Certain
articles relating to the Christian Religion are now in a course of circulation.
In a paper which was not long since delivered into my hands, the number of them
is distinguished into two series, one consisting of twenty and the other of
eleven articles. Some of them are attributed to me, others to Adrian Borrius,
and several both to him and me. Those persons by whom they were first
disseminated, attempt in them to render us suspected of having introduced into
the church and the University of Leiden, novelties and heretical instructions,
and to accuse us of error and heresy, that both the students of Divinity and
the common people may stand on their guard against us, who have this black mark
imprinted on us, lest they become infected with the same envenomed disorder,
and that those persons who enjoy the supremacy both in Church and State, may
seasonably interpose their authority, to prevent the evil from extending any
further, or rather to extinguish it in its very commencement; which, if “they
neglect to do, they will be instrumental in producing the greatest detriment to
Divine Truth, and to the Political and Ecclesiastical concord of these
Provinces.”
The
dispersion of some of these articles is not a very recent circumstance; for,
above two years ago, seventeen out of these thirty-one came into my hands,
expressed exactly in the same words as those that occur in the writing which is
the subject of my present remarks. But I was silent, and concealed my regret;
for I thought that those articles would, in their very infancy, die a natural
death, since part of them were destitute of the truth of historical narration,
by not being attributed to those who had been the authors of them; and part of
them were void of all real theological sense, by the strange intermixture of
truth and falsehood. But the issue did not answer my expectation. For they not
only remained without diminution, but gained an increase, by the addition of
other fourteen to the former seventeen articles, and by a far wider dispersion
of the whole than had at first been made. This unexpected result had the effect
of inducing me to think that I ought to oppose their progress by a moderate answer,
lest my continued silence should be interpreted as tantamount to a confession.
If this be the interpretation which, on many occasions is given to silence, it
is an easy matter thus to construe it respecting any doctrine that is aspersed
as. a heresy, “under which imputation,” it is said in a vaunting tone, “St.
Jerome would
have
no man to remain patient.”
In
this reply I will use candour and conscience. Whatever I know to be true, I
will confess and defend. On whatever subjects I may feel hesitation, I will not
conceal my ignorance; and whatever my mind dictates to be false, I will deny
and refute. May the God of truth and peace direct my mind and my hand by his
Holy Spirit! Amen.
ARTICLES
I & II
I.
Faith, that is, justifying faith, is not peculiar to the elect.
II.
It is possible for believers finally to decline and fall away from faith and
salvation.
ANSWER
The
connection between these two articles is so intimate, that when the first of
them is granted, the second is necessarily inferred; and, in return, when the
latter is granted, the former is to be inferred, according to the intention of
those persons who framed these articles. For if “faith be not peculiar to the
elect,” and if perseverance in faith and salvation belong to the elect alone,
it follows that believers not only can, but that some of them actually do, “fall
away from faith and salvation.” And, on the contrary, if it be “possible for
believers finally to fall away from faith and salvation,” it follows that “faith
is not peculiar to the elect,” they being the individuals concerning whom the
framers of these articles assert, that it is impossible for them not to be
saved. The reason of the consequence is, because the words FAITH and BELIEVERS,
according to this hypothesis, have a wider signification than the words
ELECTION and THE ELECT. The former comprehend some persons that are not elect,
that is, “some who finally fall away from faith and salvation.” No necessity,
therefore, existed for composing both these articles; it was quite sufficient
to have proposed one. And if the authors of them had sought for such
amplification, as had no real existence, but consisted of mere words, it was
possible to deduce the Second from the First in the form of a consectary. Thus
it is evident that the multitude of the articles, was the great object to be
attempted for the purpose of making it appear as if those persons ERRED IN VERY
MANY POINTS, whom the too sedulous curiosity of the brethren is desirous
without cause, of rendering suspected of heresy.
I.
But, to treat of each article singly, I declare, respecting THE FIRST, that I
never said, either in public or in private, “Faith is not peculiar to the
elect.” This article, therefore, is not attributed to its proper author; and
thus is committed a historical error.
I
add, even if I had made such a declaration as this, a defense of it would have
been ready. For I omit the scriptures, from which a more prolix discussion of
this subject might be formed; and since the Christian Fathers have with great
semblance of truth defended their sentiments from that divine source, I might
employ the consent of those Fathers as a shield to ward off from myself the
charge of NOVELTY; and the Harmony of Confessions, which are severally the
composition of those Churches that have seceded from Popery, and that come
under the denomination of” Protestants” and “the Reformed,” I might adopt for a
polished breastplate, to intercept or turn aside the dart of HERESY which is
hurled against me. Neither should I be much afraid of this subject being placed
for adjudication in the balances of the Belgic Confession and the Heidelberg
Catechism.
- Let St. Augustine, Prosper,
and the author of the book entitled The Vocation of the Gentiles, be
brought forward to bear testimony respecting “the consent of the Fathers.”
(1.)
AUGUSTINE says, “It is wonderful, and indeed most wonderful,
that God does not bestow perseverance on certain of his sons, whom he hath
regenerated in Christ, and to whom he has given faith, hope and love; while he
pardons such great acts of wickedness in sons that are alienated from him, and,
by imparting his grace, makes them his children.” (De Corrept. et Gratia, cap. 8.)
(2.)
PROSPER says, “It is a lamentable circumstance which is
proved by many examples, that some of those persons who were regenerated in
Christ Jesus, have relinquished the faith, and, ceasing to preserve their
former sanctity of manners, have apostatized from God, and their ungodly course
has been terminated under his displeasure and aversion.” (Ad Capita Galatians resp. 7.)
(3.)
The author of The Vocation of the Gentiles says, “God
bestows the power of willing to obey him, in such a manner as not to take away,
even from those who will persevere, that mutability by which it is possible for
them to be unwilling [to obey God]. If this were not the case, none of the
believers would have departed from the faith.” (Lib. ii, c. 9.)
- The HARMONY OF CONFESSIONS
might in the following manner, contribute to my defense: This dogma states
that “faith is the peculiar property of the elect,” and that “it is
impossible for believers finally to decline from faith and salvation.”
Now, if this be a dogma necessary to salvation, then that Confession which
does not contain it, or which asserts something contradictory to it,
cannot be considered as harmonizing with the rest on the subject of
religion. For wherever there is harmony, it is proper that there should be
neither defect nor contradiction in things pertaining to salvation. But
the Augustan or Lutheran Confession says that “it condemns the
Anabaptists, who deny that those persons who have once been justified, can
lose the Holy Spirit.” Besides, Philip Melancthon with his followers, and
the greater portion of the Lutheran Churches, are of opinion, that faith
is bestowed even on the non-elect.” Yet we are not afraid of acknowledging
these Lutherans for brethren.
- The BELGIC Confession does
not contain this dogma that “faith is peculiar to the elect;” and without
controversy it cannot be deduced from our CATECHISM. For when it is said,
in the article on the Church, “I believe that I shall perpetually remain a
member of the Church;” and, in the first question, “God keeps and
preserves me in such a manner, as to make all things necessarily
subservient to my salvation;” those expressions are to be understood of a
believer, in reference to his actual believing. For he who is truly such a
one answers to the character of a Christian. But no man is such except
through faith. Faith is therefore presupposed in both the
expressions.
II.
With regard to the SECOND Article, I say, that a distinction ought to be made
between power and action. For it is one thing to declare, that “it is possible
for the faithful to fall away from faith and salvation,” and it is another to
say, that “they do actually fall away.” This distinction is of such extensive
observance, that even antiquity itself was not afraid of affirming, concerning
the elect and those who were to be saved, “that it was possible for them not to
be saved;” and that “the mutability by which it was possible for them not to be
willing to obey God, was not taken away from them,” although it was the opinion
of the ancients, “that such persons never would in reality be damned.” On this
very subject, too, the greater part of our own doctors lay down a difference.
For they say, “that it is possible for such persons to fall away, if their
nature, which is inclined to lapses and defection, and if the temptations of
the world and Satan, be the only circumstances taken into consideration: but
that they will not finally fall away, because God will bring back to himself
his own elect before the end of life.” If anyone asserts, “that it is not
possible for believers, in consideration of their being elect persons, finally
to fall away from salvation, because God has decreed to save them,” I answer,
the decree concerning saving does not take away the possibility of damning, but
it removes damnation itself. For “to be actually saved,” and “a possibility of
not being saved,” are two things not contrary to each other, but in perfect
agreement.
I
therefore add that in this way I have hitherto discriminated these two cases.
And at one time I certainly did say, with an explanation subjoined to it, “that
it was possible for believers finally to decline or fall away from faith and
salvation.” But at no period have I asserted, “that believers do finally
decline or fall away from faith or salvation.” This article, therefore, is
ascribed to one who is not its author; and it is another offense against
historical veracity.
I
subjoin, that there is a vast difference between the enunciation of these two
sentences. (1.) “It is possible for believers to decline from the FAITH ;” and
(2.) “It is possible for believers to decline from SALVATION.” For the latter,
when rigidly and accurately examined, can scarcely be admitted; it being
impossible for believers, as long as they remain believers, to decline from
salvation. Because, were this possible, that power of God would be conquered
which he has determined to employ in saving believers. On the other hand, if
believers fall away from the faith and become unbelievers, it is impossible for
them to do otherwise than decline from salvation, that is, provided they still
continue unbelievers. Therefore, whether this hypothesis be granted or not, the
enunciation cannot be accurately expressed. For if this hypothesis (their
perseverance in faith) be granted, they cannot decline; but if it be not
granted, they cannot do otherwise than decline. (2.) But that first enunciation
includes no hypothesis; and therefore an answer may be given to it simply,
either that it is possible, or that it is impossible. For this cause, the
second article ought to be corrected in the following manner: “It is possible
for believers finally to fall away or decline from the faith;” or rather, “Some
believers finally fall away and decline from
the
faith.” This being granted, the other can be necessarily inferred, “therefore
they also actually decline from salvation.” Respecting the truth of this
[Second] article, I repeat the same observations which I made about the First.
For the following expressions are reciprocal to each other, and regular
consequences: “Faith is peculiar to the elect,” and “believers do not finally
fall away from the faith.” In like manner, “Faith is not peculiar to the elect,”
and “Some believers finally decline from the faith.”
ARTICLE
III
It
is a matter of doubt, whether the faith by which Abraham is said to be
justified, was a faith in Jesus Christ who was still to come. No proof can be
adduced of his having understood the promises of God in any other manner, than
that he should be the heir of the world.
ANSWER
There
are two members in this article, or rather, those members are two distinct
articles, each of which presents itself to be separately considered by us,
after I have observed, that in this passage no affirmation or negation, each of
which properly constitutes a heretic, is attributed to us, but a mere doubt
alone, that betokens a consciousness of ignorance and infirmity, which those
who arrogate to themselves the knowledge of all these things, ought to
endeavour to remove by a mild course of instruction, and not to make it a
subject of reviling or provocation.
I.
To the FIRST MEMBER I reply:
First.
I never uttered this expression; but have, on more occasions than one, taught
both in public and private a contrary doctrine. Yet I remember, when a certain
minister at Leiden had boasted of the clearness of this article, and was
astonished how any persons could be found who entertained a different opinion
about it, I told him, that the proof of it would not be a very easy occupation
to him if he had to encounter a powerful adversary, and I challenged him to
make a trial, which challenge I now repeat. I wish him to prove this assertion
by such plain arguments, as will not leave a man just reasons for doubting any
longer about the matter. This is a point on which the labours of a divine will
be more profitably expended, than on publishing and magnifying the doubts of
the infirm, whose confidence in themselves is not equal to that which he
manifests.
Secondly.
“Faith in Christ” may be received in two acceptations. Either according to
promise, which was involved in the types, figures and shadows of words and
things, and proposed in that manner: Or, it is according to the gospel, that is
clearly manifested. The difference between these two is so great, that with
regard to it the Jews are said “to have been detained or kept under the law
before faith came, concluded or shut up unto that faith which should afterwards
be revealed.” (Gal. 3:23.) And the Apostle says, “the children of Israel were
prevented, by the veil placed over the countenance of Moses, from steadfastly
looking to the end of that which is abolished,” (2 Cor. 3:13,) that is, to the
end of the law, as is evident from the whole chapter, and from Romans 10:4,
where Christ is said to be “the end of the law for righteousness to everyone
that believeth.” Let the whole description of the faith of Abraham, which the
Apostle gives at great length in Romans 4, be attentively considered, and it
will appear, that no express mention of Jesus Christ is made in it, but it is
implied in such a way as it is not easy for anyone to explain.
Let
it be added that faith in Jesus Christ seems to some persons to be used by
metonymy, for “that faith which is concerning the types and figures which
adumbrate and prefigure Jesus Christ,” although it has not united with it an
understanding of those types, unless it be a very obscure one, and such as
appears suitable to the infant Church, according to the economy of the times
and ages which God in his wisdom employs. Let a comparison be instituted
between that servitude under which the heir, so long as he is a child, is said
by the Apostle to be held, (Gal. 4:1-3,) and that bondage from which the Spirit
of the Lord is declared to liberate the man whose heart is converted to Him; (2
Cor. 3:16-18,) and this doubting will then be considered ascribable to the
proper fear of a trembling [scrupulous] conscience, rather than to a
disposition that has a powerful propensity towards heresy.
II.
TO THE SECOND MEMBER OF THIS ARTICLE, I ANSWER:
First.
I never made such an assertion.
Secondly.
If even I had, it would not have called for any deserved reprehension, except
from a man that was desirous by that very act to betray at once the weakness of
his judgment
and
his want of experience. (1.) It is a sign of a judgment not the most accurate,
to blame any man for saying that which, it is possible to prove, has been
written by the Apostle himself in so many words. For if the heir-ship of the
world was promised to Abraham in these words, “You shall be the father of many
nations,” what wonder is there if Abraham understood the promises in no other
manner than as they had been divinely pronounced? (2.) It is a mark of great
inexperience in the men who framed these articles, to suppose that the
heir-ship of the world which was promised to Abraham, appertained to this
animal life and to carnal benefits; because the world of which mention is made
in that passage, is that future world to which belongs the calling of the
Gentiles, by which vocation Abraham was made the father of many nations. This
is apparent from the consideration, that he is said to have been made the heir
of the world by the righteousness of faith, of which St. Paul (Rom. 4:13,)
proves the Gentiles likewise to be partakers; and in Ephes. 3:1-11, the Apostle
treats on the vocation of the Gentiles, and says, it belongs to “the grace of
the gospel, and to the fellowship of the mystery which from the beginning of
the world hath been hidden in God and is now brought to light by Christ, by
whom God created all things.” I repeat it, that vocation does not belong to the
wisdom by which God formed the world, but to that by which he constituted
Christ his wisdom and power to salvation to them that believe; and by which he
founded the Church, which will endure forever. See 1 Corinthians 1:21-23; 2:6-8;
Ephes. 3:1-11. If the forgers of this article say, “that they have likewise
perceived this, but had supposed that my opinion was different;” I reply, it is
not the part of a prudent man to frame a foolish adversary for himself.
ARTICLE
IV
Faith
is not an effect of election, but is a necessary requisite foreseen by God in
those who are to be elected. And the decree concerning the bestowing of faith
precedes the decree of election.
ANSWER
Of
this article also there are two entire members:
I.
In the FIRST of them, three assertions are included. (1.) “Faith is not an
effect of election.” (2.) “Faith is a necessary requisite in those who are to
be elected or saved.” (3.) “This requisite is foreseen by God in the persons to
be elected.” I confess, all these, when rightly understood and correctly
explained, agree entirely with my opinion, on the subject. But the last of the
members is proposed in terms too odious, since it makes no mention of God,
whose benefit and gift I acknowledge faith to be.
I
will now proceed to explain myself on each of these assertions:
- With regard to the FIRST,
the word “Election” is ambiguous. For it either signifies “the election by
which God determines to justify believers, while those who are unbelievers
or workers are rejected from righteousness and salvation: “Or it signifies
“the election by which he determines to save certain particular persons,
as such, and to bestow faith on them in order to their salvation, other
particular persons being also rejected, merely in reference to their being
such particular individuals.” Election is received according to this
latter signification, by those who charge me with these articles. I take
it in the former acceptation, according to Romans 9:11: “For the children being not yet born, neither
having done any good or evil, that the purpose of God according to
election might stand, not of works, but of Him that calls, it was said
unto her, the elder shall serve the younger.”
I will not now enter into a prolix
disputation, whether or not the sense in which I receive it, be the correct
one. It is evident, at least, that there is some decree of God by which he
determines to justify believers; and which, since it excludes unbelievers from
righteousness and salvation, is appropriately called “the decree according to
election” or “with election,” as being that which does not include all men
within its embrace. This decree I consider as the foundation of Christianity,
of man’s salvation, and of his assurance of salvation; and it is this of which the
Apostle treats in the ninth, tenth and eleventh chapters of his Epistle to the
Romans, and in the first chapter to the Ephesians.
But I have not yet declared what my
sentiments in general are about that decree by which God is said “to have
determined absolutely to save certain particular persons, and to bestow faith
upon them in order to their salvation, while others are reprobated from
salvation and faith;” although I have confessed, that there is a certain decree
of God, according to which he determines to administer the means to faith and
salvation, as he knows them to be suitable and proper to his righteousness,
mercy and severity. From these premises it is deduced as a most manifest
consequence, that faith is not an effect of that election by which God
determines to justify those who believe.
- With regard to the SECOND
assertion, from the particulars thus explained it is concluded, that “faith
is a necessary requisite in those who shall be partakers of salvation
according to the election of God ;” or, that “it is a condition prescribed
and required by God, to be performed by those who shall obtain his
salvation.” “This is the will of God, that whosoever believeth in the Son
hath eternal life; he that believeth not, shall be condemned.” The propositions
contained in this passage cannot be resolved into any other than this
brief one, which is likewise used in the Scripture, “Believe, and you shall
be saved.” In which the word “believe” has the force of a demand or
requirement; and the phrase “you shall be saved” has that of a suasion, by
means of a good that is promised. This truth is so clear and perspicuous,
that the denial of it would be a proof of great perversity or of extreme unskillfulness.
If anyone say, “It is a condition, but yet an evangelical one, which God
may himself perform in us, or, (as it is better expressed,) which he may
by his grace cause us to perform; “the man who speaks thus, does not
contradict this truth, but confirms it when he adds this explanation, “of
what description soever that condition may be.”
- With regard to the THIRD, I
say that we must distinguish between the condition by which it is
required, that by which it is performed, and that by which it is seen or
foreseen as performed. This third member, therefore, is proposed in a
manner much too confused. Yet, when this confusion is corrected by the
distinction which we have stated, nothing of absurdity will be apparent
even in that member. Because foreseeing or seeing, in the very nature and
order of things follows the performance itself; the performance has its
own causes into which it is to be resolved; and the efficiency of those
causes is not necessary, unless faith be prescribed and required by the
law of faith and the gospel. Since therefore faith is said “to be foreseen
by God in those who are to be saved,” those causes, without the
intervention of which there could be no faith, are not removed, but are
rather appointed. Among those causes, I consider the preventing,
accompanying and succeeding [subsequent] grace of God, as the principal.
And I say, with Fulgentius, “Those persons will be saved, or they have
been predestinated and elected, who, God foreknew, would believe by the
assistance of his preventing grace, (I add and of his accompanying grace,)
and would persevere by the aid of his subsequent grace.” In this first
member, then, there is nothing except truth of the greatest purity.
II.
The second member is, “The decree concerning the gift of faith, precedes the
decree of election;” in the explanation of which I employ the same distinction
as in the former, and say, “The decree of election, by which God determines to
justify and save believers, precedes the decree concerning the bestowment of
faith.” For faith is unnecessary, nay it is useless, without this previous
decree. And the decree of election, by which God resolves to justify and save
this or that particular person, is subsequent to that decree according to which
he determines to administer the means necessary and efficacious to faith, that
is, the decree concerning the gift of faith.
If
anyone says, “God wills first absolutely to save some particular person; and,
since he wills that, he also wills to bestow faith on him, because without
faith, it is not possible for him to be saved.” I tell him, that he lays down
contradictory propositions -- that “God wills absolutely to save someone
without regard to faith,” and yet that, “according to the will of God, he
cannot be saved without faith.” Through the will of God it has been revealed to
us, without faith it is impossible for any man to please God, or to be saved.
There is, therefore, in God no other will, by which he wills anyone to be
absolutely saved without consideration of faith. For contradictory wills cannot
be attributed to God. If any person replies, “God wills the end before he wills
the means leading to the end; but salvation is the end, and faith the means
leading to the end,” I answer, first, Salvation is not the end of God; but
salvation and faith are the gifts of God, bound and connected together in this
order between themselves through the will of God, that faith should precede
salvation, both with regard to God, the donor of it; and in reality. Secondly.
Faith is a CONDITION required by God to be performed by him who shall be saved,
before it is MEANS of obtaining that salvation. Since God will not bestow
salvation on anyone, except on him who believes, man is on this account incited
to be willing to believe, because he knows that his chief good is placed in
salvation. Man, therefore, tried by faith, as the means, to attain to salvation
as the end; because he knows that he cannot possibly obtain salvation except
through that means. And this knowledge he does not acquire except through the
declaration of the divine Will, by which God requires faith from those who wish
to be saved, that is, by which he places faith as a condition in the object,
that is, in the person to be saved.
ARTICLE
V
Naught
among things contingent can be said to be NECESSARILY done in respect to the
Divine decree.
ANSWER
My
opinion concerning Necessity and Contingency is “that they can never be
applicable at once to one and the same event.” But I speak of the necessity and
contingency that are both of the same kind, not those which are different in
their genus. The schoolmen state, that there is one necessitas consequentis -- an absolute necessity -- , and another, necessitas consequentiæ -- a
hypothetical necessity. The former is, when the necessity arises from a cause
antecedent
to
the thing itself. But necessitas
consequentiæ -- a hypothetical necessity -- arises from certain premises,
or principles, antecedent to the conclusion. A consequent, or absolute
contingency cannot consist with a consequent, or absolute necessity; nor can
they meet together in one event. In the same manner, one conclusion cannot be
both necessary and contingent in regard to its consequence; that is, it cannot
have, at the same time, a necessity and a contingency that are hypothetical.
But the cause why one thing cannot be necessary and contingent at the same
time, is this “that what is necessary, and what is contingent, divide the whole
amplitude of being. For every being is either necessary or contingent. But
those things which divide the whole of being, cannot coincide or meet together
in any single being. Otherwise they would not divide the whole range of being.
What is contingent, and what is necessary, likewise, differ in their entire
essences and in the whole of their definition. For that is necessary which
cannot possibly not be or not be done. And that is contingent which is possible
not to be or to be done. Thus contradictorily are they opposed to each other;
and this opposition is infinite, and, therefore, always dividing truth from
falsehood: as, “this thing is either a man or it is not a man;” it is not
possible for anything to be both of these at once -- that is, it is impossible
for anything of one essence. Otherwise, in another sense,” Christ is a man,” as
proceeding from his mother, Mary; “he is not a man,” in reference to his having
been begotten of the Father from all eternity; but these are two things and two
natures.
But
they say: “It is possible for one and the same event to be necessary and
contingent in different respects -- necessary with regard to the first cause,
which is God -- and contingent in respect to second causes.” I answer, FIRST.
Those things which differ in their entire essences, do not coincide in
respects. SECONDLY. The necessity or contingency of an event is to be
estimated, not from one cause, but from all the causes united together. For
after ten causes have been fixed, from which a thing is produced, not
necessarily but contingently, if one be added from which the thing may be
necessarily completed, the whole of that thing is said to have been done not
contingently but necessarily. Because, when all these causes were together
appointed, it was impossible for that thing to hinder itself from being
produced, and from being brought into existence. That thing, I confess indeed,
when distinctly compared by our mind with each of its causes, has a different
relation to them respectively. But since none of those causes is the total
cause of that event, and since all of them united together form the total
cause, the thing ought itself to be accounted and declared to have been done
from that total cause, either necessarily or contingently.
It
is not only a rash saying, but a false and an ignorant one, “that a thing
which, in regard to second causes, is done contingently is said to be done
necessarily in regard to the divine decree.” For the divine decree itself,
being an internal action of God, is not immediately the cause of the thing;
but, whatever effects it may produce, it performs them by power, according to
the mode of which a thing will be said to be either necessarily or
contingently. For if God resolve to use an irresistible power in the execution
of his decree, or if he determine to employ such a quantum of power as nothing
can resist or can hinder it from completing his purpose, it will follow that
the thing will necessarily be brought into existence. Thus, “wicked men who
persevere in their sins, will necessarily perish,” for God will by an
irresistible force, cast them down into the depths of hell. But if he resolve
to use a force that is not irresistible, but that can be resisted by the
creature, then that thing is said to be done, not necessarily but contingently,
although its actual occurrence was certainly foreknown by God, according to the
infinity of his understanding, by which he knows all results whatever, that
will arise from certain causes which are laid down, and whether those causes
produce a thing necessarily or contingently. From whence the school-men say
that “all things are done by a necessity of infallibility,” which phrase is
used in a determinate sense, although the words in which its enunciation is
expressed are ill-chosen. For infallibility is not an affection of a being,
which exists from causes; but it is an affection of a Mind that sees or that
foresees what will be the effect of certain causes. But I readily endure a
catachrestic metalepsis, when it is
evident concerning a thing, although it is my wish that our enunciations were
always the best accommodated to the natures of the things themselves.
But
the inventors of these articles try to prove by the examples which they
produce, that “one and the same thing, which, with respect to second causes, is
done contingently, is, in respect to the Divine Decree, done necessarily.” They
say “It was possible for the bones of Christ to be broken, or not to be broken.
It was possible for them to be broken, if any person considers the nature of
bones; for they were undoubtedly fragile. But they could not be broken, if the
decree of God be taken into the account.” In answer to this, I deny that in
respect of the DIVINE DECREE, they could not be broken. For God did not decree
that it was impossible for them to be broken, but that they should not be
broken. This is apparent from the manner in which the transaction was actually
conducted. For God did not employ an irresistible power by which he might
prevent the bones of Christ from being broken by those who approached to break
them; but by a mild kind of suasion, he caused that they should not will to
break the bones of Christ, by an argument drawn from its inutility. For, since
Christ had already given up the ghost, before those who broke the legs had
arrived at the cross, they were not at all inclined to undertake a vain and
fruitless labour in breaking the legs of our saviour. Because the breaking of
legs, with the design to hasten death, was only done lest the bodies should
remain suspended on the cross on a festival or sacred day, contrary to the
divine law. Indeed, if the divine Wisdom knows how to effect that which it has
decreed, by employing causes according to their nature and motion -- whether
their nature and motion be contingent or free, the praise due to such Wisdom is
far greater than if it employ a power which no creature can possibly resist.
Although God can employ such a power whensoever it may seem expedient to his
Wisdom. I am therefore, of opinion that I committed no offense when I said, “No
contingent thing -- that is, nothing which is done or has been done
CONTINGENTLY -- can be said to be or have been done NECESSARILY, with regard to
the divine decree.”
ARTICLE
VI
All
things are done contingently.
ANSWER
This
Article is expressed in such a stupid and senseless manner, that they who
attribute it to me, declare by this very circumstance, that they do not perceive
under how many falsities this expression labours; nay, they do not understand
what is the meaning of the words which they employ. For if that is said to be
done contingently which it is possible not to do, or which may not be done,
after all the causes required for its being done have been fixed; and, on the
other hand, if that is said to be done necessarily which cannot be left undone
which cannot but be done-after all the causes required for its performance have
been fixed; and if I grant, that, after some causes have been fixed, it is
impossible for any other event to ensue than that the thing should be done and
exist, how then can I be of opinion that” all things are done, or happen,
contingently?.” But they have deceived themselves by their own ignorance; from
which it would be possible for them to be liberated, if they would bestow a
becoming and proper attention on sentiments that are more correct, and would in
a friendly manner obtain from the author a knowledge of his views and opinions.
I
have both declared and taught that “necessity, in reference to its being said
to be or to happen necessarily, is either absolute or relative.” It is an
absolute necessity, in relation to a thing being said simply “to be or to
happen necessarily,” without any regard being had to the supposition, or laying
down, of any cause whatever. It is a relative necessity, when a thing is said “to
be or to happen necessarily,” after some cause had been laid down or fixed.
Thus, God exists by an absolute necessity; and by the same absolute necessity,
he both understands and loves himself. But the world, and all things produced
from it, are, according to an absolute consideration, contingent, and are
produced contingently by God, freely operating. But it being granted that God
wills to form the world by his infinite power, to which NOTHING ITSELF must be
equal to matter in the most perfect state of preparation -- and it being
likewise granted that God actually employs this power -- it will then be said, “It
was impossible for the world to do otherwise than exist from this cause;” or, “from
this cause, the world could not but exist.” And this is a relative necessity,
which is so called from the hypothesis of an antecedent cause being laid down
or fixed.
I
will explain my meaning in a different manner. Two things in this place come
under our consideration, the CAUSE and the EFFECT. If both of them be
necessarily fixed, that is, if not only the effect be fixed necessarily when
the cause fixed, but if the cause also necessarily exist and be necessarily
supposed to operate, the necessity of the effect is in that case simple and
absolute. In this manner arises the absolute necessity of the Divine effect, by
which God is said to know and love himself; for the Divine understanding and the
Divine will cannot be inoperative, [cannot but operate]. This operation of God
is not only an internal one, but it is also ad
intra, [inwards,] tending towards an object, which is himself. But whatever
God may do ad extra, [externally,]
that is, when acting on an object which is something beside himself, [or
something different from himself,] whether this object be united to him in
understanding and he tend towards it by an internal act, or whether it be in
reality separated from him and towards which he tends by an external act, the
whole of this he does freely, and the whole of it is, therefore, said to be
absolutely contingent. Thus God freely decreed to form the world, and did
freely form it. And, in this sense, all things are done contingently in respect
to the Divine decree; because no necessity exists why the decree of God should
be appointed, since it proceeds from his own pure and free [or unconstrained]
will.
Or,
to express it in another form: That is called the simple and absolute necessity
of any effect, “when the cause necessarily exists, necessarily operates, and
employs that power through which it is impossible for the thing not to exist,”
[or through which it cannot but exist]. In the nature of things, such an effect
as this cannot be contemplated. For the intellect of the Deity, by which he
understands himself, proceeds from a cause that necessarily exists and that
necessarily understands itself; but it does not proceed from a cause which
employs a power of action for such an understanding.
Under
this consideration, the relative necessity of any event is two-fold. FIRST.
When a cause that necessarily exists, but does not necessarily operate, uses a
power of action that cannot be resisted. Thus it being fixed, that “God, who is
a necessary being, wills to create a world by his omnipotence,” a world must in
that case necessarily come into existence. SECONDLY. When a cause that does not
necessarily exist and yet necessarily operates, acts with such efficacy as is
impossible to be resisted by the matter or subject on which it operates. Thus,
straw is said to be necessarily burnt [or consumed] by the fire, if it be cast
into the flame. Because it is impossible either for the fire to restrain its
power of burning so as not actually to burn, or for the straw to resist the
fire. But because God can prevent the fire from burning any combustible matter
that is brought near it or put into it, this kind of necessity is called
partial in respect to the cause, and only according to the nature of the things
themselves and the mutual affection [or relation] between them.
When
these matters have been thus explained, I could wish to see what can possibly
be said in opposition. I am desirous, that we should in preference contend FOR
THE NECESSITY OF GOD ALONE, that is, for his necessary existence and for the
necessary production of his ad intra [internal] acts, and that we should
contend for the CONTINGENCY OF ALL OTHER THINGS AND EFFECTS. Such a procedure
on our part would conduce far more to the glory of God; to whom by this method
would be attributed both the GLORY of his necessary existence, that is, of his
eternity, according to which it is a pure act without [the exercise of] power,
and the GLORY of his free creation of all other things, by which also his
goodness
becomes a supreme object of our commendation.
ARTICLE
VII
God
has not by his eternal decree determined future and contingent things to the
one part or the other.
ANSWER
A
calumny which lies concealed under ambiguous terms, is capable of inflicting a
deep injury with the greatest security; but after such equivocal expressions
are explained, the slander is exposed, and loses all its force among men of
skill and experience.
The
word “DETERMINED” is of this ambiguous description. For it signifies (1.)
either “the determination of God by which he resolves that something shall be
done; and when such a determination is fixed, (by an action, motion and impulse
of God, of whatever kind it may be,) the second cause, both with regard to its
power and the use of that power, remains free either to act or not to act, so
that, if it be the pleasure of this second cause, it can suspend [or defer] its
own action.” Or it signifies (2.) “such a determination, as, when once it is
fixed, the second cause (at least in regard to the use of its power,) remains
no longer free so as to be able to suspend its own action, when God’s action,
motion and impulse have been fixed; but by this determination, it [the second
cause] is necessarily bent or inclined to the one course or the other, all
indifference to either part being completely removed before this determined act
be produced by a free and unconstrained creature.”
- If the word “DETERMINED,”
in the article here proposed, be interpreted according to this first
method, far be it from me to deny such a sort of Divine determination. For
I am aware that it is said, in the fourth chapter of the. Acts of the
Apostles, “Both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and the people
of Israel, were gathered together against Jesus, to do whatsoever God’s
hand and counsel determined before (or previously appointed) to be done.”
But I also know, that Herod, Pontius Pilate, and the Jews, freely
performed those very actions; and (notwithstanding this “fore-determination
of God,” and though by his power every Divine action, motion and impulse
which was necessary for the execution of this “fore-determination,” were
all fixed,) yet it was possible for this act (the crucifixion of Christ,)
which had been “previously appointed” by God, not to be produced by those
persons, and they might have remained free and indifferent to the
performance of this action, up to the moment of time in which they
perpetrated the deed. Let the narrative of the passion of our Lord be
perused, and let it be observed how the whole matter was conducted, by
what arguments Herod, Pontius Pilate and the Jews were moved and induced,
and the kind of administration [or management] that was employed in the
use of those arguments, and it will then be evident, that it is the truth
which I here assert.
- But if the word “DETERMINED”
be received according to the second acceptation, I confess, that I
abominate and detest that axiom (as one that is FALSE, ABSURD, and
preparing the way for MANY BLASPHEMIES,) which, declares that “God by his
eternal decree has determined to the one part or to the other future
contingent things.” By this last phrase understand “those things which are
performed by the free will of the creature.”
(1.)
I execrate it as a FALSEHOOD: Because God in the
administration of his Providence conducts all things in such a manner that when
he is pleased to employ his creatures in the execution of his decrees, he does
not take away from them their nature, natural properties or the use of them, but
allows them to perform and complete their own proper motions. Were it
otherwise, Divine Providence, which ought to be accommodated to the creation,
would be in direct opposition.
(2.)
I detest it as AN
ABSURDITY: Because it is contradictory in the adjunct, that “something is done
contingently,” that is, it is done in such a manner as makes it POSSIBLE not to
be done; and yet this same thing is determined to the one part or the other in
such a manner, as makes it IMPOSSIBLE to leave undone that which has been
determined to be done. What the patrons of such a doctrine advance about “that
liberty not being taken away which belongs to the nature of the creature,” is
not sufficient to destroy this contradiction: Because it is not sufficient for
the establishment of contingency and liberty to have the presence of a power
which can freely act according to nature; but it is requisite that the use and
employment of that power and liberty should on no account be impeded. What
insanity therefore is it, [according to the scheme of these men,] to confer at
the creation a power on the creature of acting freely or of suspending its action,
and yet to take away the use of such a power when the liberty comes at length
to be employed. That is, to grant it when there is no use for it, but when it
becomes both useful and necessary, then in the very act to prevent the exercise
of its liberty. Let Tertullian against Marcion be examined, (lib. ii. c. 5, 6,
7,) where he discusses this matter in a most erudite and nervous manner. I
yield my full assent to all that he advances.
(3.)
I abhor it as
CONDUCING TO MULTIPLIED BLASPHEMIES. For I consider it impossible for any art
or sophistry to prevent this dogma concerning “such a previous determination”
from producing the following consequences: FIRST. It makes God to be the author
of sin, and man to be exempt from blame. SECONDLY. It constitutes God as the
real, proper and only sinner: Because when there is a fixed law which forbids
this act, and when there is such “a fore-determination” as makes it “impossible
for this act not to be committed,” it follows as a natural consequence, that it
is God himself who transgresses the law, since he is the person who performs
this deed against the law. For though this be immediately perpetrated by the
creature, yet, with regard to it, the creature cannot have any consideration of
sin; because this act was unavoidable on the part of man, after such “fore-determination”
had been fixed. THIRDLY. Because, according to this dogma, God needed sinful man
and his sin, for the illustration of his justice and mercy. FOURTHLY. And, from
its terms, sin is no longer sin.
I
never yet saw a refutation of those consequences which have been deduced from
this dogma by some other persons. I wish such a refutation was prepared, at
least that it would be seriously attempted. When it is completed, if I am not
able to demonstrate, even then, that these objections of mine are not removed,
I will own myself to be vanquished, and will ask pardon for my offense. Although
I am not accustomed to charge and oppress this sentiment [of theirs] with such
consequences before other people, yet I usually confess this single
circumstance, (and this, only when urged by necessity,) that “I cannot possibly
free their opinion from those objections.”
ARTICLE
VIII
Sufficient
grace of the Holy Spirit is bestowed on those to whom the gospel is preached,
whosoever they may be; so that, if they will, they may believe: otherwise, God
would only be mocking mankind.
ANSWER
At
no time, either in public or in private, have I delivered this proposition in
these words, or in any expressions that were of equivalent force, or that
conveyed a similar meaning. This
assertion I confidently make, even though a great number of persons might bear
a contrary testimony. Because, unless this Article received a modified
explanation, I neither approve of it at present, nor has it at any time
obtained any portion of my approval. Of this fact it is in my power to afford
evidence, from written conferences which I have had with other people on the
same subject.
In
this Article there are three topics concerning which I am desirous of giving a
suitable explanation.
FIRST.
Concerning the difference which subsists among the persons to whom the gospel
is preached. Frequent mention of this difference is made in the scriptures, and
particularly in the following passages. “I thank you, O Father, Lord of heaven
and earth, because you have hid these things from the wise and prudent, and
hast revealed them unto babes.” (Matt. 11:25.) The explanation of these words
may be discovered in 1 Corinthians 1 and 2. “Into whatsoever city or town you
shall enter, inquire who in it is worthy; and there abide till ye go thence.
And when ye come into a house, salute it. And if the house be worthy, let your
peace come upon it; but. if it be not worthy, let your peace return to you.”
(Matt. 10:11-13.) The Jews of Berea “were
more noble than those in Thessalonica, in that they received the word with all
readiness of mind,” &c. (Acts 17:11.) “Pray for us, that the word of the
Lord may have free course, and be glorified, even as it is with you; and that
we may be delivered from unreasonable and wicked men. For all men have not
faith. But the Lord is faithful,” &c. (2 Thess. 3:1-2.)
SECONDLY.
Concerning the bestowing of sufficient grace what is to be understood by such a
gift? It is well known, that there is habitual grace, and [the grace of]
assistance. Now the phraseology of the article might be understood according to
this acceptation, as though some kind of habitual grace were infused into all
those to whom the gospel is preached, which would render them apt or inclined
to give it credence, or believe the gospel. But this interpretation of the.
phrase is one of which I do not approve. But this SUFFICIENCY, after all that
is said about it, must, in my opinion, be ascribed to the assistance of the
Holy Spirit, by which he assists the preaching of the gospel, as the organ, or
instrument, by which He, the Holy Spirit, is accustomed to be efficacious in
the hearts of the hearers. But it is possible to explain this operation of the
assistance of the Holy Spirit, in a manner so modified and appropriate, and
such sufficiency may be ascribed to it, as to keep at the greatest possible
distance from Pelagianism.
THIRDLY.
Concerning the expression, “By this grace they may believe, if they will.”
These words, when delivered in such a crude and undigested form, are capable of
being brought to bear a very bad interpretation, and a meaning not at all
agreeable to the scriptures, as though, after that power had been bestowed, the
Holy Spirit and Divine Grace remain entirely quiescent, waiting to see whether
the man will properly use the power which he has received, and will believe the
gospel. When, on the contrary, he who wishes to entertain and to utter correct
sentiments on this subject, will account it necessary to ascribe to Grace its
own province, which, indeed, is the principal one, in persuading the human will
that it may be inclined to yield assent to those truths which are
preached.
This
exposition completely frees me from the slightest suspicion of heresy on the
point here mentioned; and proves it to be a report not entitled to the least
credit, that I have employed such expressions, as I am unwilling to admit,
except with the addition of a sound and proper explanation.
In
reference to the REASON which is appended to this proposition, that, otherwise,
God would only be mocking mankind, I confess it to be a remark which several
adversaries employ against the opinion entertained by many of our divines, to
convict it of absurdity. And it is not used without just cause, which might
easily have been demonstrated, had it pleased the inventors of these Articles,
(instead of ascribing them to me,) to occupy themselves in openly declaring on
this subject their own sentiments, which they keep carefully concealed within
their own bosoms.
ARTICLE
IX
The
temporal afflictions of believers are not correctly termed “CHASTISEMENTS,” but
are PUNISHMENTS for sins. For Christ has rendered satisfaction only for eternal
punishments.
ANSWER
This
Article is attributed to me by a double and most flagrant falsehood: the first
of which will be found in the Article itself, and the second in the reason
appended.
1.
Concerning the FIRST. Those who are mere novices in Divinity know that the
afflictions and calamities of this animal life, are either punishments,
chastisements, or trials. That is, in sending them, God either intends
punishment for sins, in regard to their having been already committed, and
without any other consideration; or, He intends chastisement, that those who
are the subjects of it may not afterwards fall into the commission of other or
similar offenses; or, in sending afflictions and calamities, God purposes to
try the faith, hope, charity, patience, and the like conspicuous virtues and
graces of his people. What man would be so silly as to say, when the Apostles
were called before the Jewish Council, and were beaten with rods, that “it was
a PUNISHMENT!” although “they departed from the presence of the Council, that
they were counted worthy to suffer shame for his name.” (Acts 5:41.) Is not the
following expression of the Apostle familiar to every one? “For this cause many
are weak and sickly among you, and many sleep. For if we would judge ourselves,
we should not be judged. But when we are judged, we are CHASTENED, (reproved
and instructed,) OF THE LORD, that we should not be condemned with the world.”
(1 Cor. 11:30-32.) By not reflecting on these and similar passages of
scripture, the persons who attributed these articles to me betrayed their
ignorance, as well as their audacity. If they had bestowed the least reflection
upon such texts, by what strange infatuation of mind has it happened, that they
ascribe to me a sentiment which is thus confuted by plain and obvious
quotations from the word of God?
On
one occasion, when the subject of discussion was the calamities inflicted on
the house of David on account of criminal conduct towards Uriah; and when the
passages of scripture which were adduced tended with great semblance of truth
to prove, that those calamities bore some relation to PUNISHMENT, I stated,
that “no necessity whatever existed for as to allow ourselves to be brought
into such straits by our adversaries the Papists, from which we could with
difficulty escape; since the words appear to make against the opinion which
asserts that they have by no means any reference to punishment. And because sin
merits both an eternal punishment corresponding with its grievous enormity, and
a temporal punishment, (if indeed God be pleased to inflict the latter, which
is not always his practice even with respect to those who persevere in their
transgressions, as may be seen in Psalm 73, and Job 21,) it might, not
unseasonably, be said, that, after God has pardoned the guilt so far as it is
meritorious of eternal punishment, he reserves or retains it in reference to
temporal punishment.” And I showed, that, “from these premises, no patronage
could be obtained for the Popish dogma of a Purgatory,” which was the subject
of that discussion.
2.
With regard to the REASON appended, it is supported by the same criminal
falsehood as the preceding part of the Article, and with no less absurdity of
object, as I will demonstrate. For I affirm, in the first place, that this
expression at no time escaped from my lips, and that such a thought never
entered my imagination. My opinion on this subject is, “Christ is our Redeemer
and saviour from sins, which merit both temporal and eternal death; and He
delivers us not only from death eternal, but from death temporal, which is the
separation of the soul from the body.” But it is amazing, that this opinion “Christ
has rendered satisfaction for temporal punishments alone,” could possibly have
been attributed to me by men of discretion, when the scriptures expressly
declare, “Christ was also a partaker of flesh and blood, that, through death,
he might destroy him that had the power of death, that is, the devil.” (Heb. 2:14.)
By the term DEATH in this place must be understood either “the death of the
body alone,” or “that in conjunction with eternal death. “The Son of God was
manifested, that he might destroy the works of the devil.” (1 John 3:8.) And
among those works to be destroyed, we must reckon death temporal. For “by the
envy of the devil, death entered into the world.” In another passage it is
said, “For since by man came death, by MAN came also the resurrection of the
dead;” this man is Christ. (1 Cor. 15:21.) “Christ shall change our vile body,
that it may be fashioned like unto his glorious body, according to the working
whereby he is able even to subdue all things unto himself.” (Phil. 3:21.) The greatest necessity exists for that man to
become conversant with the scriptures, who denies, that “by the death, of
Christ we are redeemed from temporal death, and obtain a right and title to a
happy resurrection.”
The
following is an affirmation which I have made: “We are not actually delivered
from temporal death, except by the resurrection from the dead, through which
our last enemy, death, will be destroyed. These two truths, therefore, are, in
my judgment, to be considered and taught, (1.) Christ, by his death,
immediately took away from death the authority or right which he had over us,
that of detaining us under his power, even as it was not possible that Christ
himself should be holden by the bonds [pains] of death. (Acts 2:24.) But (2.)
Christ will in his own time deliver us from its actual dominion, according to
the administration or appointment of God, whose pleasure it is to concede to
the soul an early period of liberation, and to the body one that is later.”
But, I confess, that I cannot with an unwavering conscience assert, and
therefore, dare not do it as if it were an object of certain knowledge, that
temporal death, which is imposed or inflicted on the saints, is not a
punishment, or has no regard to punishment,” when it is styled “an ENEMY that
is to be destroyed” by the Omnipotence of Christ.
The
contrary opinion to this is not proved by the argument, that “our corporeal
death is a passage into eternal life:” because it is a passage of the soul, and
not of the body; the latter of which, while it remains buried in the earth, is
held under the dominion of death. Nor is it established by the remark that “the
saints long for the death of the body.” (Phil. 1:21, 23.) For when they “have a
desire to be dissolved [to depart] and be with Christ,” that desire is
according to the soul; the body in the mean time remaining under the dominion
of death its enemy, until it likewise, (after being again united to its own
soul,) be glorified with it. The address of Christ to Peter may also be stated
in opposition: “When you shalt be old, you shall stretch forth your hands, and
another shall gird you, and carry you where you do not wish to go. This he
spoke, signifying by what
death
he should glorify God.” (John 21:19.)
The
framers of these articles, therefore, have imputed this opinion to me, not only
without truth, but without a sufficient sanction from their own discretion. Of
this weakness of their judgment I observe, in this Article, other two
tokens:
FIRST.
They do not distinguish between the magnitude of each error in a proper manner.
For he falls into a far greater error who DENIES, that “Christ has rendered
satisfaction for corporeal punishments,” that is, for the punishment of death
temporal, than is his who ASSENTS, that “the death of the body has regard to
punishment, since it is inflicted even on holy persons.” But they have placed
the latter error as the proposition; and the former one is brought, as a
reason, for its confirmation. When they ought to have adopted an opposite mode
of stating them, according to the relative estimate of each of these errors thus,
“Christ has rendered satisfaction for eternal punishment alone. Therefore, the
temporal afflictions of believers are not correctly called chastisements, but
are punishments for sins.”
SECONDLY.
Because they make me employ an argument, which I cannot discover to be
possessed of any force towards proving the proposition. For I grant, that
Christ has rendered satisfaction even for temporal punishments; and yet I say, “It
may likewise be true that temporal death has a reference to PUNISHMENT, even
when it is inflicted on believers.”
THIRDLY.
From these considerations, a third mark of an inconstant and wavering judgment
discovers itself. For when they employ this mode of argumentation, “Christ has
liberated us from temporal punishments. Therefore our death cannot have any
respect to punishment,” they do not perceive that I might with equal facility
draw from the same premises the following conclusion, “Therefore, it is not
equitable that the saints should die a temporal death.” My method of reasoning
is [direct] a re ad rem, from subject to subject, “Because Christ has borne the
death of the body, it is not to be borne by us.” Their method is [relative] a re ad respectum rei,
from
the subject to its relation, thus, “Because Christ has borne the death of the
body, it is indeed inflicted on us, but not so as to have any reference to
punishment.”
God
will himself approve and verify this argument a re ad rem, from subject to subject, by the effect which He will
give to it at some future period. But the argument will be prepared and stated
in a legitimate form, thus, “Christ has borne the death of the body; and,
(secondly,) has taken it away, which fact is apparent from his resurrection.
Therefore, God will take away death from us in his own good time.”
ARTICLE
X
It
cannot be proved from Scripture that believers under the Old Testament, before
the ascension of Christ, were in Heaven.
ANSWER
I
never taught such a doctrine as this in public, and I never asserted it
affirmatively in private. I recollect, however, that I said, on one occasion,
to a minister of God’s word, in reference to a sermon which he had then
delivered, “there are many passages of Scripture which seem to prove, that
believers under the Old Testament, before the ascension of Christ, were not in
Heaven.” I produced some of those passages, against which he had little to
object. But I added, that I thought it could not now be propounded with much
usefulness to any church that held a contrary opinion; but that, after it has
been diligently examined and found to be true, it may be taught with profit to
the church and to the glory of Christ, when the minds of men have been duly
prepared. I am still of the same opinion. But, about the matter itself, I
affirm nothing on either side. I perceive that each of these views of the
subject has arguments in its favour, not only in passages of scripture and in
conclusions deduced from them, but likewise in the sentiments of divines.
Having investigated all of them to the best of my ability, I confess that I
hesitate, and declare that neither view seems to me to be very evident [or to
have the preponderance.] In this opinion I have the assent of a vast majority
of divines, especially those of our own age. Most of the Christian Fathers
place the souls of the Patriarchs under the Old Testament beyond or out of
Heaven, either in the lower regions, in Purgatory, or in some other place,
which yet is situated out of the verge of what is properly called Heaven. With St. Augustine, therefore, “I prefer
doubting about secret things, to litigation about those which are uncertain.”
Nor is there the least necessity. For why should I, in these our days, when
Christ, by his ascension into Heaven, having become our Forerunner, hath opened
for us a way and entrance into that holy place, why should I now contend about
the place in which the souls of the Fathers rested in the times of the Old
Testament?
But
lest, as is usual in my case, a calumnious report should be raised on the
consequences to be deduced from this opinion, as though I was favourable to the
Popish dogma of a Purgatory, or as though I approach nearly to those who think
that the souls of the dead sleep or have slept, or, which is the worst of all,
as though I seem to identify myself with those who say, “the Fathers were like
swine that were fed and fattened without any hope of a better life,” lest such
reports as these should be fabricated, I will openly declare what my opinion is
about the state of the Fathers prior to Christ’s ascension into Heaven. (1.) I believe
that human souls are immortal, that is, they will never die. (2.) From this I
deduce, that souls do not sleep. (3.) That, after this life, a state of
felicity or of misery is opened for all men, into the one or the other of which
they enter immediately on their departure out of this world. (4.) That the
souls of the Fathers, who passed their days of sojourning on earth in faith and
in waiting for the Redeemer, departed into a place of quiet, joy, and
blessedness, and began to enjoy the blissful presence of God, as soon as they
escaped out of the body. (5.) I dare not venture to determine where that place
of quiet is situated, whether in Heaven, properly so called, into which Christ
ascended, or somewhere out of it. If any other person be more adventurous on
this subject, I think he ought to be required to produce reasons for his
opinion, or be enjoined to keep silence. (6.) I add, that, in my opinion, the
felicity of those souls was much increased by the ascension of Christ into
Heaven, and that it will be fully consummated after the resurrection of the
body, and when all the members of the Church universal are introduced into
Heaven.
I
know certain passages of Scripture which are produced, as proofs that the souls
of the Old Testament Saints have been in Heaven. (1.) “The spirit shall return
unto God who gave it.” (Eccl. 12:7.) But this expression must either be
understood in reference to all the spirits of men of every description, and
thus will afford no assistance to this argument; or, if it be understood as
relating to the souls of good men alone, it does not even then follow, that,
because “the spirit returns unto God,” it ascends into Heaven property so
called. I prefer, however, the former mode of interpretation, a return to God
the Creator and the Preserver of spirits, and the Judge of the deeds done in
the body. (2.) Enoch is said to have been taken to God, (Gen. 5:24) and Elijah
to have ascended by a whirlwind into Heaven. (2 Kings 2:11.) But, beside the
fact of these examples being out of the common order, it does not follow of
course that because Enoch was taken to God, he was translated into the highest
heaven. For the word “Heaven” is very wide in its
signification.
The same observation applies to Elijah. See Peter Martyr and Vatablus on 2
Kings 2:13. (3.) “Christ is now become the first fruits of them that slept.” (1
Cor. 15:20.) This would not appear to be correct, if Enoch and Elijah ascended
into the highest Heaven, clothed in bodies endued with immortality. (4.) “Lazarus
was carried by the angels into Abraham’s bosom,” where he enjoyed consolation.
(Luke 16:22.) But it is not proved, that Heaven itself is described by the
term, “Abraham’s bosom.” It is intimated, that Lazarus was gathered into the
bosom of his father Abraham, in which he might rest in hope of a full
beatification in Heaven itself, which was to be procured by Christ. For this
reason the Apostle, after the ascension of Christ into Heaven, “had a desire to
be with Christ.” (Phil. 1:23.) (5.) “Many shall come from the East and the
West, and shall sit down with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, in the kingdom of
Heaven.” (Matt. 8:11.) But it does not thence follow, that the Fathers have
been in Heaven, properly so called, before they, who are to be called from
among the Gentiles, sit down with them. (6.) It appears from Matthew 25, that
there are only two places, one destined for the pious, the other for the
wicked. But it does not hence necessarily follow, that the place destined for
the pious has always been Heaven supreme. There have never been more places,
because there have never been more states. But it is not necessary, that they
should always be the same places without any change. The authority of this
declaration is preserved inviolate, provided a third place be never added to
the former two. (7.) “The reward” which awaits the pious “in heaven,” is said
to be “great.” (Matt. 5:12.) Let this be granted. Therefore, [will some
reasoner say,] they must instantly after death be translated into the supreme
heaven.” This does not necessarily follow. For it is well known, that the
Scriptures have in these promises a reference to the period which immediately
succeeds the last judgment, according to the following expression: “Behold I
come quickly, and my reward is with me.” The spouse replies, “Even so come,
Lord Jesus!” (Rev. 22:12, 20) In the same manner must be understood that
passage in Luke, “They may receive you into everlasting habitations;” (Luke 16:9;)
that is, after the last judgment, at least after [the ascension of] Christ, whose
office it was to prepare those mansions for his people. (John 14:2.) (8.) “The
Fathers are said to have been justified by the same faith as we are.” (Acts 13:33.)
I acknowledge this. “Therefore they have always been in Heaven even before [the
ascension of] Christ, and we shall be after Him.” This is not a necessary
consequence. For there are degrees in glorification. Nor is it at all
wonderful, if they be said to be rendered more blessed and glorious after the
ascension of Christ into Heaven. (9.) “But Jesus said to the malefactor, today you
shall be with me in Paradise.” (Luke 23:43.) I reply, FIRST, It is not
necessary that by “Paradise” should here be understood the third heaven, or the
eternal abode of the blessed. For it denotes in general a place of felicity.
SECONDLY, St. Chrysostom says, the crucified thief was the first person whose
spirit entered into heaven. Yet he did not ascend there before Christ, nor
before the veil of the temple had been rent in two.”
But
to these passages is opposed that admirable dispensation or economy of God,
which is distinguished according to the times preceding Christ, and those which
followed. Of this dispensation the temple at Jerusalem was an illustrious
[exemplar] pattern. For its external part, by means of an interposing veil, was
separated and divided from that in which the priests daily appeared, and which
was called “The Holy of Holies,” in contradistinction to that which is called “The
Sanctuary,” (Heb. 9:2-3.) Heaven itself is designated by “The Holy of Holies”
in Heb. 9:24. It was shut as long as the former tabernacle stood, and until
Christ entered into it by his own blood. (Heb. 9:8-12.) It was his province as “our
Forerunner” to precede us, that we also might be able to enter into those
things which are within the veil. (Heb. 6:19.) For this purpose it was
necessary that liberty should be granted to us of “entering into the Holiest by
the blood of Jesus, by that new and living way which he hath consecrated for us
through the veil, that is to say, his flesh.” (Heb. 10:19-20.) On this account
the ancient worthies, who, “through faith have” most evidently “gained this
testimony that they pleased God,” are said, “not to have received or obtained
the promise; God having provided some better thing for us,” who follow Christ, “that
they without us should not be made perfect.” (Heb. 11:40.) These passages of
scripture, and a view of the dispensation which they describe, are among the
principal reasons why I cannot give my assent to the opinion which affirms, that
the Fathers have been in Heaven properly so called.
But,
that our brethren may not so highly blame me, I will oppose to them one or two
of the approved divines of our church. CALVIN, in his INSTITUTES,” (lib. iv, c. 1, s. 12,) says: “For what churches would
dissent from each other on this account alone -- that one of them, without any
of the licentiousness of contention or the obstinacy of assertion, holds the
opinion that souls, when they leave their bodies, soar up to Heaven; while
another church does not venture to define anything about the place, but only
maintains with certainty that they still live in the Lord.” Peruse also the
following passage in his “Institutes,” (lib. iii, c. 25, s. 6.) “Many persons
torment themselves by disputing about the place which departed souls occupy,
and whether they be now in the enjoyment of heavenly glory or not. But it is
foolish and rash to inquire about things unknown, more deeply than God permits
us to know them.” Behold, Calvin here says, that it is frivolous to contend
whether the souls of the dead already enjoy celestial glory or not; and, in his
judgment, it ought not to be made a subject of contention. Yet I am condemned,
or at least am accused, because I dare not positively affirm “that the souls of
the Fathers before Christ, were in Heaven, properly so called.” PETER MARTYR
proceeds still further, and is bold enough to assert, in his observations on 2
Kings 2:13, “that the souls of the Fathers before Christ, were not in Heaven
properly so called.” He says, “Now if I be asked, to what place were Enoch and
Elijah translated? I will say simply that I do not know, because that
circumstance is not delivered in the divine volume. Yet if we might follow a
very probable analogy, I would say, they were conducted to the place of the
Fathers, or into Abraham’s bosom, that they might there pass their time with
the blessed Patriarchs in expectation of the resurrection of Christ, and that
they might afterwards be elevated above the Heavens with Him when he was raised
up again.” Where it is to be noted, that Martyr entertains doubts concerning
Enoch and Elijah, but speaks decisively about those who are in Abraham’s bosom,
that is, about the Fathers, “that they were raised up above the heavens with
Christ at his resurrection.” This likewise appears from what he mentions a
little afterwards. With regard to that sublime ascension, we grant that no one
enjoyed it before Christ. Enoch, therefore, and Elijah went to the Fathers, and
there with them waited for Christ, upon whom, in company with the rest, they
were attendants when he entered into heaven.” See also BULLINGER on Luke 16:23;
Heb. 9:8; 1 Pet. 3:19.
From
the preceding explanation and extracts, I have, I think, rendered it evident,
that not only had I just causes for being doubtful concerning this matter, but
that I likewise ought not therefore to be blamed, even though I had uttered
what they here charge upon me as an error; nay, what is still more, that I
ought to be tolerated had I simply asserted, “that the souls of the Fathers
were not in Heaven prior to the ascension of Christ to that blissful abode.”
ARTICLE
XI
It
is a matter of doubt, whether believers under the Old Testament understood that
the legal ceremonies were types of Christ and of his benefits.
ANSWER
I
do not remember to have said this at any time: nay, I am conscious that I have
never said it, because I never yet durst utter any such expression. But I have
said, that an inquiry not altogether unprofitable might be instituted, “how far
the ancient Jews understood the legal ceremonies to be types of Christ?” At
least I feel myself well assured, that they did not understand those
ceremonies, as we do to whom the mystery of the Gospel is revealed. Nor do I
suppose that anyone will venture to deny this. But I wish our brethren would
take upon themselves the task of proving, that believers under the Old
Testament understood the legal ceremonies to be types of Christ and his
benefits. For they not only know that this opinion of theirs is called in question
by some persons, but that it is likewise confidently denied. Let them make the
experiment, and they will perceive how difficult an enterprise they have
undertaken. For the passages which seem to prove their proposition, are taken
away from them in such a specious manner by their adversaries, that a man who
is accustomed to yield assent to those things alone which are well supported by
proofs, may be easily induced to doubt whether the believers under the Old
Testament had any knowledge of this matter; especially if he consider, that,
according to Gal. iv, 3, the whole of the ancient [Jewish] Church was in a
state of infancy or childhood, and therefore possessed only the understanding
of a child. Whether an infant be competent to perceive in these corporal things
the spiritual things which are signified by them, let those decide who are
acquainted with that passage, “When I was a child, I understood as a child.” (1
Cor. 13:11.) Let those passages also be inspected which, we will venture to
say, have a typical signification, because we have been taught so to view them
by Christ and his Apostles; and it will be seen whether they be made so plain
and obvious, as, without the previous interpretation of the Messiah, to have
enabled us to understand them according to their spiritual meaning. It is said,
(John 8:56,) “Abraham saw the day of Christ, and was glad.” Those who are of a
contrary sentiment, interpret this passage as if it was to be understood by a
metonymy, because, Abraham saw the day of Isaac, who was a type of Christ, and
therefore his day was “the day of Christ.” It is an undoubted fact, that no
mention is made in the scriptures of any other rejoicing than of this. The
faith of Abraham and its object occupy nearly the whole of the fourth chapter
of the Epistle to the Romans. Let what is there said be compared together; and
let it be demonstrated from this comparison, that Abraham saw Christ in those
promises which he apprehended by faith. Who would understand “the sign of
Jonah,” to have been instituted to typify the three days in which Christ
remained in the bowels of the earth, unless Christ had himself given that
explanation? What injury does this opinion produce, since those who hold it do
not deny, that the Fathers were saved by the infantile faith which they
possessed? For an infant is as much the heir of his father’s property, as an
adult son.
Should
anyone say, it follows as a necessary consequence, that “the Fathers were saved
without faith in Christ.” I reply, the faith which has respect to the salvation
of God that has been promised by him, and “waits for the redemption of Israel,”
understood under a general notion, is “faith in Christ,” according to the
dispensation of that age. This is easily perceived from the following passages:
“I have waited for thy salvation, or thy saving mercy, O Lord! (Gen. 49:18.) “And
the same man, (Simeon,) was just and devout, waiting for the consolation of
Israel.” (Luke 2:25.) In the same chapter it is said, “Anna, a prophetess, spoke
of him to all them that looked for redemption in Jerusalem.”
But
if we consider the “faith in Christ,” which is that of the New Testament, and
which has regard to Him as a Spiritual and Heavenly King, who bestows upon his
followers those celestial benefits which he has procured for them by his
passion and death; then a greater difficulty will hence arise. What man ever
received more promises concerning the Messiah than David, or who has prophesied
more largely about Him? Yet anyone may with some show of reason, entertain
doubts, whether David really understood that the Messiah would be a Spiritual
and Heavenly Monarch; for when he seemed to be pouring out his whole soul
before the Lord, (2 Sam. 7,) he did not suffer a single word to escape that
might indicate the bent of his understanding to this point, which,
nevertheless, would have been of great potency in magnifying Jehovah and in
confirming his own confidence.
The
knowledge which all Israel had of the Messiah and of his kingdom, in the days
when Christ was himself on earth, appears not only from the Pharisees and the
whole of the populace, but also from his own disciples after they had for three
years and more enjoyed constant opportunities of communication with him, and
had heard from his own lips frequent and open mention of the kingdom of Heaven.
Nay, what is still more wonderful, immediately after the resurrection of Christ
from the dead, they did not even then comprehend his meaning. (Luke 24:21-25.)
From this, it seems, we must say, either “that the knowledge which they formerly
possessed had gradually died away,” or “that the Pharisees, through their
hatred against Jesus, had corrupted that knowledge.” But neither of these
assertions appears to be at all probable. (1.) The former is not; because the
nearer those times were to the Messiah, the clearer were the prophecies
concerning him, and the more manifest the apprehension of them. And this for a
good reason, because it then began to be still more necessary for men to
believe that person to be the Messiah, or at least the time was fast
approaching in which such a faith would become necessary. (2.) The latter is
not probable; because the Pharisees conceived that hatred against him on
account of his preaching and miracles. But it was at the very commencement of
his office that he called into his service those twelve disciples. There are
persons, I am aware, who produce many things from the Rabbinical writers of
that age, concerning the spiritual kingdom of Christ; but I leave those
passages to the authors of them, because it is out of my power to pronounce a
decision on the subject.
While
I have been engaged in the contemplation of this topic, and desirous to prove
from the preceding prophecies, that the kingdom of Christ the Messiah, was to
be spiritual, no small difficulty has arisen, especially after consulting most
of those who have written upon it. Let those who on this point do not allow
anyone to indulge in a single doubt, try an experiment. Let them exhibit a
specimen of the arguments by which they suppose their doctrine can be proved,
even in this age, which is illuminated with the light of the New Testament. I
will engage, that, after this experiment, they will not pass such a sinister
judgment on those who confess to feel some hesitation about this point.
These
observations have been adduced by me, not with the design of denying that the
opinion of the brethren on this matter is true, much less for the purpose of
confuting it. But I adduce them, to teach others to bear with the weakness of
that man who dares not act the part of a dogmatist on this subject.
ARTICLE
XII
Christ
has died for all men and for every individual.
ANSWER
This
assertion was never made by me, either in public or private, except when it was
accompanied by such an explanation as the controversies which are excited on
this subject have rendered necessary. For the phrase here used possesses much
ambiguity. Thus it may mean either that “the price of the death of Christ was
given for all and for everyone,” or that “the redemption, which was obtained by
means of that price, is applied and communicated to all men and to everyone.”
(1.) Of this latter sentiment I entirely disapprove, because God has by a
peremptory decree resolved, that believers alone should be made partakers of
this redemption. (2.) Let those who reject the former of these opinions
consider how they can answer the following scriptures, which declare, that
Christ died for all men; that He is the propitiation for the sins of the whole
world; (1 John 2:2;) that He took away the sin of the world; (John 1:29;) that
He gave his flesh for the life of the world; (John 6:51;) that Christ died even
for that man who might be destroyed with the meat of another person; (Rom. 14:15;)
and that false teachers make merchandise even of those who deny the Lord that
bought them, and bring upon themselves swift destruction; (2 Pet. 2:1, 3.) He
therefore who speaks thus, speaks with the Scriptures; while he who rejects
such phraseology, is a daring man, one who sits in judgment on the Scriptures
and is not an interpreter of them. But he who explains those passages agreeably
to the analogy of faith, performs the duty of a good interpreter and prophesier
[or preacher] in the Church of God.
All
the controversy, therefore, lies in the interpretation. The words themselves ought to be simply
approved, because they are the words of Scripture. I will now produce a passage
or
two from Prosper of Aquitain, to prove that this distinction was even in his
time employed: “He who says that the saviour was not crucified for the
redemption of the whole world, has regard, not to the virtue of the sacrament,
but to the case of unbelievers, since the blood of Jesus Christ is the price
paid for the whole world. To that precious ransom they are strangers, who,
either being delighted with their captivity, have no wish to be redeemed, or,
after they have been redeemed, return to the same servitude.” (Sent. 4, super
cap. Gallorum.) In another passage he says, “With respect both to the magnitude
and potency of the price, and with respect to the one general cause of mankind,
the blood of Christ is the redemption of the whole world. But those who pass
through this life without the faith of Christ, and without the sacrament of
regeneration, are utter strangers to redemption.” Such is likewise the
concurrent opinion of all antiquity. This is a consideration to which I wish to
obtain a little more careful attention from many persons, that they may not so
easily fasten the crime of novelty on him who says anything which they had never
before heard, or which was previously unknown to them.
ARTICLES
XIII AND XIV
Original
Sin will condemn no man.
In
every nation, all infants who die without [having committed] actual sins, are
saved.
ANSWER
These
articles are ascribed to Borrius. To augment their number, they have made them
two, when one would have been sufficient, from which the other necessarily
follows, even according to their own opinion. For if “original sin condemns no
one,” it is a necessary consequence that “all those will be saved who have not
themselves committed actual transgressions.” Of this class are all infants
without distinction; unless someone will invent a state between salvation and
damnation, by a folly similar to that by which, according to St. Augustine, Pelagius
made a distinction between salvation and the kingdom of heaven.
But
Borrius denies having ever publicly taught either the one or the other. He
conferred indeed in private on this subject, with some candidates for Holy
Orders: and he considers that it was not unlawful for him so to do, or to hold
such an opinion, under the influence of reasons which he willingly submits to
the examination of his brethren; who, when they have confuted them, may teach
him more correct doctrine, and induce him to change his opinion. His reasons
are the
following:
- Because God has taken the
whole human race into the grace of reconciliation, and has entered into a
covenant of grace with Adam, and with the whole of his posterity in him.
In which he promises the remission of all sins to as many as stand
steadfastly, and deal not treacherously, in that covenant. But God not
only entered into it with Adam, but also afterwards renewed it with Noah,
and at length confirmed and perfected it through Christ Jesus. And since infants
have not transgressed this covenant, they do not seem to be obnoxious to
condemnation; unless we maintain, that God is unwilling to treat with
infants, who depart out of this life before they arrive at adult age, on
that gracious condition under which, notwithstanding, they are also
comprehended as parties to the covenant; and therefore that their
condition is much worse than that of adults, to whom is tendered the
remission of all sins, not only of that which they perpetrated in Adam,
but likewise, of those which they have themselves personally committed.
The condition of infants, however is, in this case, much worse, by no
fault or demerit of their own, but because it was God’s pleasure thus to
act towards them. From these premises it would follow, that it was the
will of God to condemn them for the commission of sin, before He either
promised or entered into a covenant of grace; as though they had been
excluded and rejected from that covenant by a previous decree of God, and
as though the promise concerning the saviour did not at all belong to
them.
- When Adam sinned in his own
person and with his free will, God pardoned that transgression. There is
no reason then why it was the will of God to impute this sin to infants,
who are said to have sinned in Adam, before they had any personal
existence, and therefore, before they could possibly sin at their own will
and pleasure.
- Because, in this instance,
God would appear to act towards infants with far more severity than
towards the very devils. For the rigor of God against the apostate angels
was extreme, because he would not pardon the crime which they had
perpetrated. There is the same extreme rigor displayed against infants,
who are condemned for the sin of Adam. But it is much greater; for all the
[evil] angels sinned in their own persons, while infants sinned in the
person of their first father Adam. On this account, the angels themselves
were in fault, because they committed an offense which it was possible for
them to avoid; while infants were not in fault, only so far as they
existed in Adam, and were by his will involved in sin and guilt.
These
reasons are undoubtedly of such great importance, that I am of opinion those
who maintain the contrary are bound to confute them, before they can affix to
any other person a mark of heresy. I am aware, that they place antiquity in
opposition, because [they say] its judgment was in their favour. Antiquity,
however, cannot be set up in opposition by those who, on this subject, when the
salvation of infants is discussed, are themselves unwilling to abide by the
judgment of the ancients. But our brethren depart from antiquity, on this very
topic, in two ways:
(1.)
Antiquity maintains,
that all infants who depart out of this life without having been baptized,
would be damned; but that such as were baptized and died before they attained
to adult age, would be saved. St. Augustine asserts this to be the Catholic
doctrine in these words: “If you wish to be a Catholic, be unwilling to
believe, declare, or teach, that infants who are prevented by death from being
baptized, can attain to the remission of original sins.” (De anima et ejus Orig., lib. 3, cap. 9.) To this doctrine our
brethren will by no means accede; but they contradict both parts of it.
(2.)
Antiquity maintains
that the grace of baptism takes away original sin, even from those who have not
been predestinated; according to this passage from Prosper of Aquitain: “That
man is not a Catholic who says, that the grace of baptism, when received, does
not take away original sin from those who have not been predestinated to life.”
(Ad Cap. Gallorum, Sent. 2.) To this opinion also our brethren strongly object.
But it does not appear equitable, that, whenever it is agreeable to themselves,
they should be displeased with those who dissent from them, because they
dissent from the Fathers; and again, that, whenever it is their good pleasure,
the same parties do themselves dissent from the Fathers on this very subject.
But
with respect to the sentiments of the ancient Christian Fathers, about the
damnation of the unbaptized solely on account of original sin, they and their
successors seem to have mitigated, or at least, to have attempted to soften
down such a harsh opinion. For some of them have declared, “that the unbaptized
would be in the mildest damnation of all;” and others, “that they would be
afflicted, not with the punishment of feeling, but only with that of loss.” To
this last opinion some of them have added, “that this punishment would be
inflicted on them without any stings from their own consciences.” Though it is
a consequence of not being baptized, that the parties are said to endure only
the punishment of loss, and not that of feeling; yet this feeling exists
wherever the stings or gnawings of conscience exists, that is, where the
gnawing worm never dies. But let our brethren consider what species of
damnation that is which is inflicted on account of sin, and from which no
gnawing remorse proceeds.
From
these observations, thus produced, it is apparent what opinion ought to be
formed of the Fourteenth Article. It is at least so dependent on the
Thirteenth, that it ought not to have been composed as a separate article, by
those who maintain that there is no cause why infants should perish, except original
sin which they committed in Adam, or which they received by propagation from
Adam. But it is worth the trouble to see, on this subject, what were the
sentiments of Dr. Francis Junius, who a few years ago was Professor of Divinity
in this our University. He affirms, that “all infants who are of the covenant
and of election, are saved;” but he presumes, in charity, that “those infants
whom God calls to himself, and timely removes out of this miserable vale of
sins, are rather saved.” (De Natura et
Gratia, R. 28.) Now, that which this divine either “affirms according to
the doctrine of faith,” or “presumes through charity,” may not another man be
allowed, without the charge of heresy, to hold within his own breast as a
matter of opinion, which he is not in the least solicitous to obtrude on others
or persuade them to believe? Indeed, “this accepting of men’s persons” is far
too prevalent, and is utterly unworthy of wise men. And what inconvenience, I
pray, results from this doctrine? Is it supposed to follow as a necessary
consequence from it, that, if the infants of unbelievers are saved, they are
saved without Christ and his intervention?. Borrius, however, denies any such
consequence, and has Junius assenting with him on this subject. If the brethren
dissent from this opinion, and think that the consequences which they
themselves deduce are agreeable to the premises, then all the children of
unbelievers must be subject to condemnation, the children of unbelievers, I
repeat, who are “strangers from the covenant.” For this conclusion no other
reason can be rendered, than their being the children of those who are “strangers
from the covenant.” From which it seems, on the contrary, to be inferred, that
all the children of those who are in the covenant are saved, provided they die
in the age of infancy. But since our brethren deny this inference, behold the
kind of dogma which is believed by them. “All the infants of those who are
strangers from the covenant are damned; and of the offspring of those parents
who are in the covenant, some infants that die are damned, while others are
saved.” I leave it to those who are deeply versed in these matters, to decide,
whether such a dogma as this ever obtained in any church of Christ.
ARTICLE
XV
If
the Heathen, and those who are strangers to the true knowledge of God, do those
things which by the powers of nature they are enabled to do, God will not
condemn them, but will reward these their works by a more enlarged knowledge,
by which they may be bought to salvation.
ANSWER
This
was never uttered by me, nor indeed by Borrius, under such a form, and in these
expressions. Nay, it is not very probable, that any man, how small soever his
skill might be in sacred things, would deliver the apprehensions of his mind in
a manner so utterly confused and indigested, as to beget the suspicion of a
falsehood in the very words in which he enunciates his opinion. For what man is
there, who, as a stranger to the true knowledge of God, will do a thing that
can in any way be acceptable to God? It is necessary that the thing which will
please God, be itself good, at least, in a certain respect. It is further
necessary, that he who performs it knows it to be good and agreeable to God. “For
whatsoever is not of faith, is sin,” that is, whatsoever is done without an
assured knowledge that it is good and agreeable to God. Thus far, therefore, it
is needful for him to have a true knowledge of God, which the Apostle
attributes even to the Gentiles. (Rom. 1:18-21, 25, 28; 2:14-15.) Without this
explanation there will be a contradiction in this enunciation. “He who is
entirely destitute of the true knowledge of God, can perform something which
God considers to be so grateful to Himself as to remunerate it with some
reward.” These, our good brethren, either do not perceive this contradiction;
or they suppose, that the persons to whom they ascribe this opinion are such
egregious simpletons as they would thus make them appear.
Then,
what is the nature of this expression, “if they do those things which the
powers of nature enable them to perform?” Is “nature,” when entirely destitute
of grace and of the Spirit of God, furnished with the knowledge of that truth
which is said to be “held in unrighteousness,” by the knowledge of “that which
may be known of God, even his eternal power and Godhead,” which may instigate
man to glorify God, and which deprives him of all excuse, if he does not
glorify God as he knows Him? I do not think, that such properties as these can,
without falsehood and injury to Divine Grace, be ascribed to “nature,” which,
when destitute of grace and of the Spirit of God, tends directly downward to
those things which are earthly.
If
our brethren suppose, that these matters exhibit themselves in this foolish
manner, what reason have they for so readily ascribing such an undigested
paragraph to men, who, they ought to have known, are not entirely destitute of
the knowledge of sacred subjects? But if our brethren really think that man can
do some portion of good by the powers of nature, they are themselves not far
from Pelagianism, which yet they are solicitous to fasten on others. This
Article, enunciated thus in their own style, seems to indicate that they think
man capable of doing something good “by the powers of nature;” but that, by
such good performance, he will “neither escape condemnation nor obtain a
reward.” For these attributes are ascribed to the subject in this enunciation;
and because these attributes do not in their opinion, agree with this subject,
they accuse of heresy the thing thus enunciated. If they believe that “a man,
who is a stranger to the true knowledge of God,” is capable of doing nothing
good, this ought in the first place, to have been charged with heresy. If they
think that no one “by the powers of nature,” can perform any thing that is
pleasing to God, then this ought to be reckoned as an error, if any man durst
affirm it. From these remarks, it obviously follows, either that they are
themselves very near the Pelagian heresy, or that they are ignorant of what is
worthy, in the first instance or in the second, of reprehension, and what ought
to be condemned as heretical.
It
is apparent, therefore, that it has been their wish to aggravate the error by
this addition. But their labour has been in vain; because, by this addition,
they have enabled us to deny that we ever employed any such expression or
conceived such a thought; they have, at the same time, afforded just grounds
for charging them with the heresy of Pelagius. Thus the incautious hunter is
caught in the very snare which he had made for another. They would, therefore,
have acted with far more caution and with greater safety, if they had omitted
their exaggeration, and had charged us with this opinion, which they know to
have been employed by the scholastic divines, and which they afterwards
inserted in the succeeding Seventeenth Article, but enunciated in a manner
somewhat different, “God will do that which is in Him, for the man who does
what is in himself.” But, even then, the explanation of the schoolmen ought to
have been added, “that God will do this, not from (the merit of) condignity,
but from (that of) congruity; and not because the act of man merits any such
thing, but because it is befitting the great mercy and beneficence of God.” Yet
this saying of the schoolmen I should myself refuse to employ, except with the
addition of these words: “God will bestow more grace upon that man who does
what is in him by the power of divine grace which is already granted to him,
according to the declaration of Christ, To him that hath shall be given,” in
which he comprises the cause why it was “given to the apostles to know the
mysteries of the kingdom of heaven,” and why “to others it was not given.”
(Matt. 13:11-12.) In addition to this passage, and the first and second
chapters of the Epistle to the Romans, which have already been quoted, peruse
what is related in the Acts of the Apostles, (10, 16, 17,) about Cornelius the
Centurion, Lydia, the seller of purple, and the Bereans.
ARTICLE
XVI
The
works of the unregenerate can be pleasing to God, and are (according to
Borrius) the occasion, and (according to Arminius) the impulsive cause, by
which God will be moved to communicate to them his saving grace.
ANSWER
About
two years ago, were circulated Seventeen Articles, which were attributed to me,
and of which the fifteenth is thus expressed: “Though the works of the
unregenerate cannot possibly be pleasing to God, yet they are the occasion by
which God is moved to communicate to them his saving grace.” This difference
induces me to suspect that the negative, cannot, has been omitted in this
sixteenth article, unless, perhaps, since that time, having proceeded from bad
to worse, I now positively affirm this, which, as I was a less audacious and
more modest heretic, I then denied. However this may be, I assert that these
good men neither comprehend our sentiments, know the phrases which we employ,
nor, in order to know them, do they understand the meaning of those phrases. In
consequence of this, it is no matter of surprise that they err greatly from the
truth when they enunciate our sentiments in their words, or when they affix
other (that is, their own) significations to our words. Of this transformation,
they afford a manifest specimen in this article.
- For the word “the
unregenerate,” may be understood in two senses, (i.) Either as it denotes
those who have felt no motion of the regenerating Spirit, or of its
tendency or preparation for regeneration, and who are therefore, destitute
of the first principle of regeneration. (ii.) Or it may signify those who
are in the process of the new birth, and who feel those motions of the
Holy Spirit which belong either to preparation or to the very essence of
regeneration, but who are not yet regenerate; that is, they are brought by
it to confess their sins, to mourn on account of them, to desire
deliverance, and to seek out the Deliverer, who has been pointed out to
them; but they are not yet furnished with that power of the Spirit by
which the flesh, or the old man, is mortified, and by which a man, being
transformed to newness of life, is rendered capable of performing works of
righteousness.
- A thing is pleasing to God,
either as an initial act, belonging to the commencement of conversion, or
as a work perfect in its own essence, and as performed by a man who is
converted and born again. Thus the confession, by which anyone
acknowledges himself to be “a cold, blind and poor creature,” is pleasing
to God; and the man, therefore, flies to Christ to “buy of him eye-salve,
white raiment, and gold.” (Rev. 3:15-18.) Works which proceed from fervent
love are also pleasing to God. See the distinction which Calvin draws
between “initial and filial fear;” and that of Beza, who is of opinion
that “sorrow and contrition for sin do not belong to the essential parts
of regeneration, but only to those which are preparatory;” but he places “the
very essence of regeneration in mortification, and in vivification or
quickening.”
- “The occasion,” and the
impulsive cause, by which God is moved,” are understood not always in the
same sense, but variously. It will answer our purpose if I produce two
passages, from a comparison of which a distinction may be collected, at
once convenient and sufficient for our design. The king says, (Matt. 18:32)
“I forgave you all that debt because you desired me.” And God says to
Abraham, (Gen. 22:16-17,) “Because you have done this thing, and have not withheld
your son, your only son, in blessing, I will bless you.” He who does not
perceive, in these passages, a difference in the impelling motives, as
well as in the pleasure derived, must be very blind with respect to the
Scriptures.
- “The saving grace of God”
may be understood either as primary or secondary, as preceding or
subsequent, as operating or cooperating, and as that which knocks or opens
or enters in. Unless a man properly distinguishes each of these, and uses
such words as correspond with these distinctions, he must of necessity
stumble, and make others appear to stumble, whose opinions he does not
accurately understand. But if a man will diligently consider these
remarks, he will perceive that this article is agreeable to the
Scriptures, according to one sense in which it may be taken, but that,
according to another, it is very different.
Let
the word “unregenerate” be taken for a man who is now in the act of the new
birth, though he be not yet actually born again; let “the pleasure” which God
feels be taken for an initial act; let the impulsive cause be understood to
refer to the final reception of the sinner into favour; and let secondary,
subsequent, cooperating and entering grace be substituted for “saving grace;”
and it will instantly be manifest, that we speak what is right when we say: “Serious
sorrow on account of sin is so far pleasing to God, that by it, according to
the multitude of his mercies, he is moved to bestow grace on a man who is a
sinner.”
From
these observations, I think, it is evident with what caution persons ought to
speak on subjects on which the descent into heresy, or into the suspicion of
heresy, is so smooth and easy. And our brethren ought in their prudence to have
reflected that we are not altogether negligent of this cautiousness, since they
cannot be ignorant that we are fully aware how much our words are exposed and
obnoxious to injurious interpretations, and even to calumny. But unless they
had earnestly searched for a multitude of Articles, they might have embraced
this and the preceding, as well as that which succeeds, in the same chapter.
ARTICLE
XVII
God
will not deny his grace to anyone who does what is in him.
ANSWER
This
Article is so naturally connected with those which precede it, that he who
grants one of the three, may, by the same effort, affirm the remainder; and he
who denies one may reject all the others. They might, therefore, have spared
some portion of this needless labour, and might, with much greater convenience,
have proposed one article of the following description, instead of three: “It
is possible for a man to do some good thing without the aid of grace; and if he
does it, God will recompense or remunerate that act by more abundant grace.”
But we could always have fastened the charge of falsehood upon an article of
this kind. It was, therefore, a much safer course for them to play with
equivocations, that the fraud contained in the calumny might not with equal
facility he made known to all persons.
But
with respect to this article, I declare that it never came into our minds to
employ such confused expressions as these, which, at the very first sight of
them, exclude grace from the commencement of conversion; though we always, and
on all occasions, make this grace to precede, to accompany, and to follow; and
without which, we constantly assert, no good action whatever, can be produced
by man. Nay, we carry this principal so far as not to dare to attribute the
power here described, even to the nature of Adam himself, without the help of
Divine grace, both infused and assisting. It thus becomes evident, that the fabricated
opinion is imposed on us through calumny. If our brethren entertain the same
sentiments, we are perfectly at agreement. But if they are of opinion that Adam
was able by nature, without supernatural aid, to fulfill the law imposed on
him, they seem not to recede far from Pelagians, since this saying of Augustine
is received by these our brethren: “Supernatural things were lost, natural
things were corrupted.” Whence it follows, what remnant soever there was of
natural things, just so much power remained to fulfill the law -- what is
premised being granted, that Adam was capable by his own nature to obey God
without grace, as the latter is usually distinguished in opposition to nature.
When they charge us with this doctrine, they undoubtedly declare, that in their
judgment, it is such as may fall in with our meaning; and, therefore, that they
do not perceive so much absurdity in this article as there is in reality;
unless they think that nothing can be devised so absurd that we are not
inclined and prepared to believe and publish.
We
esteem this article as one of such great absurdity that we would not be soon
induced to attribute it to any person of the least skill in sacred matters. For
how can a man, without the assistance of Divine Grace, perform any thing which
is acceptable to God, and which he will remunerate with the saving reward
either of further grace or of life eternal? But this article excludes primary
grace with sufficient explicitness when it says, “To him who does what is in
himself.” For if this expression be understood in the following sense: “To him
who does what he can by the primary grace already conferred upon him,” then
there is no absurdity in this sentence: “God will bestow further grace upon him
who profitably uses that which is primary;” and, by the malevolent suppression
of what ought to have been added, the brethren openly declare that it was their
wish for this calumny to gain credence.
ARTICLE
XVIII
God
undoubtedly converts, without the external preaching of the Gospel, great
numbers of persons to the saving knowledge of Christ, among those who have no
outward preaching; and he effects such conversions either by the inward
revelation of the Holy Spirit, or by the ministry of angels. (BORRIUS &
ARMINIUS.)
ANSWER
I
never uttered such a sentiment as this. Borrius has said something like it,
though not exactly the same, in the following words: “It is possible that God,
by the inward revelation of the Holy Spirit, or by the ministry of angels,
instructed the wise men, who came from the east, concerning Jesus, whom they
came to adore.” But the words “undoubtedly,” and “great numbers of persons,”
are the additions of calumny, and is of a most audacious character, charging us
with that which, it is very probable, we never spoke, and of which we never
thought; and we have learned that this audacity of boldly affirming anything
whatsoever, under which the junior pastors generally labour, and those who are
ignorant of the small stock of knowledge that they possess, is an evil exceedingly
dangerous in the church of Christ.
- Is it probable, that any
prudent man will affirm that “something is undoubtedly done in great
numbers of persons,” of which he is not able, when required, to produce a
single example? We confess, that we cannot bring an instance of what is
here imputed to us. For, if it were produced by us, it would become a
subject of controversy; as has been the fate of the sentiments of
Zwinglius concerning the salvation of Socrates, Aristides, and of others
in similar circumstances, who must have been instructed concerning their
salvation by the Holy Ghost or by angels. For it is scarcely within the
bounds of probability, that they had seen the Sacred Scriptures and had
been instructed out of them.
- Besides, if this saying of
Christ had occurred to the recollection of our brethren, “Speak, Paul! and
hold not thy peace: For I have much people in this city,” (Acts 19:9-10,) they
would not so readily have burdened us with this article, who have learned
from this saying of Christ, that God sends the external preaching of his
word to nations, when it is his good pleasure for great numbers of them to
be converted.
- The following is a saying
in very common and frequent use. “The ordinary means and instrument of
conversation is the preaching of the Divine word by mortal men, to which
therefore all persons are bound; but the Holy Spirit has not so bound
himself to this method, as to be unable to operate in an extraordinary
way, without the intervention of human aid, when it seems good to Himself.”
Now if our brethren had reflected, that this very common sentence obtains
our high approval, they would not have thought of charging this article
upon us, at least they would not have accounted it erroneous. For, with
regard to the FIRST, what is extraordinary does not obtain among “great
numbers of persons;” for if it did, it would immediately begin to be
ordinary. With regard to the SECOND, if “the preaching of the word by
mortal men,” be “the ordinary means,” by which it is also intimated that
some means are extraordinary, and since the whole of our church, nay, in
my opinion, since the whole Christian world bears its testimony to this,
then indeed it is neither a heresy nor an error to say, “Even without this
means [without the preaching of the word] God can convert some persons.”
To this might likewise be added the word “undoubtedly.” For if it be
doubtful whether anyone be saved by any other means, (that is, by “means
extraordinary,”) than by human preaching; then it becomes a matter of
doubt, whether it be necessary for “the preaching of the Divine word by
mortal men,” to be called “the ordinary means.”
- What peril or error can
there be in any man saying, “God converts great numbers of persons, (that
is, very many,) by the internal revelation of the Holy Spirit or by the
ministry of angels; “provided it be at the same time stated, that no one
is converted except by this very word, and by the meaning of this word,
which God sends by men to those communities or nations whom He hath purposed
to unite to himself. The objectors will perhaps reply, “It is to be
feared, that, if a nation of those who have been outwardly called should
believe this, rejecting external preaching, they would expect such an
internal revelation or the address of an angel.” Truly, this would be as
unnatural a subject of fear, as that a man would be unwilling to taste of
the bread which was laid before him, because he understands, “Man shall
not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceeds out of the mouth
of God.” But I desist; lest, while instituting an examination into the
causes of this fear, I should proceed much further, and arrive at a point
to which our brethren might be unwilling for me on this occasion to
advance. A word is sufficient for the wise.
ARTICLE
XIX
Before
his fall, Adam had not the power to believe, because there was no necessity for
faith; God, therefore, could not require faith from him after the fall.
ANSWER
Unless
I was well acquainted with the disposition of certain persons, I could have
taken a solemn oath, that the ascription of this article to me, as the words
now stand, is an act which is attributed to them through calumny. Can I be of
opinion that “before his fall Adam had not the power to believe; “and,
forsooth, on this account, “because there was no necessity for faith.” Who is
unacquainted with that expression of the apostle? “He who approaches to God
must
believe
that He exists and that He is a rewarder of those who diligently seek him.” I
do not think, that there is a single Mahometan or Jew who dare make any such
assertion as this article contains. The man who will affirm it, must be
ignorant of the nature of faith in its universal acceptation. But who is able
to love, fear, worship, honour and obey God, without faith, that is the
principle and foundation of all those acts which can be performed to God
according to his will?
This
calumny against me is audacious and foolish. But I think, it was the wish of
its inventors to have added the words, “the power to believe in Christ;” and
indeed they ought to have made this addition. Yet perhaps someone is insane
enough to say, that “all faith in God is faith in Christ.” being inclined to
such persuasion by the argument “that there is now no true faith in God, which
is not faith in Christ.” I say therefore, I affirm and assert, I profess and
teach, “that, before his fall, Adam had not the power to believe in Christ,
because faith in Christ was not then necessary; and that God therefore could
not require this faith from him after the fall:” That is to say, God could not
require it on this account, “because Adam had lost that power of believing by
his own fault,” which is the opinion of those who charge me with the doctrine
of this article. But God could have required it, because he was prepared, to
bestow those gracious aids which were necessary and sufficient for believing in
Christ, and therefore to bestow faith itself in Christ.
But
since I here confine myself to a simple denial, the proof of these three things
is incumbent upon the brethren who affirm them. (1.) The Proposition, (2.) The
Reason added, and (3.) The Conclusion deduced from it. The PROPOSITION is this:
“Before his fall, Adam had the power to believe in Christ.” The REASON is, “because
this faith was necessary for him.” The CONCLUSION is, “Therefore God could of
right demand this faith from him after the fall.”
- A certain learned man
endeavours to prove the PROPOSITION, which he thus enunciates. “Before his
fall, Adam had an implanted power to believe the Gospel,” that is “on the
hypothesis of the Gospel;” or, as I interpret it, “If the Gospel had been
announced to him.” The argument which this learned man employs in proof
is, “Because Adam did not labour under blindness of mind, hardness of
heart, or perturbation of the passions; (which are the internal causes of
an incapacity to believe;) but he possessed a lucid mind, and an upright
will and affections, and, if the Gospel of God had been announced to him,
he was able clearly to perceive and approve its truth, and with his heart
to embrace its benefits.”
- I do not suppose anyone
will disapprove of the REASON which they assign, and therefore I do not
require a proof of it from them; yet I wish the following suggestions to
be well considered, if faith, in Christ was not necessary for Adam, to
what purpose was the power of believing in Christ conferred upon him?
- But the necessity of
proving the CONCLUSION is incumbent on our brethren, because they express
it themselves in those terms, and indeed with a reason added to it, “Because
Adam by his own fault through sin lost that power.” Out of respect to the
person, I will abstain from a confutation of this argument; not because I
account it incapable of a satisfactory refutation, which, I hope, will in
due time make its appearance.
I
will now produce a few arguments in proof of my opinion.
FIRST.
With regard to the Proposition, I prove, “that, before his fall, Adam did not
possess the power to believe in Christ.” (1.) Because such a belief would have
been futile. For there was no necessity, no utility in believing in Christ. But
nature makes nothing in vain; much less does God. (2.) Because, prior to his
sin, God could not require of him faith in Christ. For Faith in Christ is faith
in Him as a saviour from sins; he therefore, who will believe in Christ ought
to believe that he is a sinner. But, before Adam had committed any offense,
this would have been a false belief. Therefore, in commanding Adam to believe
in Christ, God would have commanded him to believe a falsehood. That power,
then, was not capable of being produced into an act, and is on the same account
useless. (3.) Faith in Christ belongs to a new creation, which is effected by
Christ, in his capacity of a Mediator between sinners and God. This is the
reason why He is called “the Second Adam,” and “the New Man.” It is not,
therefore, matter of wonder, that the capability of believing in Christ was not
bestowed on man by virtue of the first creation. (4.) Faith in Christ is
prescribed in the Gospel. But the Law and the Gospel are so far opposed to each
other in the Scriptures, that a man cannot be saved by both of them at the same
time; but if he be saved by the Law, he will not require to be saved by the
Gospel; if he must be saved by the Gospel, then it would not be possible for
him to be saved by the Law. God willed to treat with Adam, and actually did
treat with him, in his primeval state, before he had sinned, according to the
tenor of the legal covenant. What cause, therefore, can be devised, why God, in
addition to the power of believing in Himself according to the Law, should
likewise have bestowed on Adam the power of believing the Gospel and in Christ?
If our brethren say, “that this power was one and the same,” I will grant it,
when the word “power” is taken in its most general notion, and according to its
most remote application -- that of the power of understanding and volition, and
also the knowledge of common things and of all notions impressed on the mind.
But I shall deny the correctness of their observation, if the word “power” is
received as signifying any other thing than what is here specified. For that
wisdom of God which is revealed in the Gospel excels, by many degrees, the
wisdom which was manifested by the creation of the world and in the law.
SECONDLY.
With regard to the reason, “Because there was no necessity for Adam in his
primitive condition to believe in Christ.” No one will refute this argument,
unless by asserting, that God infused a power into man, which was of no service,
and which could be of none whatever, except when man is reduced to that state
into which God himself forbids him to fall, and into which he cannot fall but
through the transgression of the Divine command. But I must here be understood
as always speaking about a power to believe the Gospel and in Christ, as
distinct from a power of believing in God according to the legal
prescript.
THIRDLY.
With regard to what belongs to the Conclusion which is to be deduced from the
preceding, I will burden it only with one absurdity. If matters be as they have
stated them, “that man in his primeval state possessed a power to believe in
Christ,” when no necessity existed for the exercise of such faith in Christ;
and if this power was withdrawn from him after the fall, when it began to be
really necessary for him; such a dispensation of God has been very marvelous,
and completely opposed to the Divine wisdom and goodness, the province of which
consists in making provision about things necessary for those who live under the
government and care of these attributes.
I
desist from adding any more; because the absurdity of this dogma will not
easily obtain credit with such persons as have learned to form a judgment from
the Scriptures, and not from prejudices previously imbibed. I will only
subjoin, that this dogma never obtained in the church of Christ, nor has it
ever been accounted an article relating to faith.
ARTICLE
XX
It
cannot possibly be proved from the Sacred Writings, that the angels are now
confirmed in their estate.
ANSWER
This
article also has been besprinkled with calumny; though I am of opinion, that it
was done in ignorance by him from whose narration it is attributed to me. For I
did not deny that this fact was incapable of proof from the Scriptures; but I
inquired of him, “if it be denied, with what arguments from Scripture will you
prove it?” I am not so rash as to say, that no proof can be given from
Scripture for a matter, whose contrary I am not able satisfactorily to
establish by Scripture, at least if such proof has not produced certainty in my
own mind. For I ought to believe, that there are other persons who can prove
this, though I am myself incapable; as those persons, in like manner, with whom
I occasionally enter into conversation, ought to believe thus concerning
themselves because I cannot instantly deny that they are unable to do what, I
am sure, they will experience much difficulty in performing. For they must
themselves be aware, that from their frequent conversations, and from the sermons
which they address to the people, some judgment may be formed of their own
progress in the knowledge of the truth and in understanding the Scriptures. I
wish them, therefore to undertake the labour of proving that, about which they
will not allow me to hesitate.
I
know what has been written by St. Augustine, and others of the Fathers, about
the estate of the angels, about their blessedness, their confirmation in good,
and the certainty by which they know that they will never fall from this
condition. I also know, that the schoolmen incline towards this opinion. But
when I examine the arguments which they advance in its support, they do not
appear to me to possess such strength as may justly entitle it to be prescribed
for belief to other persons as an approved article of faith.
The
passage generally quoted from St. Matthew, (22:30,) “But they are as angels of
God in heaven,” treats only on the similitude [between young children and
angels,] in neither marrying nor being given in marriage; he does not say, that
the angels of God are now happy in heaven.
That
in Matt. 18:10, “In heaven their angels do always behold the face of my Father
who is in heaven,” does not speak of the beatific vision, but of that vision
with which those who stand around the throne of God wait for his commands. This
is apparent from the design of Christ, who wished thus to persuade them “not to
offend one of these little ones;” their beholding God, helps to confirm this
persuasion, not the beatific sight, but such a sight of God as is suited for
the reception of the [Divine] commands to keep these little ones.
“But
ye are come to the heavenly Jerusalem, and to an innumerable company of angels.”
(Heb. 12:22. This does not necessarily prove, that angels are now blessed and confirmed
in good; because, even now, those who are neither beatified nor confirmed in
good do themselves belong to that celestial city, that is, those who are said
to have “come to this heavenly city,” who still “walk by faith,” and “see
through a glass darkly.” (1 Cor. 13:12.) “Then the angels will be in a more
unhappy condition than the souls of pious men, who are now enjoying blessedness
with Christ and in his presence.” This reason which they adduce is not
conclusive. For “the angels are ministering spirits, sent forth to minister for
them who shall be heirs of eternal salvation” This service of theirs will
endure to the end of the world. In the meantime, “those who have died in the
Lord, rest from their labours.” (Rev. 14:13.)
Neither
is that a stronger argument, which says, “It is possible for the angels to
fall, if they are not confirmed in good; and therefore they must always of
necessity be tormented by a fear of their fall, which may happen; and by a fear
which is the greater, on account of the clearer knowledge that they have of the
evil into which the apostate angels are fallen.” For it is possible for the
angels to be assured of their stability, that is, that they shall never fall
away, although they be neither blessed, nor so far confirmed in that which is
good as not to be capable of falling. They may be assumed, either with such a
certainty as excludes all anxious “fear that hath torment,” but is consistent
with that “fear and trembling,” with which we are commanded to “work out our
salvation,” who are said to have “the full assurance of faith” concerning our
salvation.
But
what necessity is there to enter into this disputation, which cannot without
great difficulty be decided from the Scriptures; and which, when it is decided,
will be of small service to us. Let us rather devote our attention to this
study. Doing now the will of God as the angels do in heaven, let us endeavour
to be enabled hereafter to become partakers with them of eternal blessedness.
This is especially our duty, since the things which have been written for us
respecting the state of angels, and which are commanded to be received by
faith, are exceedingly few in number.
This,
therefore, is my reply to the former twenty of these articles, which have been
ascribed partly to me alone, and partly also to Borrius. There is not one of
them whose contrary has been believed by the Church Universal and held as an
article of faith. Some of them, however, are so artfully constructed, that
those which are their opposites savour of novelty and send forth an odour of
falsehood. Beside the fact, that the greatest part of them are attributed to us
through calumny. I now proceed to the consideration of the eleven which follow
that I may see whether the fabricators have acted in a more happy and judicious
manner, either in imputing them to me, or in reckoning them as errors or
heresies. May God direct my mind and my hand, that I may with a good conscience
declare those things which are in unison with the truth, and which may conduce
to the peace and tranquillity of our brethren.