This is the most concise of Arminius' summaries of his doctrine, given in the year 1608 (the year before his death) to an ambassador of the Elector Frederick IV of the Palatinate (then called "Palatine"), which included the area on the east bank of the Rhine River containing the territory occupied by the modern German cities of Heidelberg and Mannheim (and, in Arminius' time, would also have included part of the French region of Alsace). Although the Palatinate was in Germany, Frederick IV was a Reformed (rather than a Lutheran) ruler, so the controversy between Arminius and his Reformed colleagues would have been of interest in the Palatinate and this letter was written by Arminius to Frederick IV's ambassador to the "United Provinces" (the modern Netherlands, or "Holland" as it is sometimes erroneously referred to in North America).
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To
his excellency, the noble lord, Hippolytus a Collibus, ambassador from the most
illustrious prince, the Elector Palatine, to the seven United Dutch Provinces,
James Arminius wishes health and success.
Most
Honourable Sir:
When
I was lately admitted to a conversation with you, you had the kindness to
intimate to me the reports which you understood had been circulated at
Heidelberg about my heterodoxy in certain articles of our faith; and you gave
me this information, not only that you might yourself hear from me personally
the whole truth about the matter, but, much more, that, by the intervention of
your good offices, the suspicions concerning me, which have been so
unhandsomely conceived and propagated, might be removed from the minds of other
persons, since this is a course which truth requires. I endeavoured at that
interview, with diligence and seriousness to comply with your obliging request,
and by returning a frank and open reply to each of those questions which your
excellency proposed, I instantly disclosed my sentiments about those several
Articles. For, in addition to my being bound to do this, by my duty as a
Christian man, and especially as a divine, such a course of conduct was
demanded from me by the great candour, condescension and benevolence which you
exhibited towards me.
But
my explanation was so agreeable to your excellency, (which I ascribe to an act
of the divine Benignity towards me,) as to induce you, on that occasion, to
think it requisite that those propositions of mine should be committed to
writing and transmitted to you, not only for the purpose of being thus enabled
the more certainly and firmly to form your own judgment about the matter when
you had maturely reflected upon it, but also with the design of communicating
my written answers to others, that they might confute the calumny and vindicate
my innocence. Having followed the counsel of your prudence, and firmly relying
on the same hope, I now accede to your further wishes, in this letter; and I entreat
your excellency to have the goodness to peruse its contents with the same
candour and equanimity as were displayed when you listened to their delivery.
Unless my mind greatly deceives me, your excellency will find in this letter
that which will not only be able to obliterate, but also completely to
eradicate, every unjust suspicion concerning me, from the minds of those good
men who know that every one is the best interpreter of his own sentiments, and
that the utmost credit is to be given to him who sacredly, and in the presence
of God, bears testimony to his own meaning.
The
articles of doctrine about which your excellency made inquiries, were, as far
as my memory serves me, the following: the Divinity of the Son of God,
Providence, Divine Predestination, Grace and Free Will, and Justification.
Beside these, you inquired about the things which concerned our opinions, in
answer to the interrogatories of the States of Holland, concerning the mode of
holding the proposed synod. But as the latter relate to that most eminent man,
the Reverend John Uytenbogard, minister of the church at the Hague, as much as
to me, I leave them to be explained by him, whose residence is much nearer to
that of your excellency.
With
regard to all these doctrinal Articles, I confidently declare that I have never
taught anything, either in the church or in the university, which contravenes
the sacred writings, that ought to be with us the sole rule of thinking and of
speaking, or which is opposed to the Dutch Confession of Faith, or to the
Heidelberg Catechism, that are our stricter formularies of consent. In proof of
this assertion I might produce, as most clear and unquestionable testimonies,
the theses which I have composed on these several Articles, and which have been
discussed as Public Disputations in the university; but as those theses are not
entirely in readiness for every one, and can be with difficulty transmitted, I
will now treat upon each of them specially, as far as I shall conceive it
necessary.
I. THE DIVINITY OF THE SON OF GOD.
Concerning
the divinity of the Son of God, I have taught, and still teach, that the Father
has never been without his Word and his Spirit, but that the Word and the
Spirit are not to be considered in the Father under the notion of properties,
as wisdom, goodness, justice, or power, but under that of really existing
persons, to whom it belongs to be, to live, to understand, to will, to be
capable, and to do or act, all of which, when united, are indications and
proofs of a person, but that they are so in the Father as to be also from the
Father, in a certain order of origin, not through collaterality, to be referred
to the Father, and that they are from the Father neither by creation nor by
decision but by a most wonderful and inexplicable internal emanation, which,
with respect to the Son, the ancient church called generation, but with respect
to the Holy Spirit, was denominated spiration or breathing, a term required by
the very [etymon of the] word spirit. But about this breathing, I do not
interpose my judgment -- whether it is from the Father and the Son, as the
Latin fathers express themselves, or from the Father through the Son, as the
Greek fathers prefer to define it, because this matter, I confess, far
surpasses my capacity. If, on any subject, we ought to think and speak with
sobriety, in my opinion, it must be on this.
Since
these are my sentiments on the divinity of the Son of God, no reason could
exist why, on this point, I should endure the shafts of calumny. Yet this
slander was first fabricated and spread through the whole of Germany by one in
whom such conduct was exceedingly indecorous; because he was my pupil, and
ought to have refrained from that course, having been taught by his own painful
experience that he either possessed an unhappy memory, or was of doubtful
credit; for he had previously been convicted of a similar calumny, and had
openly confessed his fault before me, and requested my forgiveness. But, as I
learned from a certain manuscript which was transmitted to Leyden out of
Germany, and which the same youth had delivered to the Heidelberg divines, he
took the groundwork of his calumny from those things which I had publicly
taught concerning the economy of our salvation, as administered by the Father
through the Son and the Holy Spirit. In the explanation of this economy, I had
said "that we must have a diligent regard to this order, which the
Scriptures in every part most religiously observe; and that we must distinctly
consider what things are attributed as peculiar to the Father in this matter,
what to the Son, and what to the Holy Spirit."
After
this, some other persons seized upon a different occasion for the same calumny,
from my having said that the Son of God was not correctly called Autoqeon
"very God," in the same sense in which that word signifies "God
from himself."
This
audacious inclination for calumniating was promoted by the circumstance of my
having explained in a different manner, certain passages of the Old and New
Testament, which have been usually adduced to establish the Consubstantiality
or the coessentiality of the trinity. But I can with ease in a moment show,
from the books of the Old and New Testament themselves, from the whole of
antiquity, and from the sentiments of the ancient church, both Greek and Latin,
as well as from the testimony of our own divines, that nothing can be deduced
from those alleged misinterpreted passages, which is with the least semblance
of probability, adverse to the sound and orthodox faith. In his able defense of
Calvin, against the treatise of Hunnius, entitled "Calvin Judaizing,"
the learned Paraeus has taught that this last occasion was seized upon in vain;
and he has liberated me from the necessity of this service.
To
spend any time in confuting the first slander, which was circulated by the
young student, would not repay my trouble. Those who know that the Father in
the Son hath reconciled the world unto himself, and administers the word of
reconciliation through the Spirit, know, likewise, that, in the dispensation of
salvation, an order must be considered among the persons of the Trinity, and
their attributes must not be confounded, unless they be desirous of falling
into the heresy of the Patripassionists.
Respecting
the second occasion, which concerns the word Autoqeon "very God," an
answer somewhat more laboured must be undertaken, because there are not a few
persons who are of a contrary opinion, and yet our church does not consider
such persons as holding wrong sentiments concerning the trinity. This is the
manner in which they propound their doctrine. "Because the essence of the
Father and of the Son is one, and because it has its origin from no one, therefore,
in this respect, the Son is correctly denominated Autoqeon that is, God from
himself."
But
I reply, "The essence of the Son is from no one, or is from himself,"
is not the same as "the Son is from himself, or from no one." For, to
speak in a proper and formal manner, the Son is not an essence, but having his
essence by a certain mode Uparxewv of being or existence.
They
rejoin -- "The Son may be considered in two respects, "as he is the
Son, and as he is God. As he is the Son, he is from the Father, and has his
essence from the Father. But as he is God, he has his essence from himself or
from no one." But the latter of these expressions is the most correct; for
to have his essence from himself implies a contradiction.
I
reply, I admit this distinction; but it is extended much further than is
allowable. For as he is God, he has the divine essence. As he is the Son, he
has it from the Father. That is, by the word "God," is signified,
generally, that which has the divine essence without any certain mode of
subsistence. But, by the word "the Son," is signified a certain mode
of having the divine essence, which is through communication from the Father,
that is, through generation.
Let
these double ternaries be taken into consideration, which are opposed to each
other, in one series,
To
have Deity -- To BE God To have Deity from the Father -- To BE the Son To have
Deity from no one -- To BE the Father
And
it will be evident, that among themselves they mutually correspond with each
other, thus: "to have Deity," and "to be God" -- "to
have Deity from the Father," and "to be the Son" -- "to
have Deity from no one," and "to be the Father" -- are
consentaneous, though under the word "Father," as an affirmative,
that is not signified which has its essence from no one; for this is signified
by the word "ingenitus, inwardly born, which is attributed to the Father,
though not with strictness, but only to signify that the Father has not his
essence by the mode of generation. But the word "FATHER" by its own
force and meaning is conclusive on this point: For where order is established,
it is necessary that a beginning be made from some first person or thing,
otherwise there will be confusion proceeding onwards ad infinitum. But, with
respect to origin, he who is the first in this order has his origin from no
one; he who is the second, has his origin from the first; he who is the third
has his origin from the first and the second, or from the first through the
second. Were not this the real state of the matter; there would be a
Collaterality, which would make as many Gods as there were collateral persons
laid down; since the Unity of the Deity in the trinity is defended against the
Anti-trinitarians solely by the relation of origin and of order according to
origin.
But
that it may evidently appear what were the sentiments of antiquity about this
matter, I will here adduce from the ancient fathers, both of the Greek and
Latin church, some passages which are applicable to this subject.
BASIL THE GREAT
According
to the habit of causes to those things which are from them, we say that the
Father has precedence before the Son. (Ever. lib. 1.)
-
because the Son has his source from the Father. According to this, the Father
is the greater, as the cause and the source. Wherefore our Lord also has said,
"My Father is greater than I," that is, because He is the Father. But
what other signification can the word "FATHER" have, than the cause
and the beginning of Him who is begotten from Him?
(Ibid.)
The
Father is the root and the fountain of the Son and of the Holy Spirit.
(Discourse against the Sabellians and Arius.)
When
I have said "one essence," I do not understand two [persons]
distinguished from one, but the Son subsisting from the source of the Father,
not the Father and Son from one superior essence. For we do not call them
"brothers," but we confess them to be "the FATHER and the
SON." But essence is identity, because the Son is from the Father, not
made by command, but begotten from nature; not divided from the Father, but
while he remains perfect, reflecting perfectly back again the light. But that
you may not be able to charge these our assertions against us as a crime, and
lest you should say, "He preaches two gods; he announces a multitude of deities;"
there are not two gods, neither are there two fathers. He who produces two
original sources, preaches two gods. (Ibid.)
The
way of the knowledge of God is, by one Spirit, through one Son, to one Father.
And, on the contrary, natural goodness, natural sanctification, and royal
dignity are transmitted from the Father, through the only begotten Son, to the
Spirit. Thus we confess the persons [in the Godhead] and at the same time the
pious doctrine of the unity is not undermined. (On the Holy Spirit, cap.
18.)
GREGORY
NAZIANZEN
The
essence is common and equal to the Son with the Father, though the Son has it
from the Father. (Fourth Discourse on Theology.)
How
is it possible for the same thing to be greater than itself and yet equal to
itself? Is it not, therefore, plain, that the word "greater," which
is attributed to the Father in reference to the Son, must be referred to CAUSE;
but the word "equal," which is attributed to the Son, as to his
equality with the Father, must be referred to Nature? (Ibid.)
It
may indeed be truly said, but not therefore so honourably, that, "with
regard to the humanity, the Father is greater than the Son:" For what is
there wonderful in God being greater than man? (Ibid.)
AMBROSE
Though
Christ has redeemed us, yet "all things are of God," because from him
is all the paternity. It is, therefore, of necessity that the person of the
Father have the precedence.
(On
2 Corinthians v, 18.)
Consult
also his remarks On 1 Corinthians 15.
AUGUSTINE
IF
that which begets is the original source of that which is begotten, the Father
is the source of the Son, because he begets him. (On the Trinity, lib. 5, cap.
14.)
He
did not say "whom the Father will send from me," as He said,
"whom I will send from the Father," that is, plainly showing the
Father to be the source of the entire Deity. (Ibid. Lib. 4, Cap. 10.)
-
Therefore this was said concerning the Father: "He doeth the works;"
because from Him also is the origin of the works, from whom the cooperating
persons [in the Deity] have their existence: For both the Son is born of Him,
and the Holy Spirit principally proceeds from Him, from whom the Son is born,
and with whom the same Spirit is common with the Son. (Idem, tom. 10, fol. 11,
col. 1.)
Indeed
God the Father is not God from another God; but God the Son is God from God the
Father. But the Son is as much from the Father, as the Father is from no one.
(Against Maximinus, Lib. 3, cap. 23, col. 2.)
HILARY
There
is no God who is eternal and without beginning, and who is God to that God from
whom are all things. But the Father is God to the Son; for from Him He was born
God. (Lib. 4, fol. 60.)
The
confession of the true faith is, God is so born of God, as light is from light,
which, without detriment to itself, offers its own nature from itself, that it
may bestow that which it has, and that it may have what it bestows, &c.
(Lib. 6, fol 87.)
It
is apparent from these passages, according to the sentiments of the ancient
church, that the Son, even as he is God, is from the Father, because he has
received his Deity, according to which he is called "God," by being
born of the Father; though the name of God does not indicate this mode of being
or existence. From these quotations, it is also evident that, because the
Father is the source of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, he is called the
source of the whole Deity; not indeed because God has any beginning or source,
but because the Deity is communicated by the Father to the Son and the Holy
Spirit. So far, therefore, is this from being a correct expression: "The
Son of God as he is God, is from no one; and, with respect to his essence, is
from himself or from no one." For he who has received his essence by being
born of the Father, is from the Father with respect to his essence.
I
consider, therefore, that those who desire to think and to speak with orthodox
antiquity, ought to abstain from these methods of expression; because, by
adopting them, they seem to become the patrons of the opposing heresies of the
Tritheists, and the Sabellians. Peruse the preface to the Dialogues of St.
Athanasius On the Trinity, by Theodore Beza; who excuses Calvin by saying, that
he did not so solicitously observe the difference between the two phrases --
"He is the Son per se, through
himself," and "He is the Son a
se, from himself."
If
anyone be desirous of knowing from me anything further on this point, I will
not refuse to hold a placid conference with him either in writing or by
conversation. I now proceed to the other topics, in the discussion of which I
will consult brevity.
II. THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD
My
sentiments respecting the providence of God are these: It is present with, and
presides over, all things; and all things, according to their essences,
quantities, qualities, relations, actions, passions, places, times, stations
and habits, are subject to its governance, conservation, and direction. I
except neither particular, sublunary, vile, nor contingent things, not even the
free wills of men or of angels, either good or evil: And, what is still more, I
do not take away from the government of the divine providence even sins
themselves, whether we take into our consideration their commencement, their
progress, or their termination.
1.
With respect to the Beginning of Sin, I attribute the following acts to the
providence of God:
First.
Permission, and that not idle, but which has united in it four positive acts:
(1.) The preservation of the creature according to essence, life and
capability. (2.) Care lest a greater or an equal power be placed in opposition.
(3.) The offering of an object against which sin will be committed. (4.) The
destined concession of its concurrence, which, on account of the dependence of
a second on the first cause, is a necessary concurrence.
Secondly.
The administration of arguments and occasions, soliciting to the perpetration
of sin.
Thirdly.
The determination of place, time, manner, and of similar circumstances.
Fourthly.
The immediate concurrence itself of God with the act of sin.
2.
With respect to the Progress of sin, I attribute also the following four acts
to the divine government:
The
First is the direction of sin that is already begun, to a certain object, at
which the offending creature either has not aimed, or has not absolutely
aimed.
The
Second act is the direction of sin to the end which God himself wills, whether
the creature intend or do not intend that end, nay, though he intend another
and quite opposite end.
The
Third act is the prescribing and determination of the time during which he
wills or permits sin to endure.
The
Fourth act is the defining of its magnitude, by which limits are placed on sin,
that it may not increase and assume greater strength.
The
whole of these acts, both concerning the commencement and the progress of sin,
I consider distinctly in reference to the act itself, and to the anomy or
transgression of the law, a course which, according to my judgment, is
necessary and useful.
3.
Lastly, with respect to the END and COMPLETION of sin, I attribute to divine
providence either punishment through severity, or remission through grace;
which are occupied about sin, in reference to its being sin and to its being a
transgression, of the law.
But
I most solicitously avoid two causes of offense -- that God be not proposed as
the author of sin, and that its liberty be not taken away from the human will.
These are two points which, if any one knows how to avoid, he will think upon
no act which I will not in that case most gladly allow to be ascribed to the
providence of God, provided a just regard be had to the divine
pre-eminence.
But
I have given a most ample explanation of these my sentiments, in the theses
which were twice publicly disputed on the same subject in the university. On
this account, therefore, I declare that I am much surprised, and not without
good reason, at my being aspersed with this calumny -- that l hold corrupt
opinions respecting the providence of God. If it be allowable to indulge in
conjecture, I think this slander had its origin in the fact of my denying that,
with respect to the decree of God, Adam necessarily sinned -- an assertion
which I yet constantly deny, and think it one that ought not to be tolerated,
unless the word "necessarily" be received in the acceptation of
"infallibly," as it is by some persons; though this change does not
agree with the etymology of the two words; for, necessity is an affection of
being, but infallibility is an affection of the mind. Yet I easily endure the
use of the first of these words, provided those two inconveniences to which I
have recently alluded be faithfully avoided.
III. DIVINE PREDESTINATION
With
respect to the article of predestination, my sentiments upon it are the
following: It is an eternal and gracious decree of God in Christ, by which he
determines to justify and adopt believers, and to endow them with life eternal,
but to condemn unbelievers, and impenitent persons; as I have explained in the
theses on the same subject, which were publicly disputed, and in which, no one
found anything to be reprehended as false or unsound. Only it was the opinion
of some persons that those theses did not contain all the things which belong
to this decree; nay, that the predestination about which there is the greatest controversy
at this time, is not the subject of investigation in those theses. This indeed
I confess; for I considered it the best course to discuss that decree of
predestination which is the foundation of Christianity, of our salvation, and
of the assurance of salvation, and upon which the apostle treats in the eighth
and ninth chapters of the epistle to the Romans, and in the first chapter of
that to the Ephesians-
But
such a decree as I have there described is not that by which God resolves to
save some particular persons, and, that he may do this, resolves to endow them
with faith, but to condemn others and not to endow them with faith. Yet many
people declare, that this is the kind of predestination on which the apostle
treats in the passages just cited. But I deny what they assert.
I
grant that there is a certain eternal decree of God, according to which he
administers the means necessary to faith and salvation, and this he does in
such a manner as he knows to be suited to righteousness, that is, to his mercy
and his severity. But about this decree, I think nothing more is necessary to
be known, than that faith is the mere gift of the gracious mercy of God; and
that unbelief is partly to be attributed to the fault and wickedness of men,
and partly to the just vengeance of God, which deserts, blinds and hardens
sinners.
But
concerning that predestination by which God has decreed to save and to endow
with faith some particular persons, but to damn others and not endow them with
faith, so various are the sentiment, entertained even by the divines of our
profession, that this very diversity of opinion easily declares the difficulty
with which it is possible to determine anything respecting it. For while some
of them propose, as the object of predestination generally considered, that is,
of election and reprobation, man as a sinner and fallen in Adam, others lay it
down, man considered
as
created and placed "in puris
naturalibus." Some of them consider this object to be, man to be
created, or, as some of them express it, man as salvable and damnable, as
capable of being created and of falling. Others of them lay down the object of
election and reprobation, which they denominate Nonelection and Preterition,
man considered in common and absolutely; but they lay down the object of
reprobation, on which they bestow the appellation of Predamnation and
Affirmative Reprobation, man a sinner and guilty in Adam. Lastly, some of them
suppose that the object must be considered entirely in common, man as yet to be
created, as created, and as fallen.
I
am aware that when this diversity of opinion is offered as an objection, it is
usual to reply that, in the substance of the matter there is complete
agreement, although some difference exists in the circumstances. But it would
be in my power to prove, that the preceding opinions differ greatly in many of
the things which conduce to the very matter and substance of this kind of
predestination; but that of consent or agreement there is nothing except in the
minds of those who hold such sentiments, and who are prepared to bear with
those who dissent from them as far as these points extend.
Such
a mode of consent as this, [of which they are themselves the patrons,] is of
the highest necessity in the Christian church -- as, without it, peace can by
no means be preserved. I wish that I also was able to experience from them any
such benevolent feelings towards me and my sentiments. In that species of
predestination upon which I have treated, I define nothing that is not equally
approved by all. On this point, alone, I differ -- I dare not with a safe
conscience maintain in the affirmative any of the preceding opinions. I am also
prepared to give a reason for this conscientious scruple when it shall be
demanded by necessity, and can be done in a suitable manner.
IV. GRACE AND FREE WILL
Concerning
grace and free will, this is what I teach according to the Scriptures and
orthodox consent: Free will is unable to begin or to perfect any true and
spiritual good, without grace. That I may not be said, like Pelagius, to
practice delusion with regard to the word "grace," I mean by it that
which is the grace of Christ and which belongs to regeneration. I affirm,
therefore, that this grace is simply and absolutely necessary for the illumination
of the mind, the due ordering of the affections, and the inclination of the
will to that which is good. It is this grace which operates on the mind, the
affections, and the will; which infuses good thoughts into the mind, inspires
good desires into the actions, and bends the will to carry into execution good
thoughts and good desires. This grace goes before, accompanies, and follows; it
excites, assists, operates that we will, and co-operates lest we will in vain.
It averts temptations, assists and grants succour in the midst of temptations,
sustains man against the flesh, the world and Satan, and in this great contest
grants to man the enjoyment of the victory. It raises up again those who are
conquered and have fallen, establishes and supplies them with new strength, and
renders them more cautious. This grace commences salvation, promotes it, and
perfects and consummates it.
I
confess that the mind of a natural and carnal man is obscure and dark, that his
affections are corrupt and inordinate, that his will is stubborn and
disobedient, and that the man himself is dead in sins. And I add to this --
that teacher obtains my highest approbation who ascribes as much as possible to
divine grace, provided he so pleads the cause of grace, as not to inflict an
injury on the justice of God, and not to take away the free will to that which
is evil.
I
do not perceive what can be further required from me. Let it only be pointed
out, and I will consent to give it, or I will show that I ought not to give
such an assent. Therefore, neither do I perceive with what justice I can be
calumniated on this point, since I have explained these my sentiments, with
sufficient plainness, in the theses on free will which were publicly disputed
in the university.
V. JUSTIFICATION
The
last article is on justification, about which these are my sentiments: Faith,
and faith only, (though there is no faith alone without works,) is imputed for
righteousness. By this alone are we justified before God, absolved from our
sins, and are accounted, pronounced and declared righteous by God, who delivers
his judgment from the throne of grace.
I
do not enter into the question be the active and the passive righteousness of
Christ, or that of his death and of his life. On this subject, I walk at
liberty: I say "Christ has been made of God to me righteousness" --
"he has been made sin for me, that through faith, I may be the
righteousness of God in him."
Nor
yet do I refuse to confer with my brethren on this question, provided such conference
be conducted without bitterness, and without an opinion of necessity, [that the
partial view of any one should be generally received,] from which scarcely any
other result can ensue than the existence of distraction, and of increased
effervescence in the minds of men, especially if this discussion should occur
between those who are hot controversialists, and too vehement in their
zeal.
But
some persons charge me with this as a crime -- that I say the act itself of
faith, that is, believing itself, is imputed for righteousness, and that in a
proper sense, and not by a metonymy. I acknowledge this charge, as I have the
apostle St. Paul, in Romans 4, and in other passages, as my precursor in the
use of this phrase. But the conclusion which they draw from this affirmation,
namely, "that Christ and his righteousness are excluded from our
justification, and that our justification is thus attributed to the worthiness
of our faith," I by no means concede it to be possible for them to deduce
from my sentiments.
For
the word "to impute ," signifies that faith is not righteousness
itself, but is graciously accounted for righteousness; by which circumstance
all worthiness is taken away from faith, except that which is through the
gracious condescending estimation of God. But this gracious condescension and
estimation is not without Christ, but in reference to Christ, in Christ, and on
account of Christ, whom God hath appointed as the propitiation through faith in
his blood.
I
affirm, therefore, that faith is imputed to us for righteousness, on account of
Christ and his righteousness. In this enunciation, faith is the object of
imputation; but Christ and his obedience are the impetratory [procuring] or
meritorious cause of justification. Christ and his obedience are the object of
our faith, but not the object of justification or divine imputation, as if God
imputes Christ and his righteousness to us for righteousness. This cannot
possibly be, since the obedience of Christ is righteousness itself, taken according
to the most severe rigor of the law. But I do not deny that the obedience of
Christ is imputed to us; that is, that it is accounted or reckoned for us and
for our benefit, because this very thing -- that God reckons the righteousness
of Christ to have been performed for us and for our benefit -- is the cause why
God imputes to us for righteousness our faith, which has Christ and his
righteousness for its object and foundation, and why he justifies us by faith,
from faith, or through faith.
If
anyone will point out an error in this my opinion, I will gladly own it,
because it is possible for me to err, but I am not willing to be a
heretic.
The
preceding, then, as far as I remember, are the Articles which your excellency
mentioned to me, with my explanations of them produced from sincerity of mind;
and as thus sincere, I wish them to be accounted by all who see them. This one
favour I wish I could obtain from my brethren, who are associated with me in
the Lord by the profession of the same religion, that they would at least
believe me to have some feeling of conscience towards God. And this favour
ought to be easily granted by them, through the charity of Christ, if they be
desirous to study his disposition and nature.
Of
what service to me can a dissension be which is undertaken merely through a
reckless humour of mind, or a schism created in the church of Christ, of which,
by the grace of God and Christ, I profess myself to be a member? If my brethren
suppose that I am incited to such an enterprise through ambition or avarice, I
sincerely declare in the Lord, that they know me not. But I can confess that I
am so free from the latter of these vices, as never to have been tickled, on
any occasion, with even the most enticing of its snares -- though it might be
in my power to excuse or palliate it under some pretext or other. With regard
to ambition, I possess it not, except to that honourable kind which impels me
to this service -- to inquire with all earnestness in the Holy Scriptures for
divine truth, and mildly and without contradiction to declare it when found,
without prescribing it to any one, or labouring to extort consent, much less
through a desire to "have dominion over the faith of others," but
rather for the purpose of my winning some souls for Christ, that I may be a
sweet savour to him, and may obtain an approved reputation in the church of the
saints. This good name I hope I shall obtain by the grace of Christ, after a
long period of patient endurance; though I be now a reproach to my brethren,
and "made as the filth of the world and the offscouring of all
things" to those who with me worship and invoke one God the Father, and
one Lord Jesus Christ, in one spirit and with the same faith, and who have the
same hope with me of obtaining the heavenly inheritance through the grace of
our Lord Jesus Christ.
I
hope the Lord will grant unto me, that they and I may meekly meet together in
his great name, and institute a Christian conference about those things which
appertain to religion. O may the light of that sacred and happy day speedily
shine upon me. In that assembly, I engage, through the grace of God, to
manifest such moderation of mind, and such love for truth and peace, as ought
deservedly to be required and expected from a servant of Christ Jesus.
In
the meantime [till this assembly can be convened], let my brethren themselves
remain quiescent and suffer me to be quiet, that I may be at peace, and neither
annoy them, nor create any uneasiness. If they entertain other thoughts
concerning me, let them institute an [ecclesiastical] action against me; I will
not shun or evade the authority of a competent judge, neither will I forfeit my
recognizances by failing to appear.
If
it be supposed that the minds of those who hear me are preoccupied in my
favour, at a distance, by some politic subtlety which I display, and that the
matter is so managed through cunning, as makes my brethren neither to consider
it advisable to arraign me before the judges, nor to account it sufficiently
safe to commit to my care the youthful students; and therefore, that the black
stain which I have deserved ought to be affixed to my reputation, that my
pupils and hearers may be frightened away; therefore, lest the result of this
should be that the deferring of such a conference be productive of certain
danger, behold I now offer myself, that I may, in company with them, address,
solicit, and entreat those high personages who are invested with the power of
issuing a summons for a convention of this kind, or of granting it, not to
suffer us any longer to continue in this anguish and disquietude of mind, but
either themselves to apply a speedy remedy, or allow it to be applied by
others, but still by their order and under their direction.
I
will not refuse to place myself before any assembly whatsoever, whether it be
composed of all the ministers in our United Netherlands, or of some to be
convoked from each of the seven provinces, or even of all the ministers of
Holland and West Friesland, to which province our university at Leyden belongs,
or of some ministers to be selected out of these, provided the whole affair be
transacted under the cognizance of our lawful magistrates. Nor do I avoid or
dread the presence of learned men, who may be invited from other countries, provided
they be present at the conference on equitable conditions, and subject to the
same laws as those under which I must be placed.
To
express the whole matter at once -- let a convention be summoned, consisting of
many members or of few, provided some bright hope of success be afforded [to
them], a hope, I repeat it, which I shall be able, by sound arguments, to prove
destitute of good foundation. Behold me, this day, nay, this very hour,
prepared and ready to enter into it. For I am weary of being daily aspersed
with the filthy scum of fresh calumnies, and grieved at being burdened with the
necessity of clearing myself from them. In this part of my conduct, I am
assuredly dissimilar from heretics, who have either avoided ecclesiastical
assemblies, or have managed matters so as to be able to confide in the number
of their retainers, and to expect a certain victory.
But
I have finished. For I have occupied your attention, most honourable sir, a
sufficient length of time; and I have made a serious encroachment on those
valuable moments which you would have devoted to matters of greater importance.
Your excellency will have the condescension to forgive the liberty which I have
taken to address this letter to you, as it has been extorted from me by a degree
of necessity -- and not to disdain to afford me your patronage and protection,
just so far as divine truth and the peace and concord of the Christian church
will allow you to vouchsafe.
I
pray and beseech Almighty God long to preserve your excellency in safety, to
endue you yet more with the spirit of wisdom and prudence, by which you may be
enabled to discharge the duties of the embassy which has been imposed upon you,
and thus meet the wishes of the most illustrious prince, the Elector Palatine.
And, after you have happily discharged those duties, may he benignantly and
graciously grant to you a prosperous return to your own country and
kindred.
Thus
prays your Excellency's most devoted servant, James Arminius, Professor of
Theology in the University of Leiden.
Leiden,
April 5, 1608.
