant. For in thy sight shall no man living be
justified,” or “shall justify himself.” (Psalm 143:2.) Which is thus rendered
by the Apostle Paul, “For by the works of the law shall no flesh be justified.”
(Gal. 2:16.) But perhaps you will say, that you do not appear before God “by
the works of the law, but by works produced from faith and love.” I wish you to
explain to me, what it is to appear by faith, and what to appear by works; and
whether it can possibly happen, that a man may appear both by faith and works.
I know, the saints who will be placed before the tribunal of the Divine
Justice, have had Faith, and through Faith have performed good Works. But, I
think, they appear and stand before God with this confidence or trust, “that
God has set forth his Son Jesus Christ as a propitiation through Faith in his
blood, that they may thus be justified by the Faith of Jesus Christ, through
the remission of sins.” I do not read, that Christ is constituted a
propitiation through Works in his blood, that we may also be justified by
Works.
My
desire indeed is, to appear before the tribunal of God thus, [with this
confidence or trust in Christ, as a propitiation through Faith in his blood]
and “to be graciously judged through mercy from the throne of grace”. If I be
otherwise judged, I know I shall be condemned; which sore judgment may the
Lord, who is full of clemency and pity, avert according to his great mercy,
even from you, my brethren, though you thus speak, whether the words which you
use convey your own meaning, or whether you attribute this meaning to me. I
also might thus draw wonderful conclusions from this assumption, which is laid
down, if an accusation were to be set aside by retaliation or a recriminating
charge, and not by innocence. But I will not resort to such a course, lest I
seem to return evil for evil; though I might do this with a somewhat greater
show of reason.
ARTICLE
XXVI (VI.)
Faith
is not the instrument of Justification.
ANSWER
In
the enunciation of this article is given another proof of desperate and
finished negligence. What man is so utterly senseless as universally to deny,
that Faith can be called “an instrument,” since it receives and apprehends the
promises which God has given, and does also in this way concur to
justification, But who, on the other hand, will venture to say, that, in the
business of justification, faith has no other relation than that of an
instrument? It should therefore be explained, how faith is an instrument, and
how, as an instrument, it concurs to justification.
It
is, at least, not the instrument of God; not that which He uses to justify us.
Yet this is the meaning first intended to be conveyed by these words, when
rigidly taken. For God is the primary cause of justification. But since
justification is an estimate of the mind, although made at the command of the
will, it is not performed by an instrument. For it is when God wills and acts
by his power, that He employs instruments. Then, in these words, “Believe in
Christ, and thy sins shall be forgiven you,” or, which is the same thing, “and you
shall be justified;” I say, that faith is the requirement of God, and the act
of the believer when he answers the requirement. But they will say, “that it is
the act of apprehending and accepting, and that therefore, this faith bears
relation to an instrument?’ I reply, faith as a quality has in that passage
relation to the mode of an instrument; but the acceptance or apprehension
itself is an act, and indeed one of obedience, yielded to the gospel. Let that
phrase likewise which is so often used by the Apostle in Romans 6, be seriously
considered, “Faith is imputed for righteousness.” Is this faith as an
instrument, or as an act? St. Paul resolves the question, by a quotation from
the book of Genesis, when he says, “Abraham believed God, and it was imputed to
him for righteousness.” The thing itself, as it is explained by our brethren,
also solves the question. “Faith is imputed for righteousness on account of
Christ, the object which it apprehends.” Let this be granted. Yet the
apprehending of Christ is nearer than the instrument which apprehends, or by
which He is apprehended. But apprehending is an act; therefore, faith, not as
it is an instrument, but as it is an act, is imputed for righteousness,
although such imputation be made on account of Him whom it apprehends. In
brief, the capability or the quality by which anything is apprehended, and the
apprehension itself, have each relation to the object which is to be
apprehended, the former a mediate relation, the latter an immediate. The
latter, therefore, is a more modest metonymy, as being derived from that which
is nearer; even when it is granted that this phrase, “it is imputed for
righteousness” -- must be explained by a metonymy. The man, then, who says, “the
act of faith is imputed for righteousness, does not deny that faith as an
instrument concurs to justification. It is evident, therefore, from this
answer, that our brethren fabricate and “get up” articles of this kind without
the least care or solicitude, and charge me with them. This, I think, will be
acknowledged even by themselves, if they examine how they manufactured those
nine questions which, two years ago, by the consent of their Lordships the
Curators of our University, they endeavoured to offer to the Professors of
Divinity, that they might obtain their reply to them. Gravity and sobriety are
highly becoming in Divines, and serious solicitude is required to the
completion of such great matters as these.
ARTICLE
XXVII (VII.)
Faith
is not the pure gift of God, but depends partly on the grace of God, and partly
on the powers of Free Will; that, if a man will, he may believe or not
believe.
ANSWER
I
never said this, I never thought of saying it, and, relying on God’s grace, I never
will enunciate my sentiments on matters of this description in a manner thus
desperate and confused. I simply affirm, that this enunciation is false, “faith
is not the pure gift of God;” that this is likewise false, if taken according
to the rigor of the words, “faith depends partly on the grace of God, and
partly on the powers of free will” and that this is also false when thus
enunciated, “If a man will, he can believe or not believe.” If they suppose,
that I hold some opinions from which these assertions may by good consequence
be deduced, why do they not quote my words? It is a species of injustice to
attach to any person those consequences, which one may frame out of his words
as if they were his sentiments. But the injustice is still more flagrant, if
these conclusions cannot by good consequence be deduced from what he has said.
Let my brethren, therefore, make the experiment, whether they can deduce such
consectaries as these, from the things which I teach; but let the experiment be
made in my company, and not by themselves in their own circle. For that sport
will be vain, equally void of profit or of victory; as boys sometimes feel,
when they play alone with dice for what already belongs to them.
For
the proper explanation of this matter, a discussion on the concurrence and
agreement of Divine grace and of free will, or of the human will, would be
required; but because this would be a labour much too prolix, I shall not now
make the attempt. To explain the matter I will employ a simile, which yet, I
confess, is very dissimilar; but its dissimilitude is greatly in favour of my
sentiments. A rich man bestows, on a poor and famishing beggar, alms by which
he may be able to maintain himself and his family. Does it cease to be a pure
gift, because the beggar extends his hand to receive it? Can it be said with
propriety, that “the alms depended partly on the liberality of the Donor, and
partly on the liberty of the Receiver,” though the latter would not have
possessed the alms unless he had received it by stretching out his hand? Can it
be correctly said, because the beggar is always prepared to receive, that “he
can have the alms, or not have it, just as he pleases?” If these assertions
cannot be truly made about a beggar who receives alms, how much less can they
be made about the gift of faith, for the receiving of which far more acts of
Divine grace are required! This is the question which it will be requisite to
discuss, “what acts of Divine grace are required to produce faith in man?” If I
omit any act which is necessary, or which concurs, [in the production of
faith,] let it be demonstrated from the Scriptures, and I will add it to the
rest.
It
is not our wish to do the least injury to Divine grace, by taking from it
anything that belongs to it. But let my brethren take care, that they
themselves neither inflict an injury on Divine justice, by attributing that to
it which it refuses; nor on Divine grace, by transforming it into something
else, which cannot be called GRACE. That I may in one word intimate what they
must prove, such a transformation they effect when they represent “the
sufficient and efficacious grace, which is necessary to salvation, to be
irresistible,” or as acting with such potency that it cannot be resisted by any
free creature.
ARTICLE
XXVIII (VIII.)
The
grace sufficient for salvation is conferred on the Elect, and on the Non-elect;
that, if they will, they may believe or not believe, may be saved or not
saved.
ANSWER
Our
brethren here also manifest the same negligence. They take no pains to know
what my sentiments are; they are not careful in examining what truth there is
in my opinions; and they exercise no discretion about the words in which they
enunciate my sentiments and their own. They know that I use the word “Election”
in two senses. (i.) For the decree by which God resolves to justify believers
and to condemn unbelievers, and which is called by the Apostle, “the purpose of
God according to election.” (Rom. 9:11.) (ii.) And for the decree by which He
resolves to elect these or those nations and men with the design of
communicating to them the means of faith, but to pass by other nations and men.
Yet, without this distinction, they fasten these sentiments on me; when, by its
aid, I am enabled to affirm, not only, sufficient grace is conferred on, or
rather is offered to, the Elect and the Nonelect;” but also, “sufficient grace
is not offered to any except the Elect.” (i.) “It is offered to the Elect and
the Non-elect,” because it is offered to unbelievers, whether they will
afterwards believe or not believe. (ii.) “It is offered to none except the
Elect,” because, by that very thing which is offered to them, they cease to be
of the number of those of whom it is said, “He suffered them to walk in their
own ways;” (Acts 14:16;) and, “He hath not dealt so with any nation.” (Psalm 147:20.)
And who shall compel me to use words of their prescribing, unless proof be
brought from scripture that the words are to be thus and in no other way
received?
I
now proceed to the other words of the article. “That, if they will, they may
believe or not believe, be saved or not saved.” I say, in two different senses
may these words be received, “if they will, they may believe,” that is, either
by their own powers, or as they are excited and assisted by this grace. “Or
they may not believe,” while rejecting this grace by their own free will, and
resisting it. “They may be saved or not saved,” that is, saved by the admission
and right use of grace, not saved by their own wickedness, rejecting that
without which they cannot be saved.
To
the whole together I reply, that nothing is declared in these words, in
whatever manner they may be understood, which St. Augustine himself and his
followers would not willingly have acknowledged as true. I say, in these words
are enunciated the very sentiments of St. Augustine; yet he was the chief
champion against the Pelagian heresy, being accounted in that age its most
successful combatant. For in his treatise on nature and grace, (c. 67.) St.
Augustine speaks thus:, Since He is everywhere present, who, by many methods
through the creature that is subservient to Him as his Lord, can call him who
is averse, can teach a believer, can comfort him who hopes, can exhort the
diligent man, can aid him who strives, and can lend an attentive ear to him who
deprecates; it is not imputed to you as a fault, that you are unwillingly
ignorant, but that you neglect to inquire after that of which you are ignorant;
not that you do not collect and bind together the shattered and wounded
members, but that you despised Him who is willing to heal you.” The book
entitled “The Vocation of the Gentiles,”
which is attributed with a greater semblance of probability to Prosper, than to
St. Ambrose, has the following passage: “On all men has always been bestowed
some measure of heavenly doctrine, which, though it was of more sparing and
hidden grace, was yet sufficient, as the Lord has judged, to serve some men for
a remedy, and all men for a testimony.” (Lib. 2. c. 5.) In the commencement of
the ninth chapter of the same book, he explains the whole matter by saying: “The
Grace of God has indeed the decided pre-eminence in our justifications,
persuading us by exhortations, admonishing us by examples, affrighting us by
dangers, exciting us by miracles, by giving understanding, by inspiring
counsel, and by illuminating the heart itself and imbuing it with the
affections of faith. But the will of man is likewise subjoined to it and is
united with it, which has been excited to this by the before mentioned
succours, that it may co-operate in the Divine work within itself, and may
begin to follow after the reward which, by the heavenly seed, it has conceived
for the object of its desire, ascribing the failure to its own mutability, and
the success (if the issue be prosperous) to the aid of grace. This aid is
afforded to all men, by innumerable methods both secret and manifest; and the
rejection of this assistance by many persons, is to be ascribed to their
negligence; but its reception by many persons, is both of Divine grace and of
the human will.”
I
do not produce these passages, as if I thought that either my brethren or I
must abide by the sentiments of the Fathers, but only for the purpose of
removing from myself the crime of Pelagianism in this matter.
ARTICLE
XXIX (IX.)
Believers
can perfectly fulfill the Law, and live in the world without sin.
ANSWER
This
is what I never said. But when a certain person once, in a public disputation
on the Baptism of Infants, was endeavouring, by a long digression, to bring me
to the point -- either to declare that believers could perfectly fulfill the
law of God, or that they could not -- I declined an answer, but quoted the
opinion of St. Augustine, from the second book of his Treatise On the demerits
and remission of sins, against the Pelagians. That passage, I will here
transcribe, that I may defend myself against the charge of Pelagianism;
because, I perceive that the men with whom I have to do, consider even these
sentiments to be Pelagian, though they can on no count whatever, be reckoned
such.
St.
Augustine says: “We must not instantly with an incautious rashness, oppose
those who assert that it is possible for man to be in this life without sin.
For if we deny the possibility of this, we shall derogate both from the free
will of man, which desires to be in such a perfect state by willing it; and
from the power or mercy of God, who effects it by the assistance which He
affords. But it is one question whether it be possible, and another whether
such a man actually exists. It is one question, if such a perfect man is not in
existence when it is possible, why is he not? And it is another, not only
whether there is anyone who has never had any sin at all, but likewise, whether
there could at any time have been such a man, or that it is now possible? In
this fourfold proposal of questions, if I be asked “is it possible for a man to
exist in the present life without sin;” I shall confess, that it is possible by
the grace of God, and by man’s free will.” (Cap. 6.)
In
another of his works, St. Augustine says: “Pelagius disputes correctly, that
they confess it not to be impossible, by the very circumstance of either many
or all persons wishing to do it; [perfectly to fulfill the law of God;] but let
him confess whence it is possible, and peace is instantly established. For the
possibility arises from the grace of God through Christ Jesus,” &c. (On
Nature and Grace, against the Pelagians, cap. 59, 60.) And in a subsequent
passage: “For it may be made a question among true and pious Christians, has
there ever been, is there now, or can there be, in this life, any man who lives
so justly as to have no sin at all? Whosoever doubts about the possibility of
the existence of such a person after this life, he is destitute of
understanding. But I am unwilling to enter into a contest, about this
possibility even in the present life.” See the paragraphs which immediately
succeed in the same chapter. And in the 69th chapter of that work, he says: “By
the very thing, by which we most firmly believe that a just and good God could
not command impossibilities, we are admonished both of what we may do in things
easy of accomplishment, and of what we may ask in matters of difficulty;
because all things are easy to charity,” &c.
I
do not oppose this opinion of St. Augustine; but I do not enter into a contest
about any part of the whole matter. For I think the time may be far more
happily and usefully employed in prayers to obtain what is lacking in each of
us, and in serious admonitions that every one endeavour to proceed and to press
forward towards the mark of perfection, than when spent in such
disputations.
But
my brethren will say, that in the 114th question of our Catechism this very
subject is treated, and that it is there asked, “Can those persons who are
converted to God, perfectly observe the Divine Commands,” The answer subjoined
is, “By no means.” To this observation I reply, that I do not say anything
against it; but that the reason of the negative answer [or scriptural proof
added] is about the act, when the question itself is about the possibility; and
that, therefore, from this, nothing is proved. It is also well known that this
answer had been rejected by some persons; and that it was only by the intervention
of the brethren, who added an explanation to it, that it afterwards obtained
the approbation of the same individuals. But I shall be perfectly willing to
enter into a conference with my brethren about this matter, whenever it shall
be convenient; and I hope we shall easily agree in opinion.
ARTICLE
XXX (X.)
It
may admit of discussion, whether Semi-Pelagianism is not real
Christianity.
ANSWER
In
a certain lecture I said, that it would be easy, under the pretext of
Pelagianism, to condemn all those things of which we do not approve, if we may
invent half, quarter, three-fourths, four-fifths Pelagianism, and so upwards.
And I added, that it might admit of discussion whether Semi-Pelagian is not
real Christianity. By these remarks it was not my wish to patronize Pelagian
doctrine; but I was desirous to intimate, that something might be accounted as
Semi-Pelagianism which does not depart from the truth of Christian doctrine.
For as, when a departure is once made from the truth, the descent towards
falsehood becomes more and more rapid; so, by receding from falsehood, it is
possible for men to arrive at truth, which is often accustomed to stand as the
mean between two extremes of falsehood. Such indeed is the state of the matter
in Pelagianism and Manicheism. If any man can enter on a middle way between
these two heresies, he will be a true Catholic, neither inflicting an injury on
Grace, as the Pelagians do, nor on Free Will as do the Manichees. Let the
Refutation be perused which St. Augustine wrote against both these heresies,
and it will appear that he makes this very acknowledgement. For this reason it
has happened, that, for the sake of confirming their different opinions, St.
Augustine’s words, when writing against the Manichees, have been frequently
quoted by the Pelagians; and those which he wrote against the Pelagians, have
been quoted by the Manichees.
This,
therefore, is what I intended to convey; and that my brethren may understand my
meaning, I declare openly, “that it will be quite as easy a task for me to
convict the sentiments of some among them of Manicheism, and even of Stoicism,
as they will be really capable of convicting others of Pelagianism, whom they
suspect of holding that error.” But I wish us all to abstain from odious names
of this description, as they are employed without producing any benefit. For he
who is accused will either deny that his sentiments are the same as those of
Pelagius; or, if he acknowledges the existence of a similarity, he will say
that Pelagius was wrongly condemned by the Church. It would be better then to
omit these epithets, and to confer solely about the matter itself; unless,
approaching to the opinion of the Papists, we hold that what has once been
determined by the Church, cannot be drawn into controversy.
ARTICLE
XXXI (XI.)
It
is not correctly said in the Catechism, that “God is angry with us for
birth-sins;” because original sin is a punishment. But whatever is a punishment
is not properly a sin.
ANSWER
Nearly
two months ago, a certain minister of God’s word, came to me, desirous, as he
declared, to confer with me about the opinion which I held concerning the
Catechism and Dutch Confession being subjected to examination in our National
Synod. On this subject we had some conversation together, and I concluded the
expression of my opinion with this syllogism: “Every human writing which is not
in itself entitled to implicit credit, not authentic, and not divine, may be
examined, and indeed ought to be; when it can be done in order, and after a
legitimate manner, that is, in a Synod, to which [the consideration of] these
writings belongs. But such productions are the Catechism and our Confession.
Therefore, they may and ought to be subjected to examination.” When he had
wearied himself in opposing a few things to this syllogism, which I soon
dispersed by the clearest light of truth, he began to inquire what [objections]
they were which I had against the Confession and Catechism; I replied, that I
had nothing against those formularies, for that would be an act of prejudging,
which I would not take upon myself; but that there were matters in those two
productions, about which it was my wish to confer in a legitimate and orderly
manner, with my brethren at their own time, in a Synod, whether on every point
they be agreeable to the scriptures, or whether they dissent in any respect
from them. For this purpose, that if, after a serious and strict examination,
they be found to agree with the scriptures, they may be approved and confirmed
by recent and fresh sanctions; or that, if found to dissent from them, they may
be corrected as commodiously as possible.
He
became urgent with me, therefore, and requested that I would disclose to him
those points about which I was desirous to confer; and he declared, that he
asked this favour for no other reason than that he might be able himself to
think seriously about them. Unwilling positively to deny this his request, I
began to produce some parts of the Confession, and especially the fourteenth
Article. But he said, “that he made small account of this, because he thought
something might easily be discovered in the Confession, which did not perfectly
and in every respect correspond with the scriptures, at least with regard to
its phraseology, for it was the composition of only a few persons, and in fact
was written in the earliest times of the Reformation from Popery; and that he
perceived very little danger in the Confession being corrected in some
passages, since it was not much in use among the people.”
But
when he began to be still more urgent concerning the Catechism, desirous in
that particular likewise to gratify him, I adduced some passages, and, among
others, the answer to the tenth question, in which God is said “by horrid
methods to be angry both on account of birth-sins, and on account of those also
which we ourselves commit,” &c. I said two things, in these words, might
admit of discussion. (1.) Whether we could correctly call this universal taint
in our nature “birth-sins” in the plural number. I had scarcely made this
remark, when he, without waiting for any further explanation, said, “that on
one occasion, while he was explaining the Catechism to some students, he had
himself begun to think whether it was a good and proper phrase; but that he had
defended it by this argument -- The Catechism employs the plural number on
account of original sin itself, and on account of the sin committed by Adam
which was the cause of that original sin.” But as I considered that kind of
defense to be unworthy of any confutation, I said, it was better for him at
once to own that these words required emendation, than to give such an
explanation of them. After this conversation, I added another remark. (2.) It
may admit of discussion, whether God could be angry on account of original sin
which was born with us, since it seemed to be inflicted on us by God as a
punishment of the actual sin which had been committed by Adam and by us in Him.
For, in that case, the progress would be infinite, if God, angry on account of
the actual sin of Adam, were to punish us with this original sin; were He again
to be angry with us for this original sin, and inflict on us another
punishment; and, for a similar cause were He a third time to be angry on
account of that second punishment which had been inflicted, guilt and
punishment thus mutually and frequently succeeding each other, without the
intervention of any actual sin. When to this observation he replied, “that
still it was sin.” I said, I did not deny that it was sin, but it was not
actual sin. And I quoted the seventh chapter of the Epistle to the. Romans, in
which the Apostle treats on the sin, and says that “it produces in the
unregenerate all manner of concupiscence,” thus intimating that we must
distinguish between actual sin, and that which was the cause of other sins, and
which, on this very account might be denominated “sin.”
Matters
were at that interview discussed between us in this placid manner, and for the
purpose which I have just stated; and I know that I never spoke upon this
subject in any other place. Yet this our conversation was related to a certain
learned man, the very same day on which it occurred, either by the minister
himself, or by someone who had heard it from him. I had it from the lips of
this learned man himself; who urged it against me as an objection, within a few
days after the minister and I had held this discourse: for the minister had
resided at this learned man’s house, during his stay in Leiden.
Is
it equitable that things which are thus discussed among brethren for the sake
of conference, should be instantly disseminated, and publicly proclaimed as
heretical? I confess that I am devoid of all discernment, if such conduct as
this is not the very violation of the law of all familiarity and friendship.
Yet these are the persons who complain, that I decline to confer with them;
that, when I am calmly asked, I refuse to declare my sentiments; and that I
hold their minds in suspense.
To
this article, therefore, I briefly reply: It is false that I said, “that this
is not correctly expressed in the Catechism.” For I told that minister openly,
that I would not prejudge the matter; that I was desirous to wait for the
judgment of my brethren on matters of this kind, and on others which were
comprised in the Catechism and Confession; and that, after things had been thus
maturely and accurately weighed, something determinate might be concluded.
But
a previous conference of this description seems to be attended with some
utility on this account, it prevents any man from offering to the Synod itself
for examination and adjudication those matters which, by such a private
conversation as this, he might understand to have no difficulties in them. Let
the brethren recall to mind what was asked of the Professors of Divinity in our
University, by the Synod of South Holland, held at Gorchum, and let them
compare it among themselves. We are asked diligently to read through the
Confession and Catechism, and, if we find anything in them which merits
animadversion, to announce the same seasonably and in order. And this, on my
own part, I promised to do. For this purpose, is not a private conference with
brethren highly useful, that what can be removed by it may not be proposed to
the Synod for discussion, But that minister and I had known each other for many
years; I had also long held epistolary correspondence with him, and had
conversed with him on the articles of faith. On this account therefore, I
thought that I ought to comply with his request, as an experiment whether he
could expedite the affair.
CONCLUSION
THIS
then is the answer which I have thought proper to make, at present, to the
THIRTY-ONE ARTICLES that have been objected against me. If I have not given
satisfaction by it to some men, I am prepared to confer in order with any of
them upon these subjects and others which pertain to the Christian Religion,
for this purpose, that we may either agree in our sentiments; or, if this
result cannot be obtained by a conference, that we bear with each other, when
it has become evident how far we severally proceed together in the matter of
religion, and what things they are of which we approve or disapprove, and that
these points of difference are not of such a description as to forbid
professors of the same religion to hold different sentiments about them.
Some
persons perhaps will reproach me with “appearing sometimes to answer with doubt
and hesitation, when it is the duty of a Divine and a Professor of Theology to
be fully persuaded about those things which he will teach to others, and not to
fluctuate in his opinions.” To these persons I wish to reply.
- The most learned man, and
he who is most conversant with the Scriptures, is ignorant of many things,
and is always but a scholar in the school of Christ and of the Scriptures.
But one, who is thus ignorant of many things, cannot, without hesitation,
give answer in reference to all things about which an opportunity or
necessity for speaking is presented either by adversaries or by those who
wish to ask and ascertain his sentiments by private or public conference
and disputation. For it is better for him to speak somewhat doubtfully,
than dogmatically, about those things of which he has no certain
knowledge; and to intimate that he himself requires daily progress, and
seeks for instruction as well as they. For I think no one has proceeded to
such a pitch of audacity, as to style himself a master that is ignorant of
nothing, and that indulges no doubts about any matter whatever.
- It is not everything which
becomes a subject of controversy that is of equal importance. Some things
are of such a nature as to render it unlawful for any man to feel a doubt
concerning them, if he have any wish to be called by the name of
Christian. But there are other things which are not of the same dignity,
and about which those who treat on catholic sentiments [such orthodox
doctrines as are held by all real Christians,] have dissented from each
other, without any breach of truth and Christian peace. Of what
description those subjects may be which are discussed in these Articles,
and about which I have appeared to answer with hesitation, and whether
they be of absolute necessity, may likewise become in due time a topic of
discussion.
- My reply [to these
thirty-one articles] is not peremptory: Not that I have in them said
anything against conscience, but because I did not consider it requisite
to bring forward, in the first instance, all those things which I might be
able to say. I accounted my answer sufficient, and more than sufficient,
for all those objections, which have not the slightest foundation on any
reasons whatsoever; not only because they were untruly charged against me,
but because they did not impinge against the truth of the Scriptures. In
the greater number of these Articles, I might have discharged the whole of
my duty, in simply denying them, and in demanding proof. But I have gone
further than this, that I might in some degree give satisfaction, and that
I might besides challenge my brethren to a conference, if they should
think it necessary. This I will never decline, provided it be lawfully
instituted, and in such a manner as to inspire hopes of any benefits to be
derived from it. If after that conference it be discovered that, either
because I am ignorant of necessary things which ought to be taught in the
Church and in the University; or because I hold unsound opinions about
articles on which some importance is placed for obtaining salvation and
for the illustration of divine glory; or because I doubt concerning such
things as ought to be delivered dogmatically and inculcated with
seriousness and rigor, if for these reasons it be discovered that,
according to this our unhappy [natural] condition, I am unworthy to hold
any office in the Church or University, (for who is sufficient for these
things,) I will, without reluctance, resign my situation, and give place
to a man possessed of greater merit.
But
I wish to advise my brethren, particularly those of them who are my juniors,
and who have not “their senses so much exercised” in the Scriptures as to be
enabled to deliver out of those Scriptures determinate opinions about all
things, that they be not too bold in asserting anything, of which when required
to give their reasons, they will be able with great difficulty to produce them;
and, besides, that they be sedulously on their guard lest, after they have
strenuously affirmed anything which I call in doubt without employing the
contrary affirmation, and it be discovered that the arguments which I employ in
justification of my doubts are stronger than those on which they rely in that
their affirmation, they incur the charge of immodesty and arrogance among men
of prudence, and from this very circumstance be accounted unworthy of the place
which they hold with so much presumption. For it becomes a Bishop and a Teacher
of the Church, not only to hold fast the faithful word as he hath been taught,
that he may be able by his sound doctrine, both to exhort and to convince the
gainsayers, (Tit. 1:9,7,) but likewise not to be given to self-will, arrogance,
and boldness. Into which faults novices easily fall, (1 Tim. 3:6,) who, “by
their inexperience, are unacquainted with the vast difficulty with which the
eye of the inward man is healed, that it may be enabled to look upon its sun;
with the sighs and groans by which we are able in any small degree to attain to
an understanding of God; with the labour necessary for the discovery of truth;
and with the difficulty of avoiding errors.” Let them consider, that nothing is
more easy for them, than not only to assert, but also to think, that they have
discovered the truth. But they will themselves at length acknowledge the real
difficulties with which the discovery is attended, when with seriousness and
earnestness they enter into a conference about the matters in controversy, and
have after a rigid examination discussed all those things which may have been
alleged on both sides.
